Tsang Ming Jiang
About Tsang Ming Jiang
Dr. Tsang Ming Jiang (age 64) is a current director nominee of ABVC BioPharma and has served in senior technical and research roles across industry and academia. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in Electrical Engineering from National Taiwan University (1983, 1984) and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the University of Illinois at Chicago (1988). His interests include cloud computing, virtualization, SDN networks, and internet security; he previously served as ABVC’s Chief Information Officer (Nov 2016–Jan 2017) and is the brother of fellow ABVC directors Dr. Tsung‑Shann Jiang and Dr. Chang‑Jen Jiang, indicating family ties within the board .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial Technology Research Institute (Taiwan) | Technical Director | Feb 2017–Jul 2021 | Led technical programs in cloud computing and data center virtualization |
| Industrial Technology Research Institute (Taiwan) | Deputy Director | Oct 2011–Feb 2013 | Managed engineering initiatives in SDN-enabled networks |
| ABVC BioPharma | Chief Information Officer | Nov 2016–Jan 2017 | Technology oversight for corporate systems |
| Ericsson | Engineering Manager | 2013–2016 | Engineering leadership in telecom networking |
| University of Alaska Fairbanks; National Taiwan University; Chung Cheng University | Research/Academic positions | Various | Research in cloud computing and internet security |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supermicro Computer, Inc. | Technical Director | Since Aug 2022 | Operating role; not disclosed as a board directorship |
| BioFirst Corp. | Director | Since 2017 | BioFirst is a related party to ABVC; ABVC has licensing/co-development arrangements with BioFirst |
Board Governance
- Independence status: Not identified by the Board as an “independent director.” The proxy lists independent directors as Odaira, Chung, Sakamoto, Chou, and Miao; Jiang is not included .
- Committee assignments: Not listed as a member of the Audit (Chou [Chair], Miao, Hsu), Compensation (Sakamoto [Chair], Miao, Hsu), or Corporate Governance & Nominating (Odaira [Chair], Miao, Hsu) committees .
- Family relationships: Jiang is the brother of Tsung‑Shann and Chang‑Jen Jiang; multiple Jiang family members hold roles/ownership across ABVC-related entities, which heightens related-party conflict risk .
- Attendance/engagement: The proxy does not disclose individual board meeting attendance rates for directors; no data provided for Jiang .
Fixed Compensation
- Director compensation disclosure is limited; the proxy states ABVC “did not pay stock options to directors in fiscal year 2024.” No cash retainer, committee fee, or meeting fee amounts are disclosed for directors .
Performance Compensation
- No director performance-based compensation metrics (e.g., TSR, EBITDA, clinical milestones) are disclosed for directors in the proxy. ABVC maintains an Amended and Restated 2016 Equity Incentive Plan, but 2024 director option grants were not made .
Other Directorships & Interlocks
| Entity | Type | Role/Connection | Governance Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| BioFirst Corp. | Related party | Jiang is a director; ABVC/BriVision licensed and co-develops Vitargus (ABV‑1701) with BioFirst; ABVC issued shares to settle $3.0M due under the collaboration | Potential interlock; oversight of transactions with an entity where a director serves raises conflict-of-interest risks |
| Shuling Jiang (Director, >10% holder) | Related party individual | ABVC sought shareholder approval and then closed a land acquisition from Shuling (shares and warrants issued July 15–16, 2025) | Significant related-party transaction; dilution and governance optics risk |
| Rgene | Related party | ABVC expanded co-development and provided a convertible loan; ABVC later converted and owns ~37% (2025) | Ongoing related-party exposure; governance oversight required |
Expertise & Qualifications
- Technical expertise in cloud computing, virtualization, SDN-enabled networks, big data analytics, and internet security; academic pedigree with Ph.D. EECS and research/teaching roles in U.S. and Taiwan .
- Industry experience across telecom (Ericsson), national research institutes (ITRI), and hardware/software ecosystems (Supermicro), plus board role at BioFirst, relevant to ABVC’s technology and device ambitions .
Equity Ownership
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned | 41,994 (less than 1%) |
| Shares outstanding (Record Date) | 16,153,055 |
Governance Assessment
- Independence: Jiang is not designated independent; his board service is alongside immediate family members (Tsung‑Shann and Chang‑Jen) and within a network of Jiang family ownership across related parties. This materially elevates conflict-of-interest risk and undermines board independence and investor confidence .
- Committee oversight: No committee roles for Jiang; key committees are chaired and staffed by other directors. While committees are independent per Nasdaq rules, the overall board composition still reflects concentrated family influence .
- Related-party transactions (RED FLAG): ABVC’s extensive related-party dealings include the BioFirst collaboration and the 2025 land purchase from director/shareholder Shuling Jiang (shares and warrants issued), both of which demand robust independent oversight and clear recusal protocols; any deficiencies could impair governance quality .
- Ownership alignment: Jiang’s personal stake is small (<1%), limiting direct “skin in the game.” Broader Jiang-family holdings and influence through related entities are significant, but the proxy does not attribute those to Tsang Ming specifically; alignment relies on family network rather than individual exposure .
- Disclosure gaps: No director-specific cash compensation, meeting fees, or attendance records are disclosed; the only explicit item is the absence of director stock options in 2024—this opacity reduces transparency for pay-for-performance assessment .
Overall signal: Non-independence and deep related‑party ties across the Jiang family network are governance red flags that warrant enhanced scrutiny of recusal practices, committee independence effectiveness, and transaction approval processes. The 2025 land acquisition from a director/large shareholder intensifies perceived conflicts and dilution risks, making robust minority shareholder protections and transparent disclosures critical .