Jed Peters
About Jed Peters
John “Jed” Peters is Senior Vice President, ACCO Brands and President, North America, effective July 1, 2025, leading the company’s commercial businesses in the U.S. and Canada . He joined ACCO in 1998 and has 27 years in office products across marketing, sales, and global product development; he holds an MBA from Northwestern’s Kellogg School and a Marketing degree from Notre Dame . Company performance context: in 2024 ACCO delivered $1.67B net sales, $1.02 adjusted EPS, $189.7M adjusted operating income, $132.3M free cash flow, and ~$25M cost savings toward a $100M multi‑year program, while expanding gross margin by 70 bps . Investor alignment signals include robust governance (hedging/pledging prohibited; double‑trigger CIC), a strong clawback policy that goes beyond Dodd‑Frank, and 97.8% Say‑on‑Pay support in 2024 for 2023 compensation .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACCO Brands | SVP and President, North America | 2025–present | Leads U.S. and Canada commercial businesses as part of leadership reorg to simplify operating structure . |
| ACCO Brands | General Manager, U.S. School & Office Products and PowerA | to 2025 | Led core school/office and gaming accessories portfolios; brand innovation emphasis (e.g., Swingline centennial positioning) . |
| ACCO Brands | Marketing, Sales, Global Product Development (progressive roles) | 1998–2025 | Built deep North American customer relationships; product and category development leadership . |
Fixed Compensation
Company program references (role-specific targets shown for 2024 plan design; Peters’ exact targets were not disclosed).
| Role | Target AIP as % of Salary | Maximum AIP as % of Salary | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| CEO | 120.0% | 222.0% | 80% financial (max 200%) + 20% strategic (max 125%) . |
| EVP/Segment Presidents/CFO | 75.0% | 138.8% | Applies to EVP Presidents and CFO in 2024 . |
| SVP, General Counsel | 60.0% | 111.0% | GC example from 2024 NEO table . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan structure and 2024 actuals (company program reference).
| Metric | Weight | 2024 Target | 2024 Result (% of Target) | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 40% | $182.46M | 78.5% | Company-wide AIP measure . |
| Net Sales | 20% | $1,788.55M | 32.6% | Company-wide AIP measure . |
| Working Capital Efficiency | 20% | 24.7% | 90.5% | Company-wide AIP measure . |
| Strategic Measures | 20% | 100% | 66.7% | Qualitative score based on growth, cost savings, NPD, ESG . |
Long-Term Incentive (LTIP) program design (company program reference):
- 2024 LTIP for executives: PSUs (60–67%) and RSUs (33–40%); no stock options granted in 2024 .
- 2024–2026 PSU financial measures and weights: Adjusted EPS (50%), Free Cash Flow (30%), Adjusted Gross Margin % (20%), with a +/-20% TSR modifier vs peer group over three years .
PSU outcomes context:
- 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid at 11.2% of target after applying an 80% TSR modifier (below 25th percentile TSR) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Form 3 (initial statement of beneficial ownership) filed July 2, 2025.
| Category | Detail | Amount | Terms/Dates |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common stock (Direct) | Shares owned | 10,696 | As of 7/1/2025 event date . |
| Common stock (Indirect) | 401(k) plan | 557 | Indirect ownership via 401(k) . |
| Stock Option | 4,610 @ $9.04 | 4,610 | Exercisable 03/06/2022; expires 03/06/2026 . |
| Stock Option | 14,074 @ $8.29 | 14,074 | Exercisable 03/04/2023; expires 03/04/2030 . |
| Stock Option | 13,856 @ $8.42 | 13,856 | Exercisable 03/03/2024; expires 03/03/2031 . |
| Stock Option | 14,776 @ $8.46 | 14,776 | Exercisable 03/02/2025; expires 03/02/2032 . |
| RSU (time-based) | Settlement date | 15,356 | Delivers 03/14/2026, employment condition; dividend equivalents accrue . |
| RSU (time-based) | Settlement date | 18,657 | Delivers 03/12/2027, employment condition . |
| RSU (time-based) | Settlement date | 20,704 | Delivers 03/11/2028, employment condition . |
Additional alignment policies and requirements:
- Stock ownership guidelines: Segment Presidents required to hold the lower of 125,000 shares or 3× salary; executives have five years to comply (plan-wide) .
- Hedging, pledging, short sales prohibited for directors and executive officers .
- Clawback policy: recoupment for restatements and for willful/intentional misconduct; extends beyond Dodd‑Frank requirements .
Employment Terms
Executive Severance Plan (ESP) highlights (company program; tiers vary by role and may be updated periodically).
- Double-trigger for CIC benefits: requires a change-in-control and a qualifying termination .
- Involuntary termination (without cause): CEO 24 months salary + 2 years target bonus; Monko/Buchenroth/O’Connor 21 months salary + 1 year target bonus; other executive officers (e.g., GC) 18 months salary + 1 year target bonus .
- CIC termination: CEO 2.99× salary + 2.99× target bonus; Monko/Buchenroth/O’Connor 2.25× salary + 2.25× target bonus; other executive officers (e.g., GC) 2× salary + 2× target bonus; pro‑rata bonus at separation based on actual performance .
- Outplacement and continuation of benefits per plan; best‑net 280G approach (no gross‑ups disclosed in current program) .
Investment Implications
- Vesting supply over next 3 years: Time-based RSUs scheduled to deliver 15,356 shares (Mar-2026), 18,657 (Mar-2027), and 20,704 (Mar-2028) totaling 54,717 shares, which may create periodic selling pressure around vest dates absent 10b5-1 planning .
- Option expirations: Legacy options begin expiring March 2026 (4,610 @ $9.04), then 2030–2032 tranches; expirations can influence exercise timing and potential share sales, depending on moneyness and tax .
- Strong alignment safeguards: Meaningful ownership guidelines (Segment Presidents: the lower of 125,000 shares or 3× salary), strict anti-hedging/pledging, and a broad clawback reduce misalignment and excessive risk-taking incentives .
- Pay-for-performance rigor: 2024 AIP paid at 69.4% of target for core corporate NEOs amid soft sales but strong cost actions, signaling discipline in incentive payouts; PSUs paid at 11.2% for 2022–2024, reflecting multi-year underperformance vs targets and relative TSR .
- Organizational execution: Peters’ elevation aligns with the company’s restructuring to simplify structure and drive profitable growth, with leadership changes announced June 2025 as part of a $100M cost-reduction program .
Notes
- Peters’ specific salary, target bonus, and individual PSU/RSU grant values were not disclosed in the 2025 proxy; tables above cite company-wide design parameters and Peters’ Form 3 ownership. Where plan terms differ by tier, we cite current published tiers without assigning a specific tier to Peters unless disclosed .