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Jian Wang

Chief Executive Officer and President, ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. at ACM ResearchACM Research
Executive

About Jian Wang

Jian Wang is Chief Executive Officer and President of ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. (since November 2019) and a named executive officer of ACM Research, Inc.; he is 60 years old and has been with ACM since 2011 . He holds an M.S. in Computer Science (Northwestern Polytechnic University), an M.S. in Marine Engineering (Kobe University), and a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering (Southeast University) . Company performance context during his senior leadership tenure shows strong multi‑year revenue and net income growth with positive long‑term TSR versus the Russell 1000; the compensation program cites revenue and operating margin as the most important pay–performance measures .

Company performance context (fiscal years)

Metric20202021202220232024
Revenue ($USD millions)157 260 389 558 782
Net Income ($USD millions)22 43 51 97 131
Value of $100 Investment (Company TSR)440.4 462.2 125.4 317.7 245.5
Value of $100 Investment (Peer TSR: Russell 1000)120.3 151.2 122.0 153.6 190.5

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact / Focus
ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc.CEO & PresidentNov 2019–PresentLeads ACM Shanghai operations, including commercialization and growth .
ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc.VP, Research & DevelopmentJan 2015–Nov 2019Drove R&D programs .
ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc.Director, R&D2011–Jan 2015Focused on stress‑free polishing and electro‑chemical copper planarization technologies .

External Roles

No external public company directorships or outside roles disclosed for Jian Wang .

Fixed Compensation

Multi‑year cash compensation (USD)

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus %Actual Bonus Paid ($)Notes
2022180,967 62,454 Discretionary program; no fixed targets .
2023203,317 170,280 Discretionary program; see design below .
2024206,673 189,540 Bonus tied to revenue growth, operating margin improvement, new products/customers .

Design and governance highlights

  • No formal target bonus policy; the Compensation Committee uses discretion based on company and individual outcomes (no specific weightings) .
  • Independent Compensation Committee; external consultant Aon advised on program design and peer group .
  • Say‑on‑pay support in 2024 was ~85% and triennial frequency support ~83% .

Performance Compensation

Equity awards granted (grant‑date fair value, USD)

YearOptions Awards ($)RSUs/PSUsNotes
2022903,915 Options used as long‑term incentive; aligns with stock price appreciation .
20238,822,265 Mix includes ACM Research and ACM Shanghai options; CoC treatment varies per entity .
2024No NEO option grants in 2024 .

2024 annual cash bonus linkage (qualitative design; no pre‑set weights)

Metric/Objective2024 Outcome LinkagePayout Impact
Revenue growthPositive; revenue increased YoY in 2024Supported discretionary payout .
Operating margin improvementImproved in 2024Supported discretionary payout .
New products and customers (including progress with global customers)Positive progress in 2024Supported discretionary payout .

Policy anchors and risk controls

  • Clawback policy (Dodd‑Frank compliant) for incentive comp tied to financial measures, including stock price/TSR, adopted in 2023 .
  • Hedging and pledging prohibited for employees and directors; limited pledge exceptions require approval (CFO, or CEO for CFO) .
  • No tax gross‑ups; no significant perquisites; PRC‑based NEOs participate in standard benefits .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership and voting influence (as of April 15, 2025)

HolderClass A Shares% Class AClass B Shares% Class BVoting Power %
Jian Wang508,161 <1% 150,003 3.0% 2.2%

Vested vs. unvested options (as of 12/31/2024)

SecurityExercisable (#)Unexercisable (#)Exercise Price ($)ExpirationVesting / Acceleration
ACM Research (Class A)90,000 5.60 4/22/2029 Fully vested .
ACM Research (Class A)15,000 25.45 3/3/2032 Fully vested .
ACM Shanghai (common)232,500 697,500 7.06 8/2/2028 Vests 25% on each of first four anniversaries of 8/3/2023; accelerates upon CoC of ACM Shanghai .

Additional alignment factors

  • No 2024 equity grants to NEOs; outstanding ACM Shanghai options vest through Aug 2027, creating ongoing retention hooks .
  • No hedging or pledging permitted absent approved exception; no pledging by Jian is disclosed .
  • 2024 Form 4 activity: Jian is not listed among those with late Form 4s; 2024 option exercise table shows no Jian exercises in 2024 (reduces immediate selling pressure signal) .

Employment Terms

  • Contract framework: PRC‑based NEOs (including Jian) have employment agreements with statutory terms; no special U.S.‑style severance multiples .
  • Severance: PRC statutory severance as required by applicable law; no separate severance multiple for Jian disclosed .
  • Change‑in‑control: Company option awards generally accelerate on a change in control (single‑trigger), with entity‑specific provisions; Jian’s ACM Shanghai options accelerate upon a defined CoC of ACM Shanghai .
  • CoC value disclosure: Company’s CoC vesting table shows amounts for certain NEOs, and “—” for Jian under the parent‑company CoC scenario (his acceleration applies at the ACM Shanghai entity level) .
  • Clawback: Dodd‑Frank compliant recoupment policy adopted in 2023; SOX reimbursement applicable to CEO/CFO .
  • Other: No pension/SERP beyond statutory PRC benefits; no tax gross‑ups; limited perquisites .

Compensation Structure Observations

  • Mix shift and leverage: Program emphasizes equity (stock options) over cash, aligning long‑term value with shareholders; 2024 featured higher cash (bonus) but no new NEO option grants .
  • Discretion vs. formula: Cash bonuses remain fully discretionary without preset thresholds/targets/maximums; Committee cited revenue growth, operating margin, and product/customer progress for 2024 payouts .
  • Governance: Independent committee; Aon engaged to advise; peer group used as reference rather than strict benchmarking .
  • Say‑on‑pay: Broad shareholder support at ~85% in 2024; triennial vote frequency supported by ~83% .

Compensation Peer Group (reference)

Alpha and Omega Semiconductor (AOSL); AXT (AXTI); Cohu (COHU); FormFactor (FORM); Ichor (ICHR); Indie Semiconductor (INDI); Kulicke & Soffa (KLIC); Magnachip (MX); PDF Solutions (PDSF); Photronics (PLAB); Semtech (SMTC); SkyWater (SKYT); Ultra Clean (UCTT); Veeco (VECO) .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Related parties: No related‑party transactions since Jan 1, 2024; however, governance note that David H. Wang (CEO) and Jian Wang are brothers .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited absent exception; no pledging disclosed for Jian .
  • Equity award modifications/repricing: None disclosed; no 2024 option grants to NEOs .
  • Section 16 compliance: 2024 late Form 4s noted for certain directors, not indicating issues for Jian .
  • Say‑on‑pay: Supportive outcome reduces immediate compensation governance risk .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Jian’s beneficial ownership (including Class B) provides 2.2% voting power, and significant ACM Shanghai unvested options vesting through Aug 2027 reinforce retention and long‑term alignment .
  • Selling pressure timing: No 2024 exercises by Jian were disclosed; next potential supply overhang dates cluster around the annual ACM Shanghai vesting anniversaries (Aug 3, 2025–2027), subject to blackout windows and personal liquidity decisions .
  • Retention and CoC dynamics: Lack of special cash severance and single‑trigger equity acceleration at the ACM Shanghai entity level suggest retention is primarily driven by unvested equity value; a subsidiary‑level CoC could accelerate options and change incentive horizons .
  • Pay–performance rigor: Discretionary bonuses tied qualitatively to revenue growth and margins provide flexibility but less predictability; nonetheless, multi‑year company growth and TSR support the 2024 payout rationale .
  • Governance watch‑items: Family relationship at the top (CEO and Jian) requires continued board oversight; no recent related‑party transactions and broad say‑on‑pay support partially mitigate governance risk .