Jian Wang
About Jian Wang
Jian Wang is Chief Executive Officer and President of ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. (since November 2019) and a named executive officer of ACM Research, Inc.; he is 60 years old and has been with ACM since 2011 . He holds an M.S. in Computer Science (Northwestern Polytechnic University), an M.S. in Marine Engineering (Kobe University), and a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering (Southeast University) . Company performance context during his senior leadership tenure shows strong multi‑year revenue and net income growth with positive long‑term TSR versus the Russell 1000; the compensation program cites revenue and operating margin as the most important pay–performance measures .
Company performance context (fiscal years)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($USD millions) | 157 | 260 | 389 | 558 | 782 |
| Net Income ($USD millions) | 22 | 43 | 51 | 97 | 131 |
| Value of $100 Investment (Company TSR) | 440.4 | 462.2 | 125.4 | 317.7 | 245.5 |
| Value of $100 Investment (Peer TSR: Russell 1000) | 120.3 | 151.2 | 122.0 | 153.6 | 190.5 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact / Focus |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. | CEO & President | Nov 2019–Present | Leads ACM Shanghai operations, including commercialization and growth . |
| ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. | VP, Research & Development | Jan 2015–Nov 2019 | Drove R&D programs . |
| ACM Research (Shanghai), Inc. | Director, R&D | 2011–Jan 2015 | Focused on stress‑free polishing and electro‑chemical copper planarization technologies . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or outside roles disclosed for Jian Wang .
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑year cash compensation (USD)
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus % | Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 180,967 | — | 62,454 | Discretionary program; no fixed targets . |
| 2023 | 203,317 | — | 170,280 | Discretionary program; see design below . |
| 2024 | 206,673 | — | 189,540 | Bonus tied to revenue growth, operating margin improvement, new products/customers . |
Design and governance highlights
- No formal target bonus policy; the Compensation Committee uses discretion based on company and individual outcomes (no specific weightings) .
- Independent Compensation Committee; external consultant Aon advised on program design and peer group .
- Say‑on‑pay support in 2024 was ~85% and triennial frequency support ~83% .
Performance Compensation
Equity awards granted (grant‑date fair value, USD)
| Year | Options Awards ($) | RSUs/PSUs | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 903,915 | — | Options used as long‑term incentive; aligns with stock price appreciation . |
| 2023 | 8,822,265 | — | Mix includes ACM Research and ACM Shanghai options; CoC treatment varies per entity –. |
| 2024 | — | — | No NEO option grants in 2024 . |
2024 annual cash bonus linkage (qualitative design; no pre‑set weights)
| Metric/Objective | 2024 Outcome Linkage | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth | Positive; revenue increased YoY in 2024 | Supported discretionary payout . |
| Operating margin improvement | Improved in 2024 | Supported discretionary payout . |
| New products and customers (including progress with global customers) | Positive progress in 2024 | Supported discretionary payout . |
Policy anchors and risk controls
- Clawback policy (Dodd‑Frank compliant) for incentive comp tied to financial measures, including stock price/TSR, adopted in 2023 .
- Hedging and pledging prohibited for employees and directors; limited pledge exceptions require approval (CFO, or CEO for CFO) .
- No tax gross‑ups; no significant perquisites; PRC‑based NEOs participate in standard benefits .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and voting influence (as of April 15, 2025)
| Holder | Class A Shares | % Class A | Class B Shares | % Class B | Voting Power % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jian Wang | 508,161 | <1% | 150,003 | 3.0% | 2.2% |
Vested vs. unvested options (as of 12/31/2024)
| Security | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration | Vesting / Acceleration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACM Research (Class A) | 90,000 | — | 5.60 | 4/22/2029 | Fully vested . |
| ACM Research (Class A) | 15,000 | — | 25.45 | 3/3/2032 | Fully vested . |
| ACM Shanghai (common) | 232,500 | 697,500 | 7.06 | 8/2/2028 | Vests 25% on each of first four anniversaries of 8/3/2023; accelerates upon CoC of ACM Shanghai . |
Additional alignment factors
- No 2024 equity grants to NEOs; outstanding ACM Shanghai options vest through Aug 2027, creating ongoing retention hooks –.
- No hedging or pledging permitted absent approved exception; no pledging by Jian is disclosed .
- 2024 Form 4 activity: Jian is not listed among those with late Form 4s; 2024 option exercise table shows no Jian exercises in 2024 (reduces immediate selling pressure signal) .
Employment Terms
- Contract framework: PRC‑based NEOs (including Jian) have employment agreements with statutory terms; no special U.S.‑style severance multiples .
- Severance: PRC statutory severance as required by applicable law; no separate severance multiple for Jian disclosed .
- Change‑in‑control: Company option awards generally accelerate on a change in control (single‑trigger), with entity‑specific provisions; Jian’s ACM Shanghai options accelerate upon a defined CoC of ACM Shanghai .
- CoC value disclosure: Company’s CoC vesting table shows amounts for certain NEOs, and “—” for Jian under the parent‑company CoC scenario (his acceleration applies at the ACM Shanghai entity level) .
- Clawback: Dodd‑Frank compliant recoupment policy adopted in 2023; SOX reimbursement applicable to CEO/CFO .
- Other: No pension/SERP beyond statutory PRC benefits; no tax gross‑ups; limited perquisites .
Compensation Structure Observations
- Mix shift and leverage: Program emphasizes equity (stock options) over cash, aligning long‑term value with shareholders; 2024 featured higher cash (bonus) but no new NEO option grants .
- Discretion vs. formula: Cash bonuses remain fully discretionary without preset thresholds/targets/maximums; Committee cited revenue growth, operating margin, and product/customer progress for 2024 payouts .
- Governance: Independent committee; Aon engaged to advise; peer group used as reference rather than strict benchmarking .
- Say‑on‑pay: Broad shareholder support at ~85% in 2024; triennial vote frequency supported by ~83% .
Compensation Peer Group (reference)
Alpha and Omega Semiconductor (AOSL); AXT (AXTI); Cohu (COHU); FormFactor (FORM); Ichor (ICHR); Indie Semiconductor (INDI); Kulicke & Soffa (KLIC); Magnachip (MX); PDF Solutions (PDSF); Photronics (PLAB); Semtech (SMTC); SkyWater (SKYT); Ultra Clean (UCTT); Veeco (VECO) .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Related parties: No related‑party transactions since Jan 1, 2024; however, governance note that David H. Wang (CEO) and Jian Wang are brothers .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited absent exception; no pledging disclosed for Jian .
- Equity award modifications/repricing: None disclosed; no 2024 option grants to NEOs .
- Section 16 compliance: 2024 late Form 4s noted for certain directors, not indicating issues for Jian .
- Say‑on‑pay: Supportive outcome reduces immediate compensation governance risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Jian’s beneficial ownership (including Class B) provides 2.2% voting power, and significant ACM Shanghai unvested options vesting through Aug 2027 reinforce retention and long‑term alignment –.
- Selling pressure timing: No 2024 exercises by Jian were disclosed; next potential supply overhang dates cluster around the annual ACM Shanghai vesting anniversaries (Aug 3, 2025–2027), subject to blackout windows and personal liquidity decisions .
- Retention and CoC dynamics: Lack of special cash severance and single‑trigger equity acceleration at the ACM Shanghai entity level suggest retention is primarily driven by unvested equity value; a subsidiary‑level CoC could accelerate options and change incentive horizons .
- Pay–performance rigor: Discretionary bonuses tied qualitatively to revenue growth and margins provide flexibility but less predictability; nonetheless, multi‑year company growth and TSR support the 2024 payout rationale .
- Governance watch‑items: Family relationship at the top (CEO and Jian) requires continued board oversight; no recent related‑party transactions and broad say‑on‑pay support partially mitigate governance risk .