Leonard P. Singh
Chairman and President, Ameren Illinois at AEE
Executive
About Leonard P. Singh
Leonard P. Singh, 55, is Chairman and President of Ameren Illinois (a subsidiary of Ameren Corporation), a role he has held since August 2022 after joining from Consolidated Edison, where he served as Senior Vice President (Dec 2020–Jun 2022) and Vice President, Manhattan Electric Operations (Jun 2015–Dec 2020) . Under Ameren’s leadership in 2024, GAAP EPS was $4.42 (+~1% YoY) and weather‑normalized adjusted EPS was $4.65 (+~5% YoY), TSR was ~27.5% for 2024, three‑year TSR ranked at the 44th percentile of the peer group, dividends were raised ~6% in 2024 and 2025, and rate base grew ~7.4% YoY (with ~10% CAGR over the last five years), framing the performance context for Singh’s incentive metrics and payouts .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ameren Illinois | Chairman and President | Aug 2022–Present | Segment leadership of Ameren’s regulated utility in Illinois |
| Consolidated Edison Company of New York | Senior Vice President | Dec 2020–Jun 2022 | Senior operational leadership at a large regulated utility |
| Consolidated Edison Company of New York | Vice President, Manhattan Electric Operations | Jun 2015–Dec 2020 | Oversight of Manhattan electric operations |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or committee roles for Singh were disclosed in the 2025 DEF 14A materials reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 585,000 | 625,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 104,772 | 77,337 |
| Change in Pension Value ($) | 110,328 | 172,700 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 2,702,682 | 2,727,870 |
Notes:
- Ameren reports no individual employment agreements for NEOs; executives are at‑will .
- Per policy, business segment Presidents (Singh) have stock ownership requirements equal to 3x base salary; all NEOs meet requirements .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – 2024
| Element | Target/Structure | Actual/Payout |
|---|---|---|
| STIP Target (% of Salary) | 80% of base salary for business segment Presidents | — |
| Dollar Opportunity (Threshold/Target/Max) | $250,000 / $500,000 / $1,000,000 | — |
| Final Payout Factor | — | 144.8% of target (paid Feb 2025) |
| Actual STIP Paid ($) | — | 723,800 |
| Committee Adjustments | EPS adjusted to exclude a $45M net‑of‑tax Rush Island settlement and $10M net‑of‑tax FERC refunds; individual performance modifier +10% for Singh |
Long‑Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – Grants and Outcomes
| Grant/Outcome | Details | Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 LTI Grant (PSUs) | Target shares: 12,847; Threshold: 6,424; Max: 25,694 | PSUs subject to 3‑yr performance; standard plan terms |
| 2024 LTI Grant (RSUs) | Time‑based RSUs: 5,507; Grant date fair value: $1,129,033 | RSUs vest by Mar 15, 2027, subject to service |
| 2022 PSU (Relative TSR) Outcome | Target: 3,285; Earned: 3,126; Earned value 94% of original target; Payout 88% of target vs TSR peers | Vested Mar 3, 2025 |
| 2022 PSU (Clean Energy Transition) Outcome | Target: 548; Earned: 1,185; Earned value 213% of original target (company result 200% payout, Singh’s award pro‑rated and different dividend/stock effects) | Vested Mar 3, 2025 |
| 2021 Awards (Vested in 2024) | Shares acquired on vesting: 3,472; Value realized: $247,172 | Vested Mar 1, 2024 |
Performance measures used to align pay with performance include annual EPS (STIP), three‑year TSR ranking vs a peer group (PSUs), and Clean Energy Transition milestones (PSUs) .
Summary Compensation Components (Equity/Cash Mix)
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,086,882 | 1,129,033 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 565,700 | 723,800 |
| One‑Time Bonus ($) | 250,000 (sign‑on/retention paid in 2023) | — |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Common Shares) | 8,649; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/24) | 19,308; Market value $1,721,116 (at $89.14) |
| Unearned PSUs Outstanding (12/31/24) | 37,071; Market/payout value $3,304,509 (at $89.14) |
| Ownership Guidelines | Business segment Presidents: 3x salary; all NEOs comply |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited for executives; anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policies in place |
| Options | No options exercisable within 60 days reported; program does not use option repricing/backdating |
Vesting pipeline and potential selling pressure:
- 2022 PSU/RSU awards and Singh’s 2022 sign‑on RSU installment vested Mar 3, 2025 .
- 2023 and 2024 RSUs vest on payment dates in 2026 and 2027 (no later than Mar 15, 2026 and Mar 15, 2027), contingent on continued service .
Employment Terms
- Status: At‑will; no individual employment agreement disclosed for NEOs .
- Severance (Officer Severance Plan): If involuntarily terminated without cause, lump sum equal to base salary + target annual incentive, prorated annual incentive based on actual results, 12 months of employer‑subsidized medical coverage (COBRA), and outplacement services (subject to release of claims) .
Potential Payments (as of 12/31/24; estimates)
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | PSU Vesting ($) | RSU Vesting ($) | Pension Credit ($) | Health & Welfare ($) | Outplacement ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death | N/A | 1,309,734 | 828,468 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 2,138,202 |
| Disability | N/A | 3,303,173 | 1,336,833 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 4,640,006 |
| Retirement | N/A | 1,608,087 | 561,137 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 2,169,224 |
| Involuntary Not for Cause | 1,848,800 | 1,608,087 | 561,137 | N/A | 23,121 | 25,000 | 4,066,145 |
| Change of Control (with qualifying termination) | 3,875,000 | 2,372,283 | 1,336,833 | 431,184 | 96,119 | 30,000 | 8,141,419 |
Change‑of‑Control (CoC) Plan Structure:
- Double‑trigger required (CoC plus qualifying termination); benefits include 3 years of base salary and target STIP in cash, pro‑rata STIP for year of termination, 3 years of additional pension credit, and continuation of health/welfare benefits; excise tax gross‑ups eliminated for participants designated on/after Oct 1, 2009 (Singh not eligible for gross‑up) .
- Definitions of “Change of Control,” “Cause,” and “Good Reason” are detailed in the proxy; the plan may not be amended to adversely affect covered officers following or in anticipation of a CoC .
Pension/Retirement Programs (12/31/24)
| Plan | Present Value of Accumulated Benefit ($) | Cash Balance Account Lump Sum Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Retirement Plan | 115,470 | 90,957 |
| Supplemental Retirement Plan (SRP) | 194,808 | 153,452 |
Clawback and Risk Policies:
- SEC‑compliant financial restatement clawback and broader misconduct‑based recoupment authorities; anti‑pledging/anti‑hedging policies; no excise tax gross‑ups for post‑2009 CoC participants; no equity backdating or repricing .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: 2024 STIP paid at 144.8% of target, reflecting adjusted EPS and operational metrics plus a +10% individual modifier for Singh; LTI outcomes show 88% TSR PSU payout (relative TSR at the 44th percentile) and a strong Clean Energy PSU payout (Singh’s earned value at 213%), indicating balanced use of shareholder‑value and transition metrics .
- Retention and overhang: Meaningful unvested RSUs (19,308; $1.72M) and unearned PSUs (37,071; $3.30M) plus CoC protection (double‑trigger; ~$8.14M scenario value) support retention but create dilution/overhang considerations tied to performance outcomes .
- Selling pressure watchpoints: 2022 cycles vested Mar 3, 2025, and 2023/2024 RSUs vest in 2026/2027; upcoming vesting windows may coincide with potential Form 4 activity and 10b5‑1 usage, though actual sales depend on personal and governance constraints (anti‑pledging/hedging) .
- Alignment and governance: Ownership guidelines (3x salary) with confirmed compliance, anti‑hedging/pledging, and robust clawback policies reduce agency risk; beneficial ownership is small (<1%), so incentive alignment relies heavily on unvested/equity‑linked pay rather than outright stock holdings .