Shawn E. Schukar
About Shawn E. Schukar
Shawn E. Schukar is Chairman and President of Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois (ATXI), serving in this role since May 2017; he is 63 years old and is listed among Ameren’s executive officers in the 2025 proxy filings . Under Ameren’s enterprise strategy in 2024, the company delivered GAAP EPS of $4.42 ($4.65 weather‑normalized, adjusted) and a 27.5% total shareholder return (TSR) for the year, with 3‑year TSR (2022–2024) of 15.7% (44th percentile vs. peer group), which informs incentive outcomes tied to performance share units (PSUs) . ATXI and Ameren captured all MISO LRTP Tranche 1 projects in their territories and were subsequently assigned approximately $1.3 billion of Tranche 2.1 projects; Schukar publicly emphasized speed and cost discipline for these builds .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois (ATXI) | Chairman & President | May 2017 – Present | Led competitive wins across MISO LRTP projects; assigned ~$1.3B of Tranche 2.1 projects; advanced grid reliability and clean energy transmission enabling . |
| Ameren Corporation (functional) | Transmission operations leader (by function) | 2024 (disclosed) | Articulated approach to grid‑enhancing technologies as complementary to large grid investments during earnings Q&A . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 505,000 | 545,000 |
| Target Short‑Term Incentive (STIP) as % of Salary | 65% | 65% |
Notes:
- Ameren targets size‑adjusted median pay vs. utility peers .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (STIP) – 2024 structure and outcome
- Plan metrics: GAAP EPS, safety, operational, customer satisfaction, and economic opportunity & inclusion, with an individual performance modifier .
- Base payout earned (before individual modifier): 131.6% of target for 2024 .
- Individual performance modifier for Schukar: +10% .
- Final STIP payout as % of target: 144.8% .
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| STIP metric framework | EPS; safety; operational; customer; economic opportunity & inclusion |
| Base payout earned | 131.6% of target |
| Individual performance modifier (Schukar) | +10% |
| Final payout (Schukar) | 144.8% of target |
Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) – design and 2024 grants
- LTI mix: 60% PSUs (Relative TSR), 10% PSUs (Clean Energy Transition MW adds/retirements), 30% time‑based RSUs; approx. 3‑year vesting .
- 2024 grant to Schukar (grant date 2/8/2024): PSU target 7,663 units (threshold 3,832; max 15,326); RSUs 3,283 units; grant‑date fair value $673,328 .
- LTI target as % of salary (2024): 155% .
- Prior cycle performance: 2022 PSU–TSR earned at 88%; 2022 PSU–Clean Energy earned at 200%; 2022 awards vested on payment date March 3, 2025 .
| Component | Weight | 2024 Target/Grant | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs – Relative TSR | 60% | 7,663 target units (3,832 thr; 15,326 max) | 3‑year performance; 2022 cycle paid at 88% for TSR, vested Mar 3, 2025 |
| PSUs – Clean Energy Transition | 10% | Included in above | 2022 cycle paid at 200%, vested Mar 3, 2025 |
| RSUs (time‑based) | 30% | 3,283 units (2/8/2024 grant) | Vest upon payment date in March of third calendar year (no later than Mar 15, 2027 for 2024 RSUs) |
| LTI target as % of salary | — | 155% of salary | — |
Realized 2024 vesting:
- 2021 awards: 5,433 shares acquired on vesting; value realized $386,775 at $71.19 (Feb 29, 2024 close) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value/Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Outstanding unvested stock (12/31/2024) | 12,822 shares; market value $1,142,954 at $89.14 |
| Outstanding unearned PSU/other rights (12/31/2024) | 22,136 units; payout value reference $1,973,203 at $89.14 |
| 2022 PSU outcomes | TSR: 88%; Clean Energy Transition: 200%; vested upon payment Mar 3, 2025 |
| 10b5‑1 trading plan | Adopted 5/22/2024; to sell 100% of net shares from vesting in Mar 2025 and Mar 2026; estimated max 10,170 shares; plan terminates by 3/31/2026 |
| Insider Form 4 (Mar 4, 2025) | Sold 4,743 shares at ~$103.79; post‑trade direct holdings reported; tax withholding of 2,330 shares on 2/28/2025 in connection with vesting (as reported) |
| Deferred compensation balance (12/31/2024) | $3,858,286; includes $2,364,717 exec contributions; $207,316 company match; $1,286,252 earnings |
| Ownership/hedging/pledging policies | Stock ownership requirements for NEOs; anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policies for directors and executive officers |
Notes on ownership guidelines:
- The proxy discloses that NEOs are subject to stock ownership requirements; specific multiples were not detailed in the cited sections .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Change‑of‑Control (CoC) plan | Double‑trigger required for severance and accelerated vesting under equity plans |
| CoC severance level (Schukar) | Benefit Level 1‑2 (two years): lump‑sum 2x base salary + 2x target STIP; pro‑rata STIP for year of termination; 2 years of medical/dental/life insurance; additional 2 years of pension credit |
| Clawbacks | Dodd‑Frank compliant recoupment for restatements; additional clawback authority for detrimental conduct and policy violations |
| Tax gross‑ups | No excise tax gross‑ups for CoC participants who began on/after Oct 1, 2009 |
Additional Compensation Detail (2024)
| Element | Amount |
|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 505,000 |
| Stock Awards grant‑date fair value ($) | 673,328 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (STIP) ($) | 475,200 |
| Change in pension value and above‑market deferral earnings ($) | 208,426 (includes $200,421 pension plan increase; $8,005 above‑market deferral interest) |
| All other compensation ($) | 64,416 (includes $39,096 401(k) employer contributions; $14,050 life insurance premiums; other perquisites) |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance linkage is robust: STIP tied primarily to EPS and operational metrics paid at 131.6% base, with a modest individual uplift; LTI is majority PSUs with explicit TSR and clean energy milestones (2022 cohort: TSR 88%, Clean Energy 200%) . This alignment reduces agency risk but can introduce variability if TSR underperforms peers.
- Near‑term selling pressure around vesting windows is likely programmatic: pre‑disclosed 10b5‑1 plan commits sales of net shares from March 2025 and March 2026 vestings (estimated up to ~10k shares), which should be interpreted as mechanistic rather than discretionary bearish signals .
- Retention/transition risk moderate: CoC economics for Schukar are 2x salary+bonus with benefit continuation and pension credits (double‑trigger), which is competitive but not excessive; anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging and ownership requirements further align interests .
- Execution backdrop constructive for transmission: ATXI’s continued capture of MISO LRTP projects (including ~$1.3B Tranche 2.1 assignments) positions Schukar’s domain for sustained capital deployment and potential PSU value realization tied to clean energy transition goals .
- Governance support intact: Say‑on‑pay historically strong (~95% approval in 2024), reducing risk of adverse vote pressure on incentive structures .