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Bruce Ogilvie

Executive Chairman at ALLIANCE ENTERTAINMENT HOLDING
Executive
Board

About Bruce Ogilvie

Bruce Ogilvie, 67, is Executive Chairman and Class III director of Alliance Entertainment (AENT), serving since February 2023; he previously chaired Legacy Alliance since 2013 and spent his career in entertainment distribution, including founding Abbey Road Distributors in 1980 and executing turnarounds such as Wherehouse Records in 1996 . His annual cash bonus is tied to company EBITDA year-over-year growth under a single-metric plan (100% payout at ≥10% YoY EBITDA growth; pro-rata down to 1%; paid in the first quarter following fiscal year-end), aligning near-term incentives to profitability expansion . The proxy does not disclose TSR, revenue growth or EBITDA growth realized during his tenure.

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Alliance Entertainment Holding CorporationExecutive Chairman; Class III Director2023–presentBoard leadership; strategy and governance with CEO/management separation .
Legacy Alliance / Alliance (post-merger)Executive Chairman2013–presentLed combined entity following merger of Super D and Alliance .
Super DCEO, co-owner (bought one-third interest)2001–2013Grew wholesaling operations; set stage for 2013 Alliance acquisition .
Wherehouse RecordsBank-appointed turnaround leader1996Drove emergence from bankruptcy within nine months; sale to Cerberus .
Abbey Road DistributorsFounder1980–1994Scaled sales to $94M; exited via sale; E&Y Distribution Entrepreneur of the Year 1995 .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
None disclosed in proxiesNo public company board roles beyond AENT disclosed for Mr. Ogilvie .

Fixed Compensation

Metric (USD)FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Salary$769,231 $640,000 $640,000
Bonus (Cash)$0 $640,000 $640,000
Stock Awards
All Other Compensation$35,550 $35,859 $35,628
Total Compensation$804,781 $1,315,859 $1,315,628

Employment agreement terms set base salary at $800,000 with 100% target bonus opportunity (entered Feb 10, 2023) .

Performance Compensation

ElementMetricWeightingTargetActualPayout Formula & TimingVesting/Payment
Annual Cash Bonus (FY25 plan)EBITDA YoY GrowthSingle-metric (no additional metrics disclosed) 100% payout at ≥10% YoY EBITDA growth Not disclosed; paid bonus was $640,000 for FY25 Pro-rata down to 1% growth; 0% if <1% Paid in Q1 following fiscal year after audit

Additional compensation governance:

  • Clawback policy enables recovery of incentive pay upon an accounting restatement, at Board discretion (cash or equity) .
  • No outstanding equity awards for named executive officers at June 30, 2024; FY25 outstanding awards table shows none for Mr. Ogilvie (NEOs had no open awards) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership DetailAs ofAmount
Class A common shares beneficially owned (Mr. Ogilvie)Record date Sept 10, 202515,339,097 shares (30.1% of outstanding Class A)
Trust/Indirect interests2025Shares held by the Bruce Ogilvie, Jr. Trust; Mr. Ogilvie disclaims personal ownership except pecuniary interest .
Ogilvie Legacy Trust (separate trust)20258,554,025 shares; trustees are Mr. Ogilvie’s adult children; Mr. Ogilvie disclaims beneficial ownership .
Class E contingent stock (company-wide note)202560,000,000 Class A reserved for conversion of Class E in three tranches at $20/$30/$50 share price hurdles within 5/7/10 years; during escrow Class E cannot be sold or pledged, and must vote proportionally to Class A .

Notes:

  • No options/RSUs/PSUs reported outstanding for Mr. Ogilvie at FY24 year-end; FY25 NEO equity outstanding table shows none for him (non-NEO employees have awards) .
  • Insider trading policy imposes additional trading restrictions on directors and executive officers .
  • Section 16(a) late filings: Mr. Ogilvie filed late Form 4s (Feb 25, 2025 two days late; May 30, 2025 one day late; June 30, 2025 one day late), indicating multiple insider transactions during FY25; transaction details not itemized in proxy .

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Role startExecutive Chairman since February 2023 .
Employment agreementInitial 3-year term starting Feb 10, 2023; auto-renews for successive 1-year terms .
Base salary / Target bonusBase salary $800,000; target annual bonus 100% of base .
Benefits & perqsApprox. $2,000/month automobile lease; first-class air travel where available; 401(k)/health benefits (see “All Other Compensation”) .
Severance (without cause / good reason)Cash equal to base salary for the remainder of the term or 12 months, whichever is greater; pro-rata current-year bonus; COBRA premiums during severance period or until eligible elsewhere; subject to release and compliance with restrictive covenants .
DeathPro-rated annual bonus, plus earned amounts .
Equity plan eligibilityEligible for 2023 Omnibus Plan grants (Board discretion); NEOs had no outstanding awards at FY24/FY25 disclosures .
ClawbackIncentive pay recoverable on accounting restatement .
Indemnification & D&O insuranceIn place for officers/directors .

Board Service & Governance

  • Board role: Executive Chairman; Class III director (term expires at the 2026 annual meeting) .
  • Committees: Not a member; Audit, Compensation, and Nominating committees are fully independent and chaired by independent directors .
  • Leadership structure: Chair and CEO roles are separated (Chair: Ogilvie; CEO: Jeffrey Walker); no Lead Independent Director .
  • Attendance: In FY2025, no director attended fewer than 75% of Board and committee meetings .
  • Independence: Board affirms independence for committee members; Mr. Ogilvie, as an executive officer, is not independent .

Implications of dual role: Executive Chair concentration is mitigated by fully independent key committees and separation from the CEO role; absence of a Lead Independent Director is a governance consideration for shareholders monitoring independent oversight .

Related Party Transactions

Counterparty / ItemNatureFY Amounts / Terms
GameFly Holdings LLC (co-owned by Ogilvie and Walker)Sales of new release movies, video games/consoles; 3PL services; distribution agreement effective Feb 1, 2023 through Mar 31, 2028; either party may terminateSales: $2.7M (FY25) and $8.4M (FY24); distribution revenue: $0 (FY25) and $0.25M (FY24); company asserts fair-market terms .
Ogilvie Loan (line of credit)$17M LOC with Mr. Ogilvie; subordinated to revolver; bears 30-day SOFR + 5.5%; matures Dec 22, 2026Outstanding balance: $10M at June 30, 2025 and June 30, 2024; interest expense ~$1.0M (FY25) and $1.0M (FY24); rate 9.80% (6/30/25) and 10.8% (6/30/24) .
Letters of Credit provided by Mr. OgilvieNintendo ($2.0M; expired Oct 21, 2024); Prologis L.P. ($0.75M; expires Nov 20, 2025; to be replaced by company facility); Paramount ($1.75M; expires Mar 31, 2026); company reimbursed only bank feesFees reimbursed: $19,055.56 (Nintendo); $6,916.60 (Prologis); $17,743.06 (Paramount) .

Governance note: Related-party financing (subordinated LOC and letters of credit) supported liquidity and vendor relationships; transactions are disclosed under related-party policy and subject to Audit Committee oversight .

Performance & Track Record

  • Industry impact: Led Wherehouse Records out of bankruptcy within nine months, culminating in a sale to Cerberus (1996), and built/disposed Abbey Road Distributors after scaling to $94M sales; recognized with E&Y Distribution Entrepreneur of the Year (1995) .
  • AENT leadership: Executive Chair guiding strategy and governance post-SPAC business combination; CEO/Chair split maintained .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix skewed to cash: NEO disclosures show no outstanding equity awards for Mr. Ogilvie; FY24–FY25 comp comprised of salary and cash bonus, elevating liquidity (selling) pressure from vesting events but raising long-term alignment questions given limited equity at risk .
  • Performance linkage: Annual bonus fully driven by EBITDA YoY growth with a simple pro-rata schedule; Compensation Committee retains discretion for extraordinary/non-recurring items .
  • Governance controls: Clawback policy adopted; independent Compensation Committee with charter authority to use outside advisors .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Section 16 compliance: Late Form 4 filings by Mr. Ogilvie (multiple instances in FY25), indicating reporting control gaps to monitor .
  • Related-party exposure: Significant shareholder financing (subordinated LOC, letters of credit) and customer relationship (GameFly) require ongoing independent oversight to ensure arm’s-length terms .
  • Governance structure: No Lead Independent Director; however, fully independent key committees and clear CEO/Chair separation mitigate oversight risk .

Compensation Committee & Governance

  • Committee composition: Independent directors; chaired by W. Tom Donaldson III; four meetings in FY2025 .
  • Charters and authorities: Broad oversight of exec pay, equity plans, and ability to retain independent advisors; annual assessment of committee effectiveness .
  • Bonus plan update: FY25 cash bonus plan formally tied to EBITDA growth with explicit payout grid .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and incentives: Mr. Ogilvie’s pay is primarily cash with bonuses tied to EBITDA growth; absence of executive equity awards in FY24–FY25 reduces dilution but weakens long-term alignment and reduces optionality for equity-driven retention .
  • Ownership power: At ~30% of Class A shares, Mr. Ogilvie’s economic exposure is material, which partially offsets limited equity grants; voting dynamics are further influenced by 60M Class E shares in escrow that vote proportionally to Class A during escrow .
  • Governance watch items: Executive Chair structure without a Lead Independent Director, late Section 16 filings, and related-party transactions warrant continued monitoring; mitigating factors include independent committees, a clawback policy, and subordination of the shareholder LOC to the company’s revolver .
  • Trading signals: Repeated insider transaction filings (albeit some late) indicate active insider activity; absent details, treat as a neutral signal pending Form 4 specifics; no equity vesting overhang for NEOs limits forced-selling pressure from vesting cycles .