Jennifer M. Foyle
About Jennifer M. Foyle
President and Executive Creative Officer, AE and Aerie since June 2021; previously Chief Creative Officer and Global Brand President – Aerie (Sept 2020–Jun 2021) and Global Brand President – Aerie (2015–2020). Age 58, with a career spanning merchandising and brand leadership at Bloomingdale’s, Gap, J.Crew, and Calypso St. Barth before joining AEO in 2010; she has led Aerie’s multi‑year expansion and AE’s merchandising turnaround . Under her leadership, AEO delivered record revenue of $5.3B (+1% YoY) and 19% growth in adjusted operating income in FY2024; EBIT used for annual incentives was $452M vs. a $445M target, and three‑year RTSR performance for FY2022 PSUs vested at 85% (42nd percentile) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AEO Inc. | President, Executive Creative Officer – AE and Aerie | Jun 2021–present | Drove AE merchandising improvements and Aerie scale; FY2024 record revenue $5.3B; FY2023 Aerie revenue +11% to $1.7B; AE operating margin expansion . |
| AEO Inc. | Chief Creative Officer, AEO Inc.; Global Brand President – Aerie | Sep 2020–Jun 2021 | Continued Aerie brand growth and category expansion . |
| AEO Inc. | Global Brand President – Aerie | 2015–2020 | Led Aerie’s multi‑year growth trajectory, brand awareness and activewear (OFFLINE) expansion . |
| AEO Inc. | EVP / SVP, Chief Merchandising Officer – Aerie | Feb 2014–Jan 2015; Aug 2010–Feb 2014 | Led merchandise strategy and assortment development for Aerie . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Calypso St. Barth | President | 2009–2010 | Led brand operations and merchandising . |
| J.Crew Group, Inc. | Chief Merchandising Officer | 2003–2009 | Senior merchandising leadership . |
| Gap Inc. | Women’s Divisional Merchandise Manager | 1999–2003 | Women’s merchandising leadership . |
| Bloomingdale’s | Various merchandising roles | 1988–1999 | Early career roles in merchandising . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 150% | 150% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $4,592,308 | $2,475,000 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP)
| Metric | Weighting | FY2023 Target | FY2023 Actual | FY2023 Payout | FY2024 Target | FY2024 Actual | FY2024 Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBIT | 100% | $385M (stretch) | $386M | 200% | $445M | $452M | 110% |
Long‑Term Incentives – Grant Mix and 2024 Grant Details
| Component | Weighting | 2024 Grant Date | 2024 Shares / Options | 2024 Grant Value ($) | Vesting / Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (RTSR) | 50% | Apr 4, 2024 | 84,339 target (42,170 threshold; 126,509 max) | $2,444,988 | 3‑yr RTSR vs peer group; 0–150% payout with cap at 100% if absolute TSR negative; thresholds at 25th/50th/75th percentile . |
| RSUs (time‑based) | 20% | Apr 4, 2024 | 40,131 | $977,992 | Ratable over 3 years; dividend equivalents paid only upon vesting . |
| Stock Options | 30% | Apr 4, 2024 | 138,266 | $1,467,002 | 3‑yr ratable; strike $24.37; value only if share price appreciates . |
Long‑Term Incentives – FY2023 Grant Mix (values)
| Component | FY2023 Grant Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs (RTSR) | $2,099,993 | 3‑yr RTSR vs retail peer group introduced in 2023 . |
| RSUs | $839,996 | 3‑yr ratable vesting . |
| Stock Options | $1,259,999 | Strike set at grant; 3‑yr ratable vesting . |
PSU Payouts Earned
| Award Year | Performance Measure | Payout (% of Target) | Shares Earned (incl. dividend equivalents) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 PSU (vested FY2023) | RTSR vs S&P 1500 Specialty Retail | 85% | 42,660 |
| 2022 PSU (vested FY2024) | RTSR vs S&P 1500 Specialty Retail | 85% | 92,223 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of Apr 15, 2025)
| Holder | Common Stock | Rights to Acquire | Total | Percent of Shares Outstanding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jennifer M. Foyle | 276,057 | 843,788 | 1,119,845 | * <1% |
• Stock ownership guidelines: 3x base salary for NEOs; CEO 6x; unearthed performance awards and unexercised options do not count. As of the record date, the CEO and President (Foyle) are in compliance .
• Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: Company prohibits hedging and pledging of Company stock by employees and directors .
FY2024 Equity Activity (realized)
| Activity | Shares | Value Realized ($) | Net Shares After Tax |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options Exercised | 20,000 | $247,600 | — |
| RSUs/PSUs Vested | 92,574 | $2,223,618 | 41,379 |
Selected Outstanding Awards at FY2024 Year‑End (unvested)
| Award | Unvested Amount |
|---|---|
| 2023 PSUs (target) | 149,973 units |
| 2024 PSUs (target) | 86,415 units |
| 2023 RSUs (unvested) | 44,761 units |
| 2024 RSUs (unvested) | 41,119 units |
| 2024 Options (unexercisable) | 138,266 options |
| 2023 Options (exercisable / unexercisable) | 79,096 / 158,192 options |
Employment Terms
• Agreements: No employment contracts of defined length; compensation focused on at‑risk pay with clawback policy covering incentive compensation in event of restatements; dividends/dividend equivalents not paid on unearned/unvested awards .
• Change‑in‑control (CIC): Double‑trigger; if terminated within 18 months following a CIC other than for cause/death/disability or for good reason, cash severance equals 1.5x base salary plus 1.0x target annual bonus, pro‑rated target bonus, up to 12 months COBRA reimbursement; equity accelerates per award terms .
• Non‑compete / non‑solicit: Requires 24‑month non‑compete and 18‑month non‑solicit; Company may continue base salary payments up to 24 months if enforcing non‑compete; breach may result in forfeiture of unvested equity and base salary continuation .
Post‑Employment Compensation Illustrative Values (as of Feb 1, 2025)
| Scenario | Cash Severance (Base) | AIP Bonus | Options Vesting ($) | RSU Vesting ($) | PSU Vesting ($) | COBRA ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause | $1,500,000 | $2,475,000 (AIP earned) | $469,830 | $711,145 | $5,303,774 | $24,680 | $10,484,429 |
| CIC (Double‑Trigger) | $5,625,000 (1.5x base+target bonus) | $2,250,000 (target) | $469,830 | $1,652,767 | $5,303,774 | $24,680 | $15,326,052 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
• Mix and risk: Majority of compensation at risk; 2024 LTI split 50% PSUs (RTSR), 30% options, 20% RSUs; annual bonus 100% tied to EBIT .
• Goal rigor and outcomes: FY2023 EBIT exceeded stretch (200% payout); FY2024 EBIT modestly above target (110% payout). Three‑year RTSR PSUs earned at 85% for 2021 and 2022 cycles, indicating relative performance below median but above threshold .
• Governance: Clawback, anti‑hedging/pledging, double‑trigger CIC; no tax gross‑ups; use of independent consultant (FW Cook) and market benchmarking peer group .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Fiscal Year | Approval (%) |
|---|---|
| FY2021 | 92% |
| FY2022 | 94% |
| FY2023 | 95% |
• Peer group: For FY2024, peer group comprised Abercrombie & Fitch, Burberry, Capri, Gap, Guess?, Hanesbrands, Kontoor Brands, Levi's, Lululemon, PVH, Ralph Lauren, Tapestry, Under Armour, Urban Outfitters, Victoria’s Secret; FY2025 updated to remove Express and add Columbia Sportswear and VF Corp .
Performance & Track Record
• Aerie growth: FY2023 Aerie revenue +11% to $1.7B; operating margin +540 bps to 16.5% driven by soft apparel and OFFLINE activewear; AE revenue +3% and operating margin +120 bps to 17.8% .
• Company performance: FY2024 record revenue $5.3B (+1%) with adjusted operating margin +120 bps to 8.3%; strong operating cash flow $477M and capex $223M; returns of $287M (dividends $96M, buybacks $191M) .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
• Alignment safeguards: No hedging/pledging; stringent ownership guidelines; clawback policy .
• CIC design: Double‑trigger only; no tax gross‑ups .
• Related parties: Disclosed related party transactions are with CEO‑affiliated entities, none noted for Foyle .
Equity Ownership & Pledging
• Ownership: 1,119,845 total beneficial (incl. rights), <1% of shares; compliant with 3x salary guideline .
• Pledging/Hedging: Prohibited by policy .
Investment Implications
• Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Heavy variable mix tied to EBIT and RTSR suggests incentives to drive profitable growth and relative performance; recent PSU payouts below target indicate room to improve RTSR vs peers .
• Retention risk: Strong non‑compete (24 months) with potential salary continuation and double‑trigger CIC benefits reduce near‑term attrition risk; however, meaningful unvested PSUs/RSUs and regular vesting events could drive periodic Form 4 activity and selling pressure around vest dates .
• Ownership alignment: Compliance with ownership guidelines and prohibition on hedging/pledging support long‑term alignment; watch TSR trajectory and PSU measurement cycles (FY2023–FY2025; FY2024–FY2026) for future payout signals .