Marc Crady
About Marc Crady
Marc J. Crady, 55, is Senior Vice President – Chief Credit Officer at Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (“Farmer Mac”), appointed in March 2021. He previously spent over a decade at Fifth Third Bank across Food & Agribusiness and Leveraged Finance, leading the Leveraged Finance Portfolio Management group through the COVID-19 recession; he holds a B.S. in Finance (Indiana University) and an MBA in Management & Strategy (Kellogg, Northwestern) . Under his tenure period, Farmer Mac delivered strong company-level performance: 2024 ROE of 17%, book value per share of $97.85 (12/31/24), and a 7% dividend increase; five-year TSR reached 281 (value of initial $100), with TSR outpacing the S&P 500 Financial Services Index in 2023–2024; 2024 GAAP net income was $207.2M and non‑GAAP “Earnings” $180.9M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fifth Third Bank | Managing Director; roles across Food & Agribusiness and Leveraged Finance (relationship management, sponsor coverage, underwriting, portfolio management) | — (more than a decade) | Led Leveraged Finance Portfolio Management through the COVID‑19 recession; broad credit risk and portfolio leadership across cycles |
External Roles
- None disclosed for Mr. Crady in company filings .
Fixed Compensation
Target compensation structure (2024 approvals)
| Component | 2024 Target | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $415,000 | +$15,000 vs 2023 base |
| Target Bonus (% of base) | 40% | Target $166,000 |
| Target Total Cash | $581,000 | Base + target bonus |
| Target Long‑Term Incentive (RSUs, PBRSUs, SARs mix) | $190,000 | 50% time‑based RSUs; 25% performance‑based RSUs; 25% SARs |
| Target Total Direct Compensation | $771,000 | +4.9% YoY |
Base salary progression
| Year | Base Salary |
|---|---|
| 2023 | $400,000 |
| 2024 | $415,000 |
| 2025 | $425,000 (effective Jan 1, 2025) |
Reported compensation (Summary Compensation Table)
| Metric ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 385,000 | 400,000 | 415,000 |
| Stock and RSU Awards (grant‑date fair value) | 121,343 | 128,846 | 152,876 |
| SARs Awards (grant‑date fair value) | 40,613 | 39,605 | 53,536 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Compensation (bonus paid) | 237,968 | 288,431 | 149,235 |
| All Other Compensation | 1,386 | 16,938 | 27,014 |
| Total | 786,310 | 873,820 | 797,661 |
Deferred compensation (NQDC) – 2024
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Employer credits (2024) | $13,230 |
| Aggregate balance at 12/31/2024 | $27,565 |
Performance Compensation
- Annual cash incentive framework emphasizes balanced growth and credit quality. 2024 weightings: Earnings 25%, Total Revenues 15%, Business Volume 10%, Ratio of Substandard Assets to Regulatory Capital 15%, and Leadership & Strategic Performance 35% .
- 2024 corporate result equated to 89.90% of target for each NEO; Mr. Crady’s bonus paid was $149,235 versus a $166,000 target .
2024 annual cash incentive scorecard (company-wide)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings | 25% | $173.3M | $184.5M | $197.3M | $180.9M | 20.96% |
| Total Revenues | 15% | $351.8M | $374.4M | $400.5M | $362.0M | 10.88% |
| Business Volume (avg.) | 10% | $27.4B | $28.5B | $30.4B | $28.7B | 11.39% |
| Ratio of Substandard Assets to Regulatory Capital | 15% | <40% | <20% | <10% | 28.87% | 11.67% |
| Leadership & Strategic Performance | 35% | Committee assessment | Committee assessment | Committee assessment | Rated at 35% | 35.00% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 89.90% |
Notes on definitions: “Earnings” and “Total Revenues” are non‑GAAP measures defined as core earnings excluding certain items, and net effective spread plus other gains/fees, respectively .
Long‑term incentives and performance alignment
- 2024 LTI allocation: 50% time‑based RSUs (vesting 1/3 per year), 25% performance‑based RSUs (3‑year cumulative Earnings with capital/asset‑quality “gatekeepers,” payout 0–200%), 25% SARs (vesting 1/3 per year; 10‑year term) .
- Performance‑based RSUs granted in March 2024 vest in 2027 based on 3‑year cumulative Earnings thresholds ($514.8M threshold 50%; $624.8M target 100%; $710.5M max 200%) and gatekeepers for capital and asset quality (net charge‑offs and 90‑day delinquencies) .
2024 equity grants to Mr. Crady (detail)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Units | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time‑Based RSUs | 3/5/2024 | 513 target | Vest 1/3 on 3/31/2025, 3/31/2026, 3/31/2027 (retirement provisions may apply) |
| Performance‑Based RSUs | 3/5/2024 | 257 target (129–514 range) | Vest on 3/31/2027 at 0–200% of target based on 3‑yr cumulative Earnings and gatekeepers |
| SARs (exercise price $198.54) | 3/5/2024 | 873 | Vest 1/3 per year; 10‑year term |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and policies
- Beneficial ownership (3/24/2025): 6,075 shares of Class C Non‑Voting Common Stock; less than 1% of outstanding . Footnote includes shares underlying SARs exercisable within 60 days among “beneficially owned,” with caution actual delivered shares depend on future exercise economics .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Senior Vice President required to hold shares equal to 1x base salary; 14/16 officers and 13/15 directors exceeded requirements as of 1/1/2025 (individual compliance not enumerated) .
- Hedging/pledging: Insider trading policy prohibits pledging and specified hedging; pre‑clearance, open‑window sales, and 10b5‑1 plan controls apply .
- Say‑on‑Pay: 99% approval of NEO compensation at 2024 Annual Meeting .
Unvested RSUs scheduled by year (as of 12/31/2024)
| Year | RSUs Scheduled to Vest (#) |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 1,279 |
| 2026 | 700 |
| 2027 | 428 (ex‑performance RSUs granted in 2024 may also vest subject to performance) |
SARs outstanding (as of 12/31/2024)
| Tranche | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price | Expiration | Vesting Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 grant | 1,872 | — | $88.68 | 3/2/2031 | Vested |
| 2012 grant | 826 | 413 | $120.38 | 3/9/2032 | Unexercisable vested fully on 3/31/2025 |
| 2013 grant | 327 | 654 | $135.20 | 3/31/2033 | 3 equal annual installments; third vests 3/31/2026 |
| 2024 grant | — | 873 | $198.54 | 3/5/2034 | 3 equal annual installments 2025–2027 |
2024 insider activity snapshot
- SARs exercises in 2024: none by Mr. Crady (exercises were by Ramesh, Mullery, Carpenter) .
- RSUs vested in 2024 and delivered to Mr. Crady: 638 shares; value realized $125,609 .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreement: None (only CEO has a fixed‑term contract) .
- Severance: Mr. Crady does not participate in the Amended and Restated Executive Officer Severance Plan; as of 12/31/2024, only the CEO, CFO, Chief Business Officer, and General Counsel were eligible for severance; Mr. Crady would not have received severance on termination without cause or disability .
- Change‑in‑control: No additional benefits for NEOs; equity does not automatically vest upon a change‑in‑control .
- Clawback: Company-wide clawback policy aligned with SEC/NYSE standards; mandatory recoupment upon accounting restatements and discretionary recoupment for cause or miscalculated metrics .
- Stock trading/ownership controls: Pre‑clearance and open window policy; no pledging or specified hedging; ownership guidelines as above .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Annual incentives tied to core earnings, revenues, business volume, and asset quality support conservative credit posture; 2024 payout at 89.9% of target reflects performance calibration and discipline in credit metrics (substandard assets/RC) .
- Vesting/supply overhang: RSU vesting cycles create potential selling windows around March 31 each year (1,279 shares in 2025; 700 in 2026; 428 in 2027), and SARs tranches vest through 2027, potentially adding incremental supply subject to window and personal tax/liquidity needs .
- Retention/contract risk: Absence of a severance plan or employment agreement for the Chief Credit Officer reduces downside protection relative to certain peers, modestly elevating retention risk in adverse scenarios; conversely, equity mix and ownership policy support alignment over time .
- Governance/overhang mitigants: Pledging and specified hedging are prohibited; robust clawback; no golden parachutes; strong Say‑on‑Pay support (99%)—all indicative of shareholder‑friendly posture .
- Execution backdrop: Company performance under his tenure has been strong on ROE, TSR, and profitability, while incentive “gatekeepers” on capital and asset quality align credit risk management with long‑term value creation .