Ryan Lumsden
ASSURANTAbout Ryan Lumsden
Executive Vice President and President, Global Housing at Assurant (effective Sept 15, 2025). He joined Assurant in 2014 and led the Renters business for nearly six years, expanding the customer base, embedding technology to enhance client and customer experiences, introducing new products, and deepening key partnerships before his promotion to lead Global Housing . Company performance context during the latest proxy period: 2024 total shareholder return was 28.55%; Adjusted EBITDA excluding reportable catastrophes was $1.57B; and net earned premiums, fees and other income in Global Housing and Global Lifestyle totaled $11.4B .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assurant | EVP & President, Global Housing | Effective Sept 15, 2025–present | Succeeds prior segment head; joins Management Committee to lead the next phase of growth and innovation in Global Housing |
| Assurant | Head of Renters business | Nearly six years (ended 2025) | Expanded customer base, embedded technology, introduced new products, strengthened key partner relationships |
| Assurant | Strategy/business development roles (Global Housing) | Since 2014 | Supported strategy and business development across Global Housing |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equifax | Leadership positions | Not disclosed | Financial services operating/leadership experience |
| General Electric | Leadership positions | Not disclosed | Operational and commercial experience |
| Metris Companies | Leadership positions | Not disclosed | Financial services operating experience |
Fixed Compensation
- Role benchmark (seat comparison): In 2024, the then-President, Global Housing (Michael P. Campbell) had a base salary rate of $560,000 . For reference, on Aug 12, 2025 the company disclosed Campbell’s new COO compensation: $620,000 base (pro‑rated from Sept 15, 2025), 100% target bonus (pro‑rated for 2025), 300% target long-term incentive for 2026, and a one-time top‑off equity grant of ~$750,000 (25% RSUs/75% PSUs) on Oct 1, 2025 .
- Note: Assurant has not disclosed Lumsden’s specific base salary or target bonus as of this filing set; those details typically appear in a subsequent proxy or 8‑K if material .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (ESTIP) – Plan Design and 2024 Results
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (ex. reportable catastrophes) | 50% | $1,240M | $1,459M | $1,605M | $1,569M | 1.76x |
| Net earned premiums, fees & other income | 30% | $9,581M | $11,272M | $12,963M | $11,424M | 1.03x |
| Individual performance component | 20% | 0% | 100% | 200% | Determined by Committee | 0–2.0x range |
| Enterprise financial performance factor (weighted) | — | — | — | — | — | 1.49x |
- Design notes: No changes to incentive metrics or payout structures in 2024; payouts capped at 200%; no payout below minimum; metrics emphasize profitability (Adjusted EBITDA ex-catastrophes) and revenue growth (net earned premiums, fees and other income), with an individual component for differentiation .
Long-Term Incentives (ALTEIP) – PSUs and RSUs
- Mix: 75% PSUs, 25% RSUs for annual grants to NEOs; maximum payout 200% .
- PSU metrics and weights: 50% Relative TSR vs S&P 500; 50% Adjusted earnings per diluted share (ex. reportable catastrophes) for 2023–2024 awards .
- RSU vesting: Equal annual installments over three years; typical grant timing in March .
| PSU Performance Cycle | TSR Percentile vs S&P 500 | NOI/Adjusted EPS Performance | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | 77th percentile (TSR) → 156% of target | Cumulative NOI EPS ex-cat: $47.89 → 117% of target | Average PSU payout: 137% of target |
- Governance features: Clawback/recoupment policy; no dividend equivalents on unvested PSUs; no option/SAR repricing; strong insider trading policy prohibiting hedging, pledging, and speculative transactions .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 15,813.14 shares of common stock, includes restricted stock units (RSUs) |
| Derivative securities | Table II shows no derivative securities listed for Form 3; explanation notes “Includes restricted stock units” in non-derivative holdings |
| Stock ownership guidelines (executives) | Other executive officers: 3x current base salary; five-year transition period from permanent appointment; unearned PSUs excluded; until met, generally prohibited from selling >50% of net after-tax shares acquired at vesting |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for employees and directors under insider trading policy |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Assurant Policy (as disclosed) |
|---|---|
| Change-in-Control (CIC) structure | “Double trigger”: benefits payable only if, within two years post‑CIC, termination without cause or resignation for good reason; no excise tax gross‑ups; best‑net 280G cutback applies |
| CIC cash benefits | Lump sum equal to 0.5x target ESTIP for year of termination, plus 2x the sum of annual base salary + target ESTIP; 18 months’ worth of company health/life contributions; outplacement |
| CIC restrictive covenants | Non‑compete and non‑solicit for one year post‑termination; non‑disparagement for two years; confidentiality obligations indefinite (to extent enforceable) |
| Equity treatment on termination | Upon CIC+qualifying termination: RSUs vest in full; PSUs vest at greater of target pro‑rated (time elapsed) or actual performance to measurement date. Death/disability: pro‑rata vesting; retirement: settled in full (awards granted in year of retirement forfeited); involuntary without cause: pro‑rata; voluntary: forfeiture |
| Non‑CIC severance (illustrative) | Company-wide severance policy based on tenure and job grade ; 12/31/24 hypothetical involuntary termination table shows severance approximating one times base salary for NEOs (e.g., CEO $1,200,000; CFO $730,000; COO $625,000; Global Housing President $560,000) |
Performance & Track Record
- Leadership impact: As head of Renters, Lumsden expanded the customer base, introduced new products, embedded technology to improve client/customer experience, and deepened key partnerships—capabilities cited as reasons for his elevation to lead Global Housing .
- Segment context: Global Housing “significantly outperform[ed] financially” in 2024 per management’s assessment of the segment head’s achievements, including execution of operational plans, client renewals, and product launches .
- Company performance context: 2024 TSR 28.55%; net earned premiums, fees and other income $11.4B; net income $760.2M; Adjusted EBITDA (ex-catastrophes) $1.57B .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Year-over-year structural changes: No changes to incentive plan metrics or payout structures in 2024; PSUs remain 75% of LTI mix, reinforcing high performance leverage; CEO variable pay 89% and NEOs’ average 79% at target signal heavy at‑risk design .
- Metric rigor and payouts: 2024 ESTIP delivered a 1.49x enterprise financial factor (EBITDA at 1.76x; revenue at 1.03x), while 2022–2024 PSUs paid at 137% of target, indicating above-target multi-year performance alignment .
- Governance safeguards: Clawback policy; hedging/pledging prohibitions; no tax gross-ups; no liberal share recycling; options/SAR repricing not permitted; strong say‑on‑pay support (~96% in 2024) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Lumsden’s Form 3 shows a starting alignment stake (15,813.14 shares, including RSUs), with company policies requiring 3x salary ownership within five years and limiting sales until compliant—reducing short‑term selling pressure and signaling alignment .
- Incentive design supports profitable growth: The ESTIP’s profitability and revenue metrics, and PSU weight on relative TSR and Adjusted earnings (ex‑catastrophes), should reward execution in Global Housing while guarding against exogenous catastrophe volatility—supportive of durable value creation if performance persists .
- Downside protections and change-in-control economics: Double‑trigger CIC, best‑net cutback, and defined restrictive covenants temper windfalls and protect franchise value; outside CIC, illustrative severance approximates one year’s base for NEOs, limiting retention risk during normal course transitions .
- Monitoring signals: Watch for (i) first equity grant cadence/size under Lumsden’s new role (likely in subsequent proxy), (ii) any Form 4 activity as holdings evolve, and (iii) Global Housing growth, margins, and contract renewals as leading indicators for PSU outcomes and future bonus factors .