Anthony Williams
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIESAbout Anthony Williams
Anthony Williams is Executive Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO) at Akamai; age 51, appointed CHRO in January 2020 after joining in April 2015 and serving in VP roles across Talent Acquisition, Diversity, and International HR prior to promotion . During his CHRO tenure (2020–2024), Akamai’s “pay-versus-performance” table shows revenue (FX-adjusted) rising from $3,114M in 2020 to $4,033M in 2024, while the $100 TSR index ended 2024 at $111 (vs. $122 in 2020, $135 in 2021, $98 in 2022, $137 in 2023), and reported net income for 2024 was $300M in the same table (rounded; see table below for cited values) . Akamai emphasizes variable, at-risk compensation, with bonuses paid in stock, rigorous targets, and clawback policies aligned to SEC/Nasdaq rules—structures that influence executive incentives and retention under the CHRO’s remit .
Company performance context (during Williams’ CHRO tenure)
| Metric | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (FX-adjusted, $MM) | $3,114 | $3,340 | $3,611 | $3,819 | $4,033 |
| Net Income ($MM) | $557 | $676 | $619 | $577 | $300 |
| TSR: Value of $100 Investment | $122 | $135 | $98 | $137 | $111 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Akamai Technologies | EVP & CHRO | Jan-2020–present | Leads global HR during transformation toward security and cloud; emphasizes stock-based pay structure and ownership/anti-pledging policies that align executive/employee incentives . |
| Akamai Technologies | VP, International HR, Talent Acquisition & Diversity | Jan-2018–Jan-2020 | Scaled international HR and diversity/talent acquisition capabilities ahead of CHRO role . |
| Akamai Technologies | VP, Talent Acquisition & Diversity | Apr-2015–Jan-2018 | Built global recruiting and D&I foundation that supported growth . |
| First Data (now Fiserv) | Various global HR leadership roles | Pre-2015 | Large-scale HR operations exposure in payments/fintech . |
| Newell Rubbermaid | Various global HR roles | Pre-2015 | Consumer products HR leadership experience . |
| Time Warner – Turner Broadcasting | Various global HR roles | Pre-2015 | Media industry HR leadership experience . |
External Roles
- None disclosed in company filings for this period. (No board or external committee roles identified for Williams; quote usage in Akamai press communications noted below.)
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary and target bonus percentages for Anthony Williams are not disclosed; he was not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in 2024, and the Summary Compensation Table covers only the CEO and four NEOs (CFO, EVP Sales, COO-Cloud, EVP Security) .
- Akamai’s program design for executives: base salaries form a relatively small portion of total pay; CEO salary is $1; bonuses are paid in stock to align with shareholders .
Performance Compensation
Akamai ties executive pay to demanding financial and market metrics, with company-wide frameworks that likely influence CHRO incentive design even if Williams’ specific payouts are not disclosed.
- Annual incentive (NEO program) in 2024 used two 50%/50% metrics: Revenue (FX-adjusted) and Non-GAAP Operating Income; outcomes funded at 72.57% of target after a negative 6.66% ESG modifier .
- Long-term incentives mix: 50% time-vesting RSUs (1/3 per year over 3 years), 20% PRSUs (annual financial goals over three one-year periods; 3-year cliff vest), 30% Relative TSR-based RSUs (3-year cliff vs S&P 500 Index) .
Akamai 2024 annual bonus formula (NEO design)
| Metric (weight) | Threshold (0% payout) | Target (100%) | Max (200%) | Actual | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (FX-adjusted, 50%) | $3,706.6MM | $4,118.4MM | $4,530.2MM | $4,032.7MM | 79.2% |
| Non-GAAP Operating Income (50%) | $1,094.7MM | $1,216.3MM | $1,337.9MM | $1,187.5MM | 76.3% |
| Funding before ESG | — | — | — | — | 77.75% |
| ESG modifier | — | — | — | — | -6.66 pts → 72.57% final |
Akamai 2024 PRSU tranche results (applied to 2022–2024 grants where applicable)
| Metric (weight) | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Achievement vs Target | PRSU Earned vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (FX-adjusted, 50%) | $3,706.6MM | $4,118.4MM | $4,530.2MM | $4,032.7MM | 97.9% | 79.2% |
| Non-GAAP EPS (50%) | $6.04 | $6.71 | $7.38 | $6.59 | 98.2% | 81.8% |
| Overall PRSU payout | — | — | — | — | — | 80.5% |
Notes:
- Vesting for PRSUs and Relative TSR RSUs occurs after the 3-year performance period and TL&C certification (e.g., 2024 grants vest post-2026 certification) .
- Annual bonus is paid in stock and uses objective metrics with capped payouts; Akamai maintains clawback policies (2014 detrimental conduct; 2023 SEC/Nasdaq Rule 10D-compliant) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Executive stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x salary; other NEOs 3x salary (raised from 2x in 2024). For senior executives in the TL&C program (non-NEOs), the guideline is 1x salary; unvested/exercisable equity doesn’t count, and non-compliant executives are restricted from selling shares until in compliance .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Executives and directors are prohibited from hedging (short sales, options, collars, swaps, etc.) and may not pledge Akamai stock as loan collateral—mitigating alignment and margin-call risk .
- Beneficial ownership: Williams is not listed in the 2025 Security Ownership table (covers directors and NEOs); thus his exact shareholdings and pledged shares (if any) are not disclosed in that table .
- Section 16 compliance: The 2024 proxy notes several amended Form 4s to correct prior disclosures, including one filed by “Williams,” indicating administrative corrections but not specifying sizes or patterns; continue monitoring Form 4s for selling pressure signals .
Employment Terms
- Executive Severance Plan (non-COC): If terminated without cause, eligible executives receive a lump sum equal to 1x base salary, plus a lump sum equal to target annual bonus, plus up to 12 months COBRA premium reimbursement, subject to a release .
- Change-in-Control (2022 COC Agreement): If employed at COC and terminated without cause or resign for good reason within one year, executives receive i) prorated target annual bonus through termination date, ii) lump sum of 1x base salary, iii) lump sum of then-current target annual bonus, and iv) up to 12 months COBRA reimbursement .
- Equity treatment at COC: Awards are generally assumed/continued; if so, unvested awards become immediately vested/exercisable/free from forfeiture upon a qualifying termination within one year post-COC (double-trigger) .
- No employment contracts except CEO (Leighton) and as required by law; broad best practices include no repricing without shareholder approval, independent consultant, and reasonable COC terms without excise tax gross-ups .
Performance & Track Record
- Strategic initiatives and culture: Williams publicly advocates flexible work and talent access; Akamai’s 2025 survey with i4cp cites 83% of remote-friendly companies reporting high/very high productivity, with Williams highlighting benefits for talent attraction/retention and Akamai’s flexible program (95% employee autonomy, lower attrition at 7.3% vs 13.2% industry, +15% YoY global applicants per hire in 2025) .
- Operating performance (recent): Q3-2025 GAAP revenue $1,054.6M; GAAP operating margin 16%; Non-GAAP operating margin 31%; Adjusted EBITDA margin 43%—illustrative of current profitability performance metrics used in incentive frameworks .
- Say-on-pay and shareholder support: 2025 say-on-pay approved (For 99,157,714; Against 14,471,582; Abstain 572,636) underscoring investor acceptance of executive pay design .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: High equity weighting and stock-settled annual bonuses increase alignment but also create vesting overhang; shift to RSUs and PRSUs (vs. options) aligns with broader trend toward lower-risk equity and relative market comparators (S&P 500 TSR) .
- Metric rigor: Annual bonus and PRSUs tie to FX-adjusted revenue and profitability (Non-GAAP OI/EPS) with capped outcomes and ESG modifier; 2024 results funded below target (72.57%) and PRSUs earned ~80.5% for the tranche—evidence of true variability .
- Governance: Double-trigger equity vesting at COC, anti-hedging/pledging, ownership guidelines, and dual clawbacks constrain risk and bolster alignment; no excise tax gross-ups .
Risks, Red Flags, and Monitoring
- Insider selling pressure: Individual Form 4s for Williams not summarized in proxy; continue to monitor Section 16 filings for any 10b5-1 plans or concentrated sales around vesting events .
- Restructuring/severance optics: Non-GAAP adjustments regularly exclude restructuring and stock-based comp; investors should reconcile GAAP vs. incentive metrics when assessing pay-for-performance .
- Plan share usage: 2025 amendment increased plan share reserve; monitor for dilution vs. repurchases (company repurchased $300M at avg $77.51 in Q2-2025) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong governance (ownership rules, anti-pledging, clawbacks) and at-risk equity mix indicate high pay-for-performance alignment—positive for investors seeking culture and retention stability under the CHRO .
- Retention: Standardized severance and double-trigger COC terms reduce involuntary turnover shock and align equity incentives during strategic transitions—mitigating retention risk tied to workforce realignments or M&A .
- Performance sensitivity: Sub-target payouts in 2024 (bonus and PRSUs) show compensation is sensitive to operating performance, moderating the risk of pay inflation despite transformation initiatives; monitor 2025–2026 PRSU tranches and TSR outcomes for forward leverage .
- Watch items: Track future proxies for whether Williams becomes an NEO (would trigger detailed disclosures), any pledging exceptions (policy forbids), changes to ownership multiples, and insider trading patterns for selling pressure signals .