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Kenneth F. Bernstein

Kenneth F. Bernstein

Chief Executive Officer and President at ACADIA REALTY TRUST
CEO
Executive
Board

About Kenneth F. Bernstein

Kenneth F. Bernstein is President and Chief Executive Officer of Acadia Realty Trust (AKR) and a Trustee of the Board; he has served as CEO since January 2001 and as President/Trustee since August 1998. He holds a BA from the University of Vermont and a JD from Boston University School of Law; the 2023 proxy listed his age as 61 at that time, and noted extensive real estate, legal, and leadership credentials including prior COO experience and broad industry governance roles . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show cumulative TSR and FFO-per-share consistency with the Company’s emphasis on relative TSR and FFO measures: 2024 CEO “compensation actually paid” aligned with TSR of 111.88 and FFO per diluted Share/OP Unit of 1.12; 2023 TSR was 75.85 and FFO 1.28 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Acadia Realty TrustPresident and TrusteeSince Aug 1998Executive leadership and Board oversight since RDC asset acquisition
Acadia Realty TrustChief Executive OfficerSince Jan 2001Long-tenured CEO guiding Core Street Retail and Investment Management strategy
RD Capital, Inc.Chief Operating Officer1990–Aug 1998Led day-to-day operations across RDC management companies and affiliates
Battle Fowler LLPAssociate (Attorney)Pre-1990 (not specified)Real estate legal foundation supporting later executive roles

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC)Board of Trustees; ChairmanChairman 2017–2018; Board tenure not specifiedSector leadership; shapes retail real estate policy and best practices
NAREITCo-Chair, Board of Governors (prior)Not disclosedREIT industry governance and advocacy
Urban Land Institute (ULI); Real Estate RoundtableMemberNot disclosedThought leadership across real estate development and policy
YPO-WPO Real Estate NetworkFounding Chairman; Board of AdvisorsNot disclosedExecutive network building; information flow across leaders
Golub CapitalBoard of TrusteesNot disclosedCross-industry financial insights and capital markets connectivity

Fixed Compensation

Metric (USD)2021202220232024
Base Salary$700,000 $850,000 $850,000 $850,000
Stock Awards (grant-date fair value)$3,683,258 $3,608,086 $3,359,692 $3,315,800
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation$1,253,033 $1,686,550 $1,903,182 $2,059,264
All Other Compensation$8,988 $9,438 $10,188 $10,638
Total$5,645,279 $6,154,074 $6,123,062 $6,235,702

Key design points:

  • CEO salary set near 25th percentile of peer group and remained flat in 2024; base salaries for other NEOs increased ~3% to stay competitive .
  • AKR granted no stock options or similar instruments in 2024, emphasizing full-value equity and LTIP units over options .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Structure and 2024 Outcomes (CEO)

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActual
FFO/share (before special items)22.5% $1.11 $1.14 $1.17 $1.16
Core Leasing Activity (value)20.0% $5.0M $6.0M $7.0M $15.8M
Net Debt/EBITDA10.0% 6.75x 6.25x 5.75x 5.50x
Transactional Activity (value)17.5% $100.0M $300.0M $750.0M $597.3M
Strategic Plan Execution (score)10.0% 1.00 3.00 5.00 4.00
Individual (score)20.0% 1.00 3.00 5.00 See Below (not quantified)
Non-Equity Incentive Paid$2,059,264

Note: 2023 individual performance score for CEO was 3.85 (illustrative of methodology; 2024 score not disclosed in the excerpt) . 2023 annual incentives earned for CEO totaled $2,024,845 before elective conversions .

Bonus Exchange Program (deferral into LTIP Units at 20% discounted share price; subject to 5-year vesting for CEO and 2-year post-vest holding)

YearCash PaidElective LTIP Units (value)
2024$2,775,105
2023$2,531,056

Long-Term Incentives (Equity Mix, Vesting, and Performance Metrics)

  • Time-based LTIP Units/RSUs: 50% of annual equity award; ratable vesting over 5 years; CEO subject to additional 2-year post-vest holding period .
  • Performance-based LTIP Units/RSUs: 50% of annual equity award; 3-year performance period; relative TSR vs Nareit indices and same-property NOI growth; CEO awards vest 60% at period end, remaining 40% ratably over next two years, plus 2-year post-vest hold .

2025 award cycle (granted in 2025; 3-year performance period):

MetricWeightingThreshold (50%)Target (100%)Maximum (200%)
Relative TSR vs. Nareit Shopping Center Index50% 25th pct 50th pct 75th pct
Relative TSR vs. Nareit Retail Index25% 25th pct 50th pct 75th pct
Same-Property NOI Growth25% 2–3% 3% 4%

Status of performance-based awards (as of 12/31/2024):

AwardPerformance PeriodStatus
2018 Award1/1/2018–12/31/202018% of target earned
2019 Award1/1/2019–12/31/20210% earned
2020 Award1/1/2020–12/31/20220% earned
2021 Award1/1/2021–12/31/202363% of target earned
2022 Award1/1/2022–12/31/2024155% of target earned (60th pct vs Nareit Shopping Center; 71st pct vs Nareit Retail)
2023/2024 AwardsIn progressTracking above target

Vesting realizations (2024):

CEOShares Acquired on VestingValue Realized on Vesting
2019–2023 grants vesting 1/6/2024204,288 $3,436,124 (closing price $16.82)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Date (as-of)Beneficial Ownership (shares)Percent of Class
Mar 7, 20232,002,232 2.10%
Mar 5, 20242,218,520 2.15%
Mar 11, 20252,547,290 2.13%

Ownership guidelines and alignment:

  • CEO ownership guideline: 10x base salary; met as of 12/31/2024; unearned PSUs excluded from calculation .
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Short sales, derivatives, margin accounts, and pledging prohibited; all Trustees/executives in compliance as of the proxy date .
  • Option usage: AKR did not grant stock options in 2024 .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey Terms
Agreement termAmended and restated 3/31/2014; extended CEO position for three years; renewable for successive yearly periods; annual compensation review by Board/Comp Committee
Non-compete / non-solicit15-month post-termination non-compete and non-poaching under certain termination circumstances
Severance (Death/Disability/Without Cause/Good Reason)Lump sums including: unpaid accrued salary; 3x current salary; 3x average cash value of bonuses for last two years; pro-rated cash bonus at average; reimbursement of expenses; immediate vesting of all incentive awards; 2-year health coverage (except death)
Change-of-Control (double-trigger)If CoC followed by termination Without Cause or for Good Reason within 12 months: same payments as above; no additional CoC benefit
ClawbackPolicy to recoup erroneously awarded incentive compensation in event of restatement; no recoveries required for 2024 or prior disclosed period; filed as exhibit to 10-K

Board Governance

  • Board composition and independence: Seven of eight Trustees standing for election are independent; Audit, Compensation, and Nominating & Corporate Governance committees are fully independent .
  • Leadership structure: Independent Lead Trustee presides over executive sessions; executive sessions of independent Trustees occur at each regularly scheduled Board meeting .
  • Committees: Audit Committee members are independent with designated financial experts; committee rosters disclosed (e.g., Denien (Chair)/Thurber/McIntyre/Spitz in 2024) .
  • Governance practices: Majority voting with resignation policy; annual election; no poison pill; Board refreshment initiatives; anti-hedging/anti-pledging; annual say-on-pay proposal; ESG oversight via Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee .

Director compensation (for non-employee Trustees; employees receive none):

Component20242025
Annual cash fee$75,000 $80,000
Annual equity fee$100,000 $120,000
Lead Trustee cash/equity (in lieu of standard)$175,000 / $100,000 $125,000 / $150,000
Committee chair feesAudit $25,000; Others $15,000 Audit $25,000; Others $20,000
Employees serving as TrusteesNo separate compensation

Dual-role implications:

  • Bernstein serves as CEO and Trustee and is not classified independent . A robust Lead Trustee and fully independent key committees mitigate governance concerns typically associated with combined leadership roles .

Performance & Track Record

Selected operating performance and capital allocation commentary:

  • 2024: Core same-property NOI growth of 5.9% in Q3; raised dividend; reduced pro-rata Net Debt/EBITDA to 5.6x; significant acquisitions/pipeline with equity funding .
  • Q4 2024: Same-property NOI growth of 5.7%; ~$611M of accretive acquisitions; dividend increased; 2025 projected FFO Before Special Items of $1.35 mid-point and 5–6% same-property NOI growth .
  • 2025: Continued momentum—Q3 same-property NOI +8.2% (street retail +13%); pro-rata Net Debt/EBITDA reduced to ~5.0x; ~$487M YTD acquisitions with additional equity raised .
  • Capital strategy: Emphasis on leverage-neutral acquisitions, OP unit issuance, capital recycling, and accretive growth to earnings, NAV, and above organic growth targets .

Pay-versus-performance (FFO and TSR context):

Metric2021202220232024
FFO per diluted Share/OP Unit1.26 1.02 1.28 1.12
Cumulative TSR88.66 61.04 75.85 111.88

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Equity-heavy mix with long vesting and mandatory post-vest holding for CEO signals alignment and reduces near-term selling pressure; options are de-emphasized (none granted in 2024) .
  • Annual incentive metrics remain formulaic, anchored 70%+ to financial/operational outcomes (FFO/share, leasing, leverage, transactional activity) and strategic/individual components, supporting pay-for-performance rigor .
  • Peer positioning: CEO salary around 25th percentile and flat in 2024; other NEO salaries modestly increased (~3%) with bonus opportunity lifted from 75% to 85% of base to align with peers—suggests more at-risk pay without inflating fixed comp .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Change-of-control economics include triple salary and triple average bonus plus immediate vesting—generous benefits but using a double-trigger; no additional CoC benefit beyond standard package .
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies and ownership guidelines enforced; no pledging permitted and compliance affirmed—reduces alignment risk .
  • Clawback policy exists; no restatements requiring recovery during disclosed periods—mitigates risk of pay misalignment .

Equity Ownership & Director Service Notes

  • Bernstein’s beneficial ownership rose from ~2.00M shares (2023) to ~2.22M (2024) to ~2.55M (2025), maintaining ~2.1–2.2% of class—demonstrating increasing alignment over time .
  • As a management Trustee, he receives no separate director compensation; independent committees and Lead Trustee structure provide oversight balance .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Substantial equity, long vesting, and post-vest holds plus rising beneficial ownership underpin strong long-term alignment; anti-pledging reduces forced-sale risks .
  • Incentive design: Annual and long-term metrics tied to FFO/share, leasing productivity, leverage, relative TSR, and NOI growth should correlate with operational execution and capital allocation decisions; recent awards paid meaningfully when TSR outperformed (2022 cycle paid 155% of target), indicating sensitivity to shareholder outcomes .
  • Retention and transition: Evergreen employment with 15-month non-compete and double-trigger CoC terms suggests low near-term departure risk; however, generous severance and immediate vesting upon specified terminations are noteworthy from a governance standpoint .
  • Trading signals: The elective conversion of annual cash bonuses into discounted LTIP Units and long holding requirements dampen near-term selling pressure; watch for vesting events and the status of multi-year TSR/NOI awards to gauge potential future realized values .
  • Governance: CEO as Trustee balanced by independent Lead Trustee and fully independent key committees; no poison pill; regular executive sessions—overall governance mitigants are in place for dual-role concerns .