Ander Krupa
About Ander Krupa
Executive Vice President, General Counsel, Corporate Secretary and Chief Compliance Officer at Albemarle. Promoted on July 30, 2025; joined Albemarle in May 2017 as VP, Deputy General Counsel and Assistant Corporate Secretary, with prior roles at BWX Technologies, The Babcock & Wilcox Company, and Greenberg Traurig LLP; JD (Georgia State University College of Law) and BA (University of Georgia) . Company performance context during his tenure includes 2024 net sales of $5.4B, cost/productivity program achieving >50% of $300–$400M target, and AIP results of 98% of Adjusted EBITDA target and 104% of Adjusted Cash Flow from Operations target; TSR lagged sector amid lithium price declines, despite structural cost actions .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Albemarle | EVP, General Counsel, Corporate Secretary & Chief Compliance Officer | 2025– | Leads legal, ethics, risk, and compliance; signed major corporate agreements (e.g., Ketjen transaction docs) |
| Albemarle | VP, Deputy General Counsel & Assistant Corporate Secretary | 2017–2025 | Supported global business units, commercial activities, and M&A |
| BWX Technologies; The Babcock & Wilcox Company | Assistant General Counsel (Governance & Securities) | n/d | Governance, securities, corporate law in manufacturing |
| Greenberg Traurig LLP | Attorney, Corporate & Securities | n/d | Capital markets and corporate advisory experience |
External Roles
- No external public-company directorships or disclosed board roles identified as of promotion press release .
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary and target bonus for Krupa were not disclosed in the 2025 proxy (he was not a 2024 NEO). Albemarle’s executive program comprises base salary plus a performance-based Annual Incentive Plan (AIP); 2024 AIP weightings and outcomes are below .
| 2024 AIP Structure (Enterprise) | Threshold | Target | Superior |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (45% weight) | 85% of target | 100% | 115% |
| Adjusted Cash Flow from Operations (30% weight) | 85% | 100% | 115% |
| Stewardship (10% weight: OSHA, Process Safety, Environmental) | 0% payout if below target | Target | 200% cap |
| Individual (15% weight) | 0–30% | 0–30% | 0–30% |
| 2024 Enterprise Results (after negative discretion) | EBITDA 98% | CFO 104% | Business score 89.9% |
| Citations: structure and ranges ; results . |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Design | Metrics/Weight | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIP (Annual cash) | Company/individual performance | Adjusted EBITDA (45%), Adjusted CFO (30%), Stewardship (10%), Individual (15%) | One-year plan; negative discretion applied in 2024 to align with underlying performance . |
| Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | 50% PSUs, 25% RSUs, 25% Stock Options | PSUs: rTSR vs peer group (50%), Adjusted ROIC (50%) | Three-year cliff vesting; options 10-year term; PSU payout capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative . |
Performance context and outcomes used to calibrate incentives:
- 2024 AIP enterprise outcomes: Adjusted EBITDA 98% of target; Adjusted Cash Flow from Operations 104% of target; business score 89.9% after negative discretion .
- PSU (2022–2024) results: rTSR 0% payout; Adjusted ROIC 200% payout (22.03% vs 12.25% target) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Practice | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive stock ownership guidelines | CEO 6x salary; CFO 4x; Other Executive Officers 3x salary; 5-year compliance window . |
| Holding requirement | Must hold at least 50% of net shares vesting annually until guideline met . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, and employees; no margin or derivative transactions in ALB stock . |
| LTI vesting | PSUs/RSUs cliff vest after 3 years; options 10-year term . |
| Section 16 compliance | Company reports compliance for 2024 (no delinquent filings) . |
Note: Krupa’s individual beneficial ownership (direct/indirect) and unvested awards were not disclosed in the 2025 proxy’s NEO/Director ownership table (he was not a 2024 NEO) .
Employment Terms
Albemarle maintains an Executive Severance Plan (amended Oct 27, 2025). Participants designated under this plan are eligible for the following (Krupa’s specific participation is not disclosed; terms shown for designated executives):
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Bonus Treatment | Benefits/Other | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination by Company without Cause prior to a Change in Control | Lump sum = 1.5x (annual base salary + target annual variable comp) paid within 30 days | Pro-rata AIP per plan; prior-year bonus per plan provisions | COBRA at employee cost level for 18 months; outplacement; financial counseling (up to $14,000 in year of termination) | Executive Severance Plan (amended Oct 27, 2025) . |
| Termination by Company without Cause or by executive for “Change in Control Good Reason” on/after Change in Control | Lump sum = Severance Multiple × (greater of pre-CIC or termination base salary + greater of pre-CIC or termination target bonus); Severance Multiple ≤2.0 and ≥1.0 | Accrued incentive comp; pro-rated target-year incentive per plan timing; individual modifier default 100% if not set | Company-paid COBRA up to 24 months; outplacement (up to $25,000); financial counseling (up to $12,500 per year for two years) | Awards’ treatment governed by award notices/plan documents (no single-trigger; follows plan terms) . |
| 280G excise | “Best-net” cutback (no gross-up) to avoid excess parachute payments if applicable . |
Clawbacks and governance protections:
- Broad clawback policies covering annual and long‑term incentives .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies (see above) .
Non-compete/solicit:
- Plan-level documents do not specify; award and employment agreements govern. CEO agreements include robust restrictive covenants (reference point; not directly applicable to Krupa) .
Performance & Track Record
| Area | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Legal governance and transaction execution | Signed Albemarle’s Ketjen Corporation transaction agreement documents as EVP/GC (Seller signature pages) . |
| Executive compensation governance context | Farient Advisors is the independent compensation consultant; strong pay-for-performance approach; negative discretion applied to 2024 AIP . |
| Company operating results & actions | 2024 net sales $5.4B; cost/productivity program >50% of $300–$400M target achieved; capex reduced by >$450M YoY . |
| Panel-level performance calibration | AIP outcomes (EBITDA 98%, CFO 104% post-discretion) and PSU 2022–2024 results (rTSR 0%, ROIC 200%) reflect market cycle/lithium price impacts and focus on capital efficiency . |
| Shareholder votes | 2025 Say‑on‑Pay results: For 54,878,236; Against 24,774,734; Abstain 128,698 . 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval 85.9% . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Variable-heavy design with AIP and PSUs linked to profitability (Adjusted EBITDA), cash discipline (Adjusted CFO), safety/environmental stewardship, relative TSR and Adjusted ROIC; LTI three‑year cliff vesting aligns long-term outcomes and mitigates near-term volatility over-rewarding .
- Governance: robust clawbacks; anti‑hedging/pledging; ownership guidelines (3x salary for other executive officers) bolster alignment. Negative discretion applied in 2024 demonstrates committee oversight .
- CIC economics: plan provides 1.0–2.0x multiple post‑CIC (less than CEO’s 3.0x CIC agreement), reducing windfall risk while supporting retention through change .
Equity Ownership & Pledging
- Individual ownership for Krupa not disclosed in proxy; insider trading policy prohibits hedging/pledging and limits trading to open windows or approved Rule 10b5‑1 plans, which helps mitigate forced‑selling pressure and misalignment risk .
Employment Terms
- If designated under Albemarle’s Executive Severance Plan, Krupa would have: 1.5x cash severance pre‑CIC; 1.0–2.0x post‑CIC with COBRA support and transition services; award treatment per plan/notice; best‑net 280G cutback; no excise tax gross‑up .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong structures (ownership guidelines, anti‑pledging/hedging, PSU mix, ROIC/TSR metrics, 3‑year vesting, clawbacks) suggest high alignment of legal leadership incentives with shareholder value creation and risk stewardship—important for a resource‑cycle business facing regulatory and contractual complexity .
- Retention risk: CIC and severance protections (1.5x pre‑CIC; 1.0–2.0x post‑CIC for designated executives) are market‑standard to moderate, supporting continuity without excessive parachute risk; award treatment governed by plan reduces single‑trigger optics .
- Trading signals: Anti‑hedging/pledging and trading‑window controls lower forced‑selling pressure; no 2024 Section 16(a) delinquencies reported. Absence of disclosed insider sales data for Krupa in proxy limits read‑through on personal liquidity needs; monitor future Form 4s post‑promotion for flow and any 10b5‑1 plans .
- Execution: Krupa’s long internal tenure and M&A/corporate governance background, plus execution involvement on transactions (e.g., Ketjen), are positives for navigating regulatory approvals, JV contracts, and restructuring amid the lithium downcycle and Albemarle’s cost/capex resets .