Neal Sheorey
ALBEMARLEAbout Neal Sheorey
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Albemarle since November 6, 2023, after 20+ years at Dow in finance, corporate development, investor relations, and business leadership roles . He holds an MBA (finance and corporate strategy) from the University of Michigan and a B.S. in chemical engineering from Northwestern University . In 2024, Albemarle reported net sales of $5.4B with enterprise AIP results of 98% of Adjusted EBITDA target and 104% of Adjusted Cash Flow from Operations target (post lithium-price adjustment), and executive pay design continued to emphasize TSR and ROIC alignment . Albemarle’s 2024 say‑on‑pay received 85.9% support and the company highlights strong correlation between realizable executive pay and TSR over time .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dow | Vice President, Coatings & Performance Monomers | 20+ years in progressive leadership (dates not individually disclosed) | P&L leadership over a >$4B portfolio; strategy, profitability, growth initiatives . |
| Dow | Vice President, Investor Relations | 20+ years in progressive leadership (dates not individually disclosed) | External capital markets leadership; messaging and shareholder engagement . |
| Dow | Senior Director, Corporate Development | 20+ years in progressive leadership (dates not individually disclosed) | M&A and portfolio strategy . |
| Dow | Global Finance Director, Chemicals business group | 20+ years in progressive leadership (dates not individually disclosed) | Group finance leadership across capital‑intensive operations . |
External Roles
- No public company board or external directorships disclosed in Albemarle’s proxy/bio materials specific to Sheorey (none cited).
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base salary ($) | Target bonus % | Actual bonus paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 600,000 | 80% | 503,280 |
| 2023 | 23,077 salary; 300,000 bonus | — | 300,000 (bonus) |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (Enterprise plan – applicable to CFO)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Superior | 2024 Actual | Result vs Target | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (USD mm) | 45% | 1,394 | 1,640 | 1,886 | 1,614 | 98% | Lithium price modifier applied; Committee exercised negative discretion overall . |
| Adjusted Cash Flow from Operations (USD mm) | 30% | 1,019 | 1,199 | 1,379 | 1,248 | 104% | Committee exercised negative discretion overall . |
| Stewardship (safety, process, environment) | 10% | See targets | See targets | See superior | OSH 0.13; Process 11; Env 5 | 0%, 190%, 183% | OSH paid 0% due to a Level 3 incident . |
| Individual | 15% | — | — | — | 15% for Sheorey | — | NEO individual modifiers approved by Committee . |
- Business performance payout: 89.9% for Enterprise (before individual modifier); CFO’s actual bonus reflected 89.9% company score + 15% individual = $503,280 .
2024 Long‑Term Incentive Program (granted 2/22/2024)
| Vehicle | Weight | Grant detail | Vesting | Performance curve / economics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs – rTSR | 25% of total TDC (50% of PSUs) | 4,231 target units; 1,269 at threshold; 8,462 at superior | 3‑year cliff (Q1 2027 upon certification) | 30th/50th/75th percentile = 30%/100%/200%; cap at 100% if absolute TSR negative . |
| PSUs – Adjusted ROIC | 25% of total TDC (50% of PSUs) | 4,231 target units; 1,269 at threshold; 8,462 at superior | 3‑year cliff (Q1 2027) | 30%/100%/200% at threshold/target/superior ; definition per CD&A . |
| RSUs | 25% | 4,231 units | Vest 3rd anniversary in 2027 (continued employment) | Time‑based. |
| Stock options | 25% | 10,267 options @ $118.18 strike; 10‑yr term | Vest 3rd anniversary in 2027 | At 12/31/2024 close ($86.08), these were out‑of‑the‑money . |
- 2024 LTIP grant value: $2,000,000 (25% options/25% RSUs/50% PSUs) .
- Plan design: 50% PSUs (rTSR and adjusted ROIC equally), 25% RSUs, 25% options; 3‑year cliff vesting; no option repricing without shareholder approval .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (3/12/2025) | 1,243 shares; <1% of outstanding . |
| Unvested RSUs (as of 12/31/2024) | 4,231 (2/22/2024 grant) and 3,906 (11/6/2023 new‑hire RSUs, vest 1/3 annually) . |
| Unvested PSUs (as of 12/31/2024) | rTSR PSUs: 1,269 (threshold units shown); Adjusted ROIC PSUs: 1,269 (threshold units shown) . |
| Options outstanding (as of 12/31/2024) | 10,267 unexercisable options @ $118.18 expiring 2/21/2034; OTM vs $86.08 close . |
| Ownership guidelines | CFO required 4x base salary; must hold ≥50% of net shares until in compliance; NEOs were in compliance (subject to 5‑year phase‑in) as of 3/12/2025 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited (short sales, derivatives, margining, pledging) . |
| Trading controls | Windowed trading and pre‑clearance or 10b5‑1 plans . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Appointment date | Nov 6, 2023 (EVP & CFO) . |
| Employment agreement | No individual employment agreement for NEOs other than CEO; governed by severance/CIC programs and equity plan terms . |
| Severance (non‑CIC) | If terminated without cause due to position elimination/organizational redesign: 1.5x (base + target AIP) cash; one year outplacement; standard benefits; prorated equity vesting per plan . |
| Change‑in‑Control | Double trigger; 2x (base + target AIP) cash; prorated AIP; COBRA 2 years; financial counseling up to $12.5K/yr x2; outplacement up to $25K; no excise tax gross‑ups (best‑net cutback) . |
| Non‑compete / non‑solicit | Two‑year post‑employment for NEOs under CIC/severance agreements . |
| Clawbacks | SEC 10D‑compliant incentive recoupment; broader misconduct recoupment/forfeiture policy (time‑ and performance‑based awards) . |
Estimated payments (as of 12/31/2024 assumptions)
| Scenario | Cash severance | AIP | PSUs | RSUs | Options | Benefits | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination (no CIC) | 1,620,000 | — | — | 115,261 | — | — | 1,735,261 |
| Disability | — | 503,280 | — | 700,433 | — | — | 1,203,713 |
| Death | — | — | 242,918 | 700,433 | — | — | 943,351 |
| CIC + qualifying termination | 2,160,000 | 503,280 | 728,409 | 700,433 | — | 68,402 | 4,160,524 |
Compensation Structure Notes and Perquisites
- 2024 target pay mix for non‑CEO NEOs averaged 79% variable (AIP + LTIP) .
- EDCP: Company made $39,714 contribution for Sheorey in 2024; EDCP year‑end balance $40,152 .
- Perquisites in 2024 included relocation expenses ($111,799) and relocation tax gross‑ups ($78,091), plus executive health and financial planning .
- Equity grant process follows open‑window cadence; no option repricing without shareholder approval .
Say‑on‑Pay, Peer Group, Governance
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support: 85.9% .
- Compensation peer group maintained for 2025 includes APD, CE, CC, CTVA, DOW, DD, EMN, FMC, FCX, HUN, MOS, NEM, OLN, WLK . Target pay set within competitive range; not strictly pegged to a percentile .
- No related‑party transactions since the beginning of 2024 .
Performance & Track Record
- Albemarle 2024 context: net sales $5.4B; Energy Storage volumes +26%; cash from operations $702M; >50% of $300–$400M cost and productivity program achieved by year‑end .
- AIP weighting emphasized Adjusted EBITDA (45%) and Adjusted Cash Flow from Operations (30%), with stewardship (10%) and individual (15%); a lithium price modifier muted commodity swings; negative discretion reduced enterprise payout by 34 points to 107.5% before individual modifiers .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: CFO pay is heavily at‑risk and tied to cash generation, TSR, and ROIC, consistent with Albemarle’s pivot toward cash discipline amid lithium price volatility .
- Retention and selling pressure: Significant unvested equity (2023–2024 RSUs/PSUs and 2024 options) vests in 2027; options were OTM at 12/31/2024 ($86.08 vs $118.18 strike), reducing near‑term monetization; ownership guidelines require retaining ≥50% of net shares until 4x‑salary compliance, limiting discretionary sales .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger with 2x cash multiple and ancillary benefits (no excise gross‑ups), balanced by two‑year non‑compete; payouts sized to be meaningful but not excessive, lowering entrenchment risk while aligning during strategic transactions .
- Governance and risk: Anti‑hedging/pledging, dual clawbacks, and no option repricing underpin alignment; absence of related‑party transactions reduces governance red flags .