Agnieszka Kamps
About Agnieszka Kamps
Agnieszka K. Kamps, age 48, is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Alamo Group Inc. (ALG). She joined as EVP & Treasurer on March 6, 2024 and became CFO and Principal Financial Officer effective May 4, 2024; she also temporarily served as interim Principal Accounting Officer from November 2024 into early 2025 without additional compensation . Kamps holds a BBA (Accounting) from Robert Morris University and an MBA from Friedrich‑Alexander‑Universität Erlangen‑Nürnberg; prior roles include VP & CFO at Americas Styrenics (2021–2024) and accounting/finance management positions at Siemens companies and United Technologies . During 2024, ALG delivered net sales of approximately $1.6B, fully diluted EPS of $9.63, and EBITDA of $221M; its five‑year cumulative total shareholder return to 12/31/24 was 151.71 versus 176.44 for the S&P 500 Industrials .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Americas Styrenics, LLC | Vice President & Chief Financial Officer | 2021–2024 | Led finance organization at a polymers JV; joined ALG thereafter to succeed retiring CFO |
| Siemens companies | Accounting/finance management capacities | Not disclosed | Held various accounting management roles, building large‑company controls experience |
| United Technologies | Accounting/finance management capacities | Not disclosed | Finance management roles supporting operational rigor in diversified industrials |
External Roles
- None disclosed in company filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 detail |
|---|---|
| Base salary | $450,000 (set upon joining March 2024) |
| Target annual bonus (% of salary) | 60% (pro‑rated for 2024) |
| Actual annual incentive paid | $113,566 (39% payout on adjusted pre‑tax income; 13% on inventory turnover) |
| Sign‑on cash bonus | $50,000 (subject to one‑year repayment condition) |
| Car allowance | $800 per month |
| All other compensation | $52,238 (includes relocation; car allowance included in “other”) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (EIP) design and outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual/Payout | Payout mechanics | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company adjusted pre‑tax income | 75% | $197.3M | $158.9M → 39% of target payout | Threshold/mid/target/max schedule with Committee adjustments for strike and restructuring | |
| Company inventory turnover | 25% | 3.1 | 2.8 → 13% of target payout | Same schedule; formulaic outcome | |
| Aggregate payout | — | — | $113,566 | Paid under EIP (0–200% range) |
2024 Long‑Term Equity Grants (time‑based RSAs; performance‑based PSUs)
| Award type | Grant date | Shares/units | Grant‑date fair value | Key terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSAs (time‑based) | March 6, 2024 | 2,879 (includes 1,400 sign‑on RSAs) | $584,379 total (at $202.98 per share) | Vest ratably over 3 years beginning first anniversary of grant; double‑trigger acceleration on CIC with qualifying termination |
| PSUs (performance units) | March 6, 2024 | 1,479 target units | $300,207 total (value based on probable outcome at grant; $202.98 ref price) | 3‑year performance period (2024–2026) on equally‑weighted cumulative operating income growth and avg ROIC; 50–200% payout range |
PSU metrics framework (company program)
- Metrics: cumulative operating income (growth) and average ROIC, equally weighted (50%/50%); Board sets challenging but achievable targets aligned to strategic plan .
- Example cycle outcome (2022–2024 program): cumulative operating income $511.4M, average ROIC 16%, payout 95% of target; Kamps did not have a 2022 grant .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership measure | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 2,879 shares (<1% of class) |
| Unvested RSAs (12/31/24) | 2,879 shares; market value $535,235 at $185.91 |
| PSUs outstanding (target, 12/31/24) | 1,479 units; target payout value $274,961 at $185.91 |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | None |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CFO/Division EVPs: 2.5× base salary; 5‑year period to reach; hold at least 50% of net shares until target met; all NEOs and Directors have met or are within the 5‑year transition |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None; NEOs serve at Board’s discretion |
| Clawback policy | Recovery of performance‑based compensation (cash and equity) applies to all NEOs |
| Tax gross‑ups | No excise tax gross‑ups for change‑in‑control benefits |
| Change‑in‑control agreement | Double‑trigger protection; severance factor for CFO is 2×; RSAs and stock options accelerate on qualifying termination; PSUs have pro‑rata vesting on CIC based on time elapsed and expected/target performance |
| Potential payouts on involuntary termination following CIC (as of 12/31/24) | Severance payment $1,345,574; accelerated equity $625,972; health benefits $13,425; aggregate $1,984,971 |
| SERP (legacy) | Not yet vested (PV $30,980); would vest on CIC with lump sum $112,050; otherwise monthly installments over 15 years when vested (10 years of credited service) |
| Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan (adopted 11/6/25; effective 1/1/26) | Discretionary contributions up to 6% of base+bonus for select execs (participants include Kamps); 100% vesting after 3 years; immediate vesting on CIC; accounts earn benchmarked interest; paid on separation/death/disability; initial credit for Kamps equal to actuarial PV of her SERP account as of 12/31/25 (due to termination of SERP for new participants) |
Performance Compensation
EIP structure
| Component | Description |
|---|---|
| Design | Annual cash plan with 0–200% payout range; CFO metrics: adjusted pre‑tax income (75%) and company inventory turnover (25%) |
| Adjustments | 2024 pre‑tax income adjusted for Gradall strike ($3.6M) and Vegetation Management actions ($6.1M) |
| Outcomes | CFO payout: 39% on pre‑tax income, 13% on inventory turnover; total $113,566 |
Long‑term equity mix
| Type | Purpose | 2024 mix |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs | Performance‑based (3‑year), aligns to operating income growth and ROIC | 50% of LT value |
| RSAs | Time‑based (3‑year ratable), retention/ownership | 50% of LT value |
Governance, Peer Group, and Shareholder Feedback
- Compensation peer group updated for 2024; includes industrial peers such as Federal Signal, Allison Transmission, Barnes Group, Franklin Electric, Watts Water Technologies, Helios Technologies, REV Group, Kadant; Committee uses market alignment and size/industry criteria .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval was approximately 99% of votes cast; Committee reaffirmed pay philosophy and elements aligned with shareholder interests .
- Board oversight and committee roles codified; independent Compensation Committee, no employment contracts, strong stock ownership and anti‑hedging/pledging policies .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: CFO annual incentive weights profit quality (adjusted pre‑tax income) and balance sheet discipline (inventory turnover), with PSUs tied to multi‑year operating income and ROIC—supportive of margin/capital efficiency focus .
- Retention vs. liquidity: RSAs vest annually over three years from March 6, 2024; first tranche vests at first anniversary, potentially introducing modest scheduled selling pressure around vest dates; however, guidelines require holding at least 50% of net shares until ownership targets are met .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger CIC with 2× salary+target bonus and equity acceleration provides market‑standard protection without tax gross‑ups; aggregate CIC payout estimated at ~$2.0M as of 12/31/24—adequate retention but not excessively dilutive .
- Ownership/skin‑in‑the‑game: Beneficial ownership is 2,879 shares (<1% of class) with prohibited hedging/pledging and formal ownership multiples; as a new executive, Kamps is within the 5‑year compliance window, tempering immediate alignment optics but strengthening over time via RSAs/PSUs .
- Deferred comp transition: NQDC adoption with 6% discretionary credits and 3‑year vesting, plus initial credit of SERP PV, supports retention and smooths benefit continuity as SERP is closed to new accruals—reduces forfeiture risk and executive turnover incentives .