Kevin Thomas
About Kevin Thomas
Kevin J. Thomas, 60, is Executive Vice President of Alamo Group’s Industrial Equipment Division (appointed August 6, 2024). He joined Alamo Group in February 2022 as Vice President of the Excavator and Vacuum Truck Group after a 20+ year career at Navistar, including President of Navistar Defense LLC since 2015; earlier roles included engineering and program leadership at Navistar, General Dynamics Land Systems, and General Motors Truck Group . In 2024, his annual incentive payouts reflected strong divisional execution with $325,412 earned on EIP metrics across EBIT, sales growth, inventory turns, safety, and company pre-tax income . Company performance context: Alamo Group’s five‑year cumulative TSR from 12/31/2019–12/31/2024 was 151.71 vs. 149.37 for the S&P SmallCap 600 and 176.44 for S&P 500 Industrials; 2020–2024 net income increased ~101% and pre‑tax income ~88% (company-level) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alamo Group Inc. | EVP, Industrial Equipment Division | Aug 2024 – Present | Leads Industrial Equipment Division; metrics tied to divisional EBIT, growth, inventory turns, safety, and company pre‑tax income . |
| Alamo Group Inc. | VP, Excavator & Vacuum Truck Group | Feb 2022 – Aug 2024 | Delivered “outstanding results” in Excavator/Vacuum group; promoted to EVP . |
| Navistar Defense LLC (Navistar International) | President | 2015 – 2022 | Led defense business; prior program management at Navistar Defense . |
| Navistar International | Director-level roles (Engineering; Blue Diamond Truck LLC; Program Mgmt.) | 1999 – 2015 | Product/engineering and JV governance roles . |
| General Dynamics Land Systems; General Motors Truck Group | Engineering/operations roles | Prior to 1999 | Early career technical/operations experience . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Committee/Notes | Years |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | No public company directorships disclosed in filings | — |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Salary ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 323,950 | — |
| 2024 | 430,000 | Adjusted to $343,390 in Feb 2024; increased to $430,000 upon EVP appointment in Aug 2024 . |
| 2024 Target Annual Cash Incentive ($) | 187,460 | Maximum 374,920; 2024 EIP was pro‑rated across role change periods . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Executive Incentive Plan (EIP) – 2024 Outcomes
| Period | Metric | Weighting (if disclosed) | Payout Result | Cash Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 1 – Aug 6, 2024 | Industrial Equipment Division EBIT | — | 40% | |
| Excavator & Vacuum Truck Group EBIT | — | 80% | ||
| Excavator & Vacuum Truck Group Organic Revenue Growth | — | 30% | ||
| Excavator & Vacuum Truck Group Return on Net Assets | — | 50% | ||
| Total for period | — | — | 160,624 | |
| Aug 6 – Dec 31, 2024 | Company Adjusted Pre‑Tax Income | — | 8% | |
| Division EBIT | — | 90% | ||
| Division Sales Growth | — | 30% | ||
| Division Inventory Turnover | — | 16% | ||
| Division Recordable Injury Rate | — | 10% | ||
| Total for period | — | — | 164,788 | |
| Full‑Year 2024 | Total EIP Payout | — | — | 325,412 |
Notes: 2024 EIP metrics for divisional leaders included company adjusted pre‑tax income, division EBIT, division sales growth, division inventory turnover, and division recordable injury rate; pre‑Aug 6 criteria also included group‑level EBIT, organic revenue growth, and return on net assets for Excavator & Vacuum Truck .
Long-Term Equity Awards (granted/held)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Units (#) | Vesting | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Status as of 12/31/2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSA | Feb 2023 | 400 (unvested at 12/31/24) | Vests annually in 3 equal installments | — | 400 not vested; MV $74,364 at $185.91 . |
| RSA | Feb 25, 2024 | 750 | Vests annually in 3 equal installments | 152,663 | 750 not vested; MV $139,433 at $185.91 . |
| RSA | Aug 1, 2024 | 409 | Vests annually in 3 equal installments | 75,575 | 409 not vested; MV $76,037 at $185.91 . |
| PSU (3‑yr) | Aug 1, 2024 | 409 target | 3‑year performance period (Jan 1, 2024 – Dec 31, 2026) | — | 409 unearned; MV $76,037 at $185.91 (at target) . |
| Options | — | — | — | — | No option grants outstanding for Thomas . |
2024 vesting activity: 200 shares vested to Thomas in 2024 (value $40,710); no option exercises .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 21, 2025) | 1,759 shares; <1% of outstanding . Total shares outstanding: 12,063,468 . |
| Unvested RSAs counted with voting/dividends | 1,159 shares of unvested RSAs included in beneficial ownership computation methodology for NEOs (Thomas-specific count referenced in footnote) . |
| Outstanding Unvested Equity at 12/31/2024 | RSAs: 400 (2023), 750 (Feb 2024), 409 (Aug 2024); PSUs: 409 target for 2024–2026 cycle . |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | None for Thomas . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Division EVPs & CFO: 2.5× annual base salary; hold 50% of net shares until achieved; five-year compliance window. All NEOs/Directors either met or are within the five-year transition . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers . |
| Clawback | Company may recover performance-based compensation (cash and equity) for NEOs under Clawback Policy . |
Vesting cadence and potential selling pressure: Three tranches of time-based RSAs (2023, Feb 2024, Aug 2024) vest over three years; PSUs cliff-vest at end of 3‑year performance period subject to goals. The 50% net share retention until ownership guidelines are met reduces immediate selling pressure from vesting .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements: None; NEOs serve at Board discretion without individual employment contracts .
- Change in Control (CIC) agreement: Thomas entered into Alamo’s standard CIC agreement on July 31, 2024 at 2× annual salary; includes SERP participation at 20% of base salary (as generally described in SERP) . Double‑trigger equity vesting applies for terminations within six months before or 24 months after a CIC (excluding death/disability/for‑cause/voluntary not for “good reason”) .
- CIC severance economics (as of 12/31/2024): Severance payment $1,234,920; accelerated equity $314,926; health benefits $23,870; aggregate $1,573,716. Payments subject to 4999 excise‑tax “best‑net” cutback if applicable .
- SERP: Present value of accumulated benefit $156,627 at 12/31/2024; not vested (vesting at 10 years or upon CIC). On CIC: immediate vesting and lump sum; otherwise, benefits are paid over 15 years upon retirement/disability; Thomas projected to fully vest in 2032 .
- Deferred Compensation Plan (adopted Nov 2025; effective Jan 1, 2026): Eligible executives (including Thomas) may receive discretionary contributions up to 6% of base salary and bonus, 3‑year cliff vesting, CIC acceleration; Thomas to receive an initial credit equal to actuarial present value of his SERP account (due to SERP termination for new participants) .
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Divisional execution (2024) | EIP results indicate strong divisional EBIT outperformance post‑promotion (90% payout on Division EBIT Aug–Dec; 80% on Excavator/Vacuum EBIT pre‑Aug) and balanced performance across growth, ROA, inventory, safety . |
| Group leadership outcomes | Management highlighted “outstanding results” in Excavator/Vacuum Truck Group; continued strong industrial demand (vacuum truck rental fleet renewals) . |
| Company TSR context (5‑yr) | See table below; performance broadly in line with small‑cap benchmark over 5 years . |
Company TSR context (cumulative, $100 base)
| 12/19 | 12/20 | 12/21 | 12/22 | 12/23 | 12/24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ALG | 100.00 | 110.41 | 118.24 | 114.36 | 170.62 |
| S&P SmallCap 600 | 100.00 | 111.29 | 141.13 | 118.41 | 137.42 |
| S&P 500 Industrials | 100.00 | 111.06 | 134.52 | 127.15 | 150.20 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: Program balances fixed salary with performance-based annual cash and 50/50 split of PSUs and RSAs for long-term incentives; PSUs tied to three‑year financial goals, RSAs with time-based vesting .
- Target incentive: 2024 target EIP $187,460 (max $374,920), pro‑rated across role change periods .
- Governance safeguards: No single‑trigger CIC; no hedging/pledging; no excise tax gross‑ups; clawback in place; independent comp consultant; stock ownership requirements .
Related Party Transactions; Risk Indicators
- Hedging/Pledging: Prohibited for executives (mitigates alignment/credit risk) .
- Clawback: Recovery of performance-based pay possible (governance safeguard) .
- Legal/Investigations/Interlocks: No disclosures pertaining to Thomas in reviewed filings.
- Say-on-pay: Board recommends “For” vote; no historical percentages disclosed in 2025 proxy .
Equity Ownership & Vesting Schedule Details (as of 12/31/2024)
| Grant | Type | Unvested at 12/31/24 (#) | Vesting Schedule | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 2023 | RSA | 400 | 1/3 per year over 3 years | MV $74,364 at $185.91 . |
| Feb 25, 2024 | RSA | 750 | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Grant-date FV $152,663; MV $139,433 at $185.91 . |
| Aug 1, 2024 | RSA | 409 | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Grant-date FV $75,575; MV $76,037 at $185.91 . |
| Aug 1, 2024 | PSU (target) | 409 | 3‑year performance (2024–2026) | MV $76,037 at $185.91 (assumes target) . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Thomas’ pay mix emphasizes performance via EIP and PSUs, with strict ownership guidelines (2.5× salary) and a 50% net share‑holding requirement until compliance, alongside anti‑hedging/pledging and clawback provisions—supportive of long‑term alignment .
- Retention risk: Multi‑year RSA/PSU grants with three‑year vesting and CIC double‑trigger provisions create retention hooks; SERP vesting at 10 years (or CIC) and the new Deferred Compensation Plan with 3‑year vesting further strengthen retention .
- Near‑term supply/insider selling pressure: Multiple RSA tranches (2023, Feb 2024, Aug 2024) vesting over 2025–2027 and potential PSU payout in 2026 could introduce selling windows; mitigated by 50% net share hold until guideline met and policy ban on pledging/hedging .
- CIC economics: Two‑times salary‑plus‑target bonus cash severance and equity acceleration on double trigger total ~$1.57M (as of 12/31/24), meaningful but not excessive; “best‑net” 280G cutback reduces shareholder cost risk .
- Execution track: Documented divisional EBIT outperformance and successful leadership transition from Excavator/Vacuum to Division EVP suggest strong operational capability in the industrial segment that is a core earnings driver (notably vacuum trucks) .