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Jeffrey Poulton

Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer at ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS
Executive

About Jeffrey Poulton

Jeffrey V. Poulton is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Alnylam, a role he has held since August 2019; he is 57 years old as of March 1, 2025 . Prior roles include CFO of Indigo Agriculture (2018–2019) and multiple senior roles at Shire Plc including CFO (2015–2017) and leadership of its rare disease commercial businesses; earlier in his career he held financial leadership positions at Cinergy and PPG and served as a U.S. Navy Commissioned Officer . Under his tenure, Alnylam’s three-year TSR for 2022–2024 was 38.76% and five-year TSR for 2020–2024 was 104.32%, with 2024 one-year TSR of 22.94% . Revenues grew from $1.04B in 2022 to $2.25B in 2024 while EBITDA loss narrowed from -$741M to -$120M over the same period (see Company Performance) (*Values retrieved from S&P Global).

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Alnylam PharmaceuticalsEVP & CFOAug 2019–presentLeads finance through commercial scaling and pipeline advancement; NEO in compensation program design .
Indigo AgricultureChief Financial OfficerJan 2018–Apr 2019Supported initial commercial scale-up incl. international expansion .
Shire PlcCFO; Exec Committee & Board Member; led rare disease commercial units2015–2017 (CFO); 2003–2014 (prior roles)Drove finance and global rare disease strategy across U.S., LATAM, APAC .
Cinergy Corp; PPG IndustriesFinancial leadership rolesPrior to 2003Led corporate finance/business development initiatives .
U.S. NavyCommissioned OfficerLeadership credentials and discipline .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
CervoMed Inc.DirectorCurrentPublic-company board experience in biotech .
Homology Medicines, Inc.DirectorPriorFormer public-company director role .

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base Salary ($)$660,000 $693,000
Target Bonus (% of Salary)55% 55%
Corporate Performance Modifier (%)105% 190%
Actual AIP Payout ($)$381,150 $724,190

Notes:

  • 2024 AIP maximum was increased to 200% to align with peers .
  • No guaranteed annual bonus or salary increases for executives .

Performance Compensation

  • Plan design: 50% PSUs, 25% RSUs, 25% options; options vest 25% at 1-year then 6.25% quarterly through year 4; RSUs vest in equal tranches over three years; PSUs vest on achievement of defined clinical/regulatory/financial milestones (no earlier than 1 year); 2024 PSUs must be achieved within five years (prior awards up to ten years) .
Equity Awards (Grant-Date Values)20232024
PSUs ($)$2,175,000 $2,362,500
RSUs ($)$1,087,500 $1,181,250
Options ($)$1,087,500 $1,181,250
Total ($)$4,350,000 $4,725,000

Annual Incentive (AIP) Goals and Outcome

  • 2024 categories: Culture; Early Pipeline & Development; Marketed Products & Financial Performance; outcome 190% based on above-target achievements (e.g., HELIOS-B Phase 3 results, KARDIA-2 data, net revenue, expense control) .
  • 2023 categories: Culture; Pipeline & Development; Commercial Objectives; outcome 105% (with 5% overlay for Roche collaboration and DOJ closure) .

PSU Goal Framework and Status (Selected)

Grant DateGoalWeightStatus / Milestone
Feb 24, 2021Positive Phase 3 clinical outcomes in ATTR cardiomyopathy25%Achieved Aug 2022 .
Feb 24, 2021$2.5B cumulative net product revenues by 12/31/202425%Achieved Aug 2023 .
Feb 24, 2021Non-GAAP operating income profitability for a 12-month calendar year by 12/31/202525%Achieved Feb 2025 .
Feb 24, 2021Initiate first Phase 3 in a prevalent disease25%Not yet achieved (as of proxy date) .
Feb 27, 2023FDA acceptance of NDA for ATTR cardiomyopathy after positive Phase 330%Achieved Nov 2024 .
Feb 27, 2023Human PoC for extrahepatic, non-CNS target30%Not yet achieved .
Feb 27, 2023Non-GAAP operating income in FY 202540%Not yet achieved .
Mar 1, 2024Initiate Phase 3 in a prevalent indication30%Not yet achieved .
Mar 1, 2024Start Phase 3 for ALN‑TTRsc04 in ATTR cardiomyopathy30%Not yet achieved .
Mar 1, 2024First $2.5B annual GAAP net product revenue40%Not yet achieved .

Governance levers:

  • Clawback policy covers both cash and equity incentives .
  • No hedging or pledging permitted; no excise tax gross-ups; limited perquisites .
  • Stock ownership guidelines in place; 2023 revision excluded unvested PSUs from guideline compliance counts .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

As ofDirect Shares OwnedShares Acquirable Within 60 DaysTotal Beneficial Ownership% Outstanding
Jan 31, 202530,701203,866234,567<1%
  • Footnote: 57 shares reflect prior 401(k) matching shares contributed by Alnylam (pre-2020 practice) .
  • Company prohibits hedging and pledging of company stock .

Insider activity and vesting signals:

  • 2024 sales included 1,605 shares (Jun 25, 2024) and 1,682 shares (Nov 26, 2024) at ~$231–$251 per share .
  • Early 2025 featured small periodic sales (e.g., Feb 14, 2025 and Feb 28, 2025) and option exercises .
  • On Oct 1, 2025, two PSU tranches vested (from 2021 and 2024 grants) tied to initiation of a Phase 3 study in a prevalent indication; a mandatory sell-to-cover of 3,821 shares occurred on Oct 2, 2025 to satisfy withholding; beneficial ownership post-events was 54,052 shares (direct) plus 57 indirect .

Employment Terms

Change-in-control (CIC) economics (double trigger):

  • For NEOs (ex‑CEO): upon termination without cause or for good reason within 12 months post‑CIC, lump-sum cash equal to 1.5× (base salary + target bonus), 18 months COBRA-equivalent cash, and full acceleration of unvested equity; CEO has 2.0× and 24 months COBRA and an 18‑month CIC protection period .
  • Payments are reduced only if doing so increases after-tax benefits (280G cutback) .

Potential CFO payouts upon CIC termination (illustrative tables from proxies):

ItemDec 31, 2023 CFO Amount ($)
Cash Severance (1.5× base+target bonus)1,534,500
COBRA Equivalent42,640
Accelerated Options872,980
Accelerated RSUs/PSUs5,731,581
Total8,181,701
ItemDec 31, 2024 CFO Amount ($)
Cash Severance (1.5× base+target bonus)1,611,230
COBRA Equivalent45,290
Accelerated Options2,179,054
Accelerated RSUs/PSUs9,710,773
Total13,546,347

Additional governance:

  • Clawback applies to cash and equity; no hedging/pledging; strong stock ownership guidelines .

Company Performance (context for pay-for-performance)

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues ($)1,037,418,000*1,828,292,000*2,248,243,000*
EBITDA ($)-740,604,000*-228,121,000*-120,215,000*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Complementary TSR data:

  • 3-year TSR (2022–2024): 38.76%; 5-year TSR (2020–2024): 104.32%; 1-year TSR (2024): 22.94% .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • High at-risk mix with 50% PSU weight and no single-trigger acceleration enhances alignment; clawback and anti-hedging/pledging further tighten governance .
  • AIP maximum raised to 200% in 2024 to better benchmark peers after sustained growth/risk scaling; payout at 190% reflects above-target execution on clinical and commercial milestones .
  • Ownership guidelines were tightened in 2023 by excluding unvested PSUs from compliance, reducing “paper” coverage and strengthening real alignment .

Say‑on‑Pay & Peer Group

  • Say‑on‑pay support: 95% approval at the 2024 annual meeting, indicating strong investor endorsement .
  • 2024 peer group included BeiGene, Biogen, BioMarin, Exact Sciences, Exelixis, Incyte, Jazz, Moderna, Neurocrine, Sarepta, United Therapeutics, Vertex; for 2025, Regeneron and Gilead were added and Exelixis/Jazz removed to reflect maturation .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • No hedging/pledging allowed; no excise tax gross‑ups; robust clawback policy .
  • Insider sales pattern shows modest periodic dispositions and sell‑to‑cover mechanics on PSU vesting; no evidence in filings of margin usage or pledging (prohibited) .

Investment Implications

  • Strong pay-for-performance architecture (heavy PSUs, clawback, revised ownership guidelines) aligns the CFO’s incentives with long-term value creation and reduces governance risk .
  • Double‑trigger CIC and lack of hedging/pledging mitigate windfall and alignment risks; however, large unvested equity and PSU milestones can create periodic sell‑to‑cover supply around vesting events (e.g., milestone-triggered PSU conversions) .
  • Operationally, revenue growth and improving EBITDA trajectory, coupled with robust 3- and 5-year TSRs, support the design of above-target payouts in 2024; continued execution against PSU financial and clinical goals (e.g., Phase 3 initiations, profitability) will be key to future equity realizations and signal management confidence .

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