Christian Swahn
AUTOLIVAbout Christian Swahn
Executive Vice President, Global Supply Chain Management at Autoliv since August 2019; age 54 (2025 proxy). Prior roles include Senior Vice President, Purchasing at Volvo Bus (2016–2019) and Purchasing Director at SKF (2013–2016). Education: M.Sc. Mechanical Engineering (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm) and Executive MBA (School of Business, Economics and Law, Gothenburg) . During his tenure, Autoliv’s stock ended 2019 at $84.41, 2020 at $92.10, 2021 at $103.41, fell to $76.58 in 2022, rose to $110.19 in 2023, and closed 2024 at $93.79, with compensation outcomes tied to TSR, EPS, relative organic sales growth, and GHG emissions performance via PSU design .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv | EVP, Global Supply Chain Management | Aug 2019–present | Leads global supply chain, navigating raw material volatility and logistics disruptions; emphasized supplier partnerships and end-to-end demand/supply integration . |
| Volvo Bus Corporation | Senior Vice President, Purchasing | 2016–2019 | Drove procurement for bus operations . |
| SKF AB | Purchasing Director, Industrial Market & Global Categories | 2013–2016 | Managed category strategy and industrial-market purchasing . |
| Volvo Penta; Finnveden | Various positions | N/A | Early supply-chain/manufacturing roles . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in 2024/2025 proxies for Swahn (no public directorships listed) .
Fixed Compensation
- Base salary and target bonus % for non-NEO executives (like Swahn) are not itemized in the proxy. The LDCC targets market-median pay and increased base salaries 3.5%–14.0% for NEOs in 2024; Swedish-based executives are benchmarked to a Swedish industrial peer group (e.g., AB Volvo, Atlas Copco, Sandvik, SKF) .
- Annual non-equity incentive design and company-level 2024 outcome shown below (applies to executives generally) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Non-Equity Incentive (2024)
| Component | Weight | Definition | 2024 Company Outcome / Payout Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | GAAP EBIT adjusted for antitrust and restructuring | Actual $1,007M (109% of 2023); factor contributed to payout; executives outside Europe Division earned 152% of target; Europe Division program paid 153% of target . |
| Adjusted Cash Conversion | 50% | Free Cash Flow (OpCF – Capex, net) / Net Income, adjusted | Actual 85%; factor contributed to payout; same payout context as above . |
PSU Program Structure and Outcomes (Tranches concluded 2022–2024; PSUs cliff-vest three years after grant; 2024 tranche vests Q1’27; grants typically in February; awards accrue dividend-equivalent RSUs; RSUs/PSUs generally cliff-vest after three years) .
| Tranche (Performance Year) | Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 (A) | EPS | 60% | $4.0 | $6.0 | $8.0 | $4.4 | 20% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 0 pp | 4 pp | 8 pp | 6.6 pp | 165% | |
| Greenhouse Gas Emissions | 15% | 451 | 430 | 409 | 430 | 100% | |
| Final Payout | 68% | ||||||
| 2023 (B) | EPS | 60% | $4.0 | $6.0 | $8.0 | $8.19 | 200% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 0 pp | 4 pp | 8 pp | 8 pp | 200% | |
| Greenhouse Gas Emissions | 15% | 410 | 373 | 336 | 358 | 140.5% | |
| Final Payout | 191% | ||||||
| 2024 (C) | EPS | 60% | $6.0 | $8.0 | $10.0 | $8.32 | 116% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 0 pp | 4 pp | 8 pp | 1.6 pp | 40% | |
| Greenhouse Gas Emissions | 15% | 372 | 338 | 304 | 306 | 194.1% | |
| Final Payout | 109% |
- PSU design and metrics: EPS (60%), Relative Organic Sales Growth (25%), and GHG Emissions (15%) used since 2022; tranches vest on three-year cliff basis, with 2024 tranche vesting Q1’27; grants to executives other than CEO are 75% PSUs / 25% RSUs by grant value; CEO gets 100% PSUs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Policies and Guidelines
- Stock ownership guideline: CEO 2x base salary; other executive officers 1x base salary; must retain 75% of net RSU shares until compliant .
- Hedging, short-selling, and pledging of Autoliv securities are prohibited (mitigates misalignment and forced-selling risk) .
- Clawback: NYSE-compliant recoupment for restatements, plus broader board-authorized clawback for harmful conduct .
- Options: As of 12/31/2024, no executive officer held unvested options (shift toward RSUs/PSUs) .
Disclosed Holdings (historical baseline; current individual holdings for non-NEOs like Swahn are not itemized in proxies)
- Form 3 (initial): 569 common shares; 853 RSUs vesting 9/1/2022 (filed for event 09/01/2019; amended 01/10/2020) .
- 2025 Security Ownership table provides NEOs and directors; Swahn (not a 2024 NEO) is not individually listed; the executive group (24 individuals) held 231,485 shares combined; shares outstanding 77,721,831 as of 2/28/2025 .
Employment Terms
Key Contract Provisions (Swahn’s Employment Agreement and 2021 amendment)
- Role/location: EVP, Supply Chain Management; principal workplace Gothenburg, Sweden (effective April 1, 2021; amendment specifies no “Good Reason” triggered by this change) .
- Severance: If terminated without Cause or if the executive resigns for Good Reason, lump-sum cash severance equals 1.5x base salary, subject to release of claims .
- Non-compete: 12 months post-termination; inapplicable if Company terminates without Cause or executive resigns for Good Reason. If operative, Company pays up to 12 monthly payments equal to monthly base salary less new monthly salary, capped at 60% of prior annual base; breach remedies include damages equal to six times average monthly base salary .
- Governing law & dispute resolution: Swedish law; arbitration seated in Stockholm under the Swedish Arbitration Act; Company generally bears arbitration costs unless claims are frivolous/in bad faith .
- Change-in-control and equity: For awards under the plan—since 2021, if awards are assumed/equitably converted, acceleration is double-trigger (termination without cause or resignation for good reason within two years post-CIC); if not assumed, awards accelerate at CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; double-trigger policy for CIC benefits .
Additional Signals on Execution and Risk
- Supply chain leadership focus: Emphasized supplier partnerships, design-to-cost, and end-to-end visibility; discussed navigating raw material spikes (e.g., steel), container/logistics disruptions, and weather impacts; highlighted transparent collaboration across suppliers and internal teams to mitigate volatility .
- Compensation benchmarking: Sweden-based executives’ compensation (relevant for Swahn) benchmarked to large-cap Swedish industrials with global operations (e.g., AB Volvo, Atlas Copco, Sandvik, SKF, Assa Abloy, Skanska, Electrolux, SSAB, Stora Enso, Scania, Alfa Laval, Volvo Cars) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Swahn participates in an incentive framework tightly linked to EPS, cash conversion, relative sales growth, and GHG reduction—drivers that directly affect cash generation, balance-sheet strength, and TSR. PSU outcomes from 2022–2024 demonstrate sensitivity to earnings, market outgrowth, and sustainability metrics (combined payouts 68%, 191%, 109%), underscoring upside when execution and market conditions align .
- Selling pressure/pledging risk: Policy bans hedging/pledging and requires meaningful ownership (1x salary) with 75% net-share retention pre-compliance, reducing forced-selling and misalignment risks .
- Retention and transition risk: Contract features (six-month notice norms in company practice for senior executives; 12-month non-compete with paid consideration) plus double-trigger CIC terms support continuity while limiting windfalls. Severance at 1.5x salary (no bonus multiple) is moderate and not shareholder-unfriendly; arbitration under Swedish law expedites dispute resolution .
- Execution track record: Commentary and initiatives point to disciplined supply-chain management through commodity and logistics shocks; incentive metrics (Adjusted OI and Cash Conversion) prioritize operational cash flow, indicating continued focus on working-capital discipline and profitability .
Note: Where specific compensation amounts for Swahn are not disclosed (non-NEO), company-level program designs and outcomes are shown to assess incentive alignment and potential pay realizability.
Citations:
- Biography and role:
- Share price/TSR context and CAP linkages:
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- PSU metrics/design/outcomes/vesting:
- Ownership guidelines; hedging/pledging; clawback:
- Options outstanding status:
- Employment agreement; amendment; severance; non-compete; governing law/arbitration:
- Change-in-control equity and no gross-ups; double-trigger policy:
- Executive ownership table (non-NEO disclosure status; group holdings):
- Form 3 holdings baseline (2019/2020):
- Swedish compensation peer group:
- Supply chain commentary (execution focus):