Fabien Dumont
AUTOLIVAbout Fabien Dumont
Fabien Dumont, age 47, is Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) at Autoliv, appointed in September 2024 after joining Autoliv in 1998; he previously served as Vice President of Engineering at Autoliv China and earlier led China Operations across airbags, textiles, inflators, and steering wheels; he holds an Executive MBA from CEIBS and remains based in China . Autoliv’s 2024 performance outcomes driving incentive pay included Adjusted Operating Income of $1,007 million (109% of 2023) and Adjusted Cash Conversion of 85%, which produced a 152% of target annual cash incentive for NEOs outside Europe; pay-versus-performance disclosures show 2024 value of a $100 ALV investment at $125 (vs. $143 in 2023), Net Income of $648 million, and Adjusted Operating Income of $1,007 million .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv | Executive Vice President, Chief Technology Officer | Sep 2024–Present | Member of the Executive Management Team; brings fast-moving China market capabilities across Autoliv; continues to be based in China . |
| Autoliv China | Vice President, Engineering | Jul 2018–Sep 2024 | Led innovations for China; drove design and technological transformation of the steering wheel business . |
| Autoliv China | VP Operations (Airbag, Textile, Inflator, Steering Wheels) | Mar 2012–Jul 2018 | Led China operations across multiple safety product lines . |
| Autoliv | Various roles | 1998–2012 | Progressively senior leadership roles since joining in 1998 . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the 2025 Proxy Statement or related filings reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
- Dumont is not listed among Autoliv’s 2024 Named Executive Officers (NEOs), so specific salary and bonus values are not disclosed for him; the 2024 NEO cohort comprises CEO, CFO, President Europe, President Americas, and General Counsel .
- Company practice: cash compensation for executives is typically set in local currency (with LTI targets in USD), which is relevant for globally based executives like the CTO .
Performance Compensation
Annual non-equity incentive program (company framework relevant to executives)
| Metric | Weight | 2023 Result | 2024 Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | NEO payout: 164% of target (outside Europe) / 25% weight for Division Europe program; Europe program paid 105% of target . | Actual AOI $1,007m = 109% of 2023; overall NEO payout 152% of target (outside Europe) . |
| Adjusted Cash Conversion | 50% | Included in 2023 framework (25% for Division Europe program); part of 164%/105% payouts above . | 85% in 2024; contributed to 152% payout (outside Europe) . |
Notes: The company uses a limited number of enterprise metrics to guide incentives and mitigate risk; no adjustments were made in 2025; for 2024, payouts followed the stated metric curves .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) equity program (design for executives)
- Mix: For executives other than CEO, 75% PSUs and 25% RSUs; minimum 3-year vesting; no stock options granted since 2015 and none outstanding .
- PSUs (2024 grant): three one-year performance periods (2024/2025/2026) with EPS (60%), Relative Organic Sales Growth (25%), and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (15%); any earned 2024 tranche vests in Q1 2027, subject to continued employment .
- PSUs (2023 grant): same metrics across 2023/2024/2025; any earned PSUs vest in Q1 2026, subject to continued employment .
- Legacy PSU cycle (2021–2023): metrics were EPS (70%) and Order Intake (30%); realized at 83% of target .
- RSUs: 3-year cliff vesting from grant date (typical grant dates: Feb 21, 2022; Feb 15, 2023; Feb 20, 2024) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Company policy / disclosure |
|---|---|
| Ownership guidelines | CEO: 2x base salary; other executive officers: 1x base salary; until compliant, must retain 75% of net shares from RSU settlements . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for all employees and directors (policy against hedging, short-selling, and pledging) . |
| Clawback | NYSE-mandated restatement recoupment for SEC 16 officers; broader discretionary clawback for “harmful conduct” (including policy/code violations, egregious misconduct, violations of securities laws) . |
| Equity grant policy | No backdating/timing manipulation; grants typically on 10-K filing date; off-cycle grants on 15th day of second month of each quarter post-approval . |
| Options | No stock options granted since 2015; none outstanding; plan prohibits option repricing without shareholder approval . |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | Double-trigger vesting if awards are assumed; if not assumed/equitably converted, full vest at CIC; older plan terms (1997 Plan) allowed single-trigger vesting at target; awards since 2019 designed with double-trigger on assumed awards . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms disclosed (company framework; NEO examples where applicable) |
|---|---|
| Notice/non-compete payments | Company disclosures for NEOs include “salary differential” for non-compete equal to 60% of monthly gross salary for up to 12 months; exact terms vary by local law/agreements . |
| Severance components | NEO termination tables show lump-sum cash severance, continued benefits during notice, and equity treatment based on event; amounts are scenario-based and currency-adjusted (SEK/CHF/EUR/CNY/USD) . |
| Equity vesting on separation | Under current design, RSUs/PSUs observe vesting and CIC rules above; older plan terms allowed full RSU vesting at CIC and PSUs at target; death/retirement acceleration and post-period PSU determination per plan . |
Vesting Schedules and Key Dates
| Award type | Typical grant dates | Vesting schedule | Specific vest windows (illustrative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | Feb 21, 2022; Feb 15, 2023; Feb 20, 2024 | 3-year cliff vesting (continued employment) | Vests on 3rd anniversary of grant date . |
| PSUs (2024) | Feb 20, 2024 | Three 1-year performance tranches (2024/2025/2026); cliff vest in Q1 2027 for earned 2024 tranche | Tranche A (2024) earned on 2024 outcomes; vests Q1 2027; B/C for 2025/2026 set annually . |
| PSUs (2023) | Feb 15, 2023 | Three 1-year tranches (2023/2024/2025); cliff vest Q1 2026 for earned 2023/2024 tranches | Tranche A/B vest Q1 2026 if earned . |
Note: 12/31/2024 ALV closing price was $93.79 (used for outstanding award valuations in proxy tables) .
Performance & Track Record Highlights
- Strategic focus areas communicated by the CTO include adaptive safety for reclined seating trends, virtual engineering, and regulatory-driven safety transitions (Europe/China 2026–2029), reflecting technology roadmaps aligned to China’s fast timelines and global regulatory upgrades .
- 2024 company-level outcomes tied to pay: AOI $1,007m (109% of 2023), Adjusted Cash Conversion 85%, supporting 152% payout for NEOs outside Europe .
Say-on-Pay and Governance Signals
- Say-on-pay support was approximately 97.0%, 97.1%, and 97.6% in 2024, 2023, and 2022, respectively, indicating strong shareholder backing of pay design .
- Compensation governance emphasizes independent LDCC oversight, use of PSUs since 2019 (100% for CEO; 75% for other executives), minimum 3-year vesting, no option grants since 2015, and double-trigger CIC for assumed awards .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: The executive pay architecture concentrates value in PSUs with clear metrics (EPS 60%, Relative Organic Sales Growth 25%, GHG 15%) and enterprise-wide cash/earnings conversion targets for the annual bonus; above-target payouts in 2024 and 2023 were directly tied to AOI and cash conversion outcomes, reinforcing pay-for-performance for senior operators like the CTO even when individual compensation is not disclosed .
- Retention and selling pressure: Three-year cliff RSU/PSU structures, stock ownership guidelines (1x salary for executives), mandatory net share retention until guideline compliance, and a prohibition on hedging/pledging strengthen alignment and reduce common governance risks associated with premature liquidity or leverage on insider holdings .
- Change-in-control and risk controls: Double-trigger CIC acceleration for assumed awards, robust clawback policy beyond NYSE minimums, and no option repricing collectively mitigate windfall risk and support long-term value creation incentives in volatile cycles .
- Execution lens: Dumont’s 25+ years at Autoliv with deep China engineering and operations experience, and his continued China base, position him to translate fast-to-market innovation cycles into global platforms, a key lever given regulatory escalation and interior-safety shifts (e.g., reclined seating) .