Fredrik Westin
AUTOLIVAbout Fredrik Westin
Autoliv’s Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President, Finance since May 2020, age 52, with prior CFO roles at Sandvik Mining and Rock Technology (2015–2020, Netherlands) and Johnson Controls’ Global Automotive Interiors business (2014–2015, Japan) plus finance positions across Germany, China and Japan at Johnson Controls (2006–2014), earlier roles at WestLB (2002–2006) and Volkswagen (from 1998). Education: MBA from INSEAD (France) and MSc in Mechanical Engineering from RWTH Aachen (Germany) . Company performance during his tenure shows pay-versus-performance alignment and robust outcomes in 2023–2024: Autoliv cumulative TSR index was 143 in 2023 and 125 in 2024; Net Income rose to $648 million in 2024; Adjusted Operating Income reached $1,007 million in 2024 .
Company Performance Indicators (context)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv TSR (Value of $100) | 110 | 126 | 96 | 143 | 125 |
| Net Income ($USD Millions) | 188 | 437 | 425 | 489 | 648 |
| Adjusted Operating Income ($USD Millions) | 482 | 683 | 598 | 920 | 1,007 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sandvik Mining and Rock Technology | Chief Financial Officer | 2015–2020 | Led finance for a global industrial unit; cross-border operating finance governance . |
| Johnson Controls Global Automotive Interiors | CFO & VP Finance/IT/Integration & Change Office | 2014–2015 | Finance leadership through integration/change in Japan; multi-functional oversight . |
| Johnson Controls (Germany, China, Japan) | Finance roles | 2006–2014 | International finance operations across major auto regions . |
| WestLB | Leadership roles | 2002–2006 | Corporate finance and banking experience . |
| Volkswagen | Early career | 1998–2002 | Industrial/automotive foundation . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 525,739 | 544,140 | 563,185 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 50% | 50% | 50% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | 222,387 | 446,195 | 428,020 |
| Stock Awards ($, GAAP grant-date fair value) | 203,744 | 278,351 | 294,838 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 209,625 | 213,758 | 227,315 |
| Retirement Contributions (% of Salary) | 35% | 35% | 35% |
- 2024 perquisites included company car and healthcare ($19,350), defined contribution plan ($197,115), and vacation supplement ($10,850) .
- 2024 cash annual incentive anchored to Adjusted Operating Income and Adjusted Cash Conversion paid at 152% of target for execs outside Europe; Westin’s actual payout was $428,020 vs a target of ~50% of base ($281,592) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Non-Equity Incentive (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target Mechanics | Actual (2024) | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | 0× if ≤70% of 2023; 2× if ≥130% of 2023; linear in-between | $1,007m | Contributed to 152% overall payout |
| Adjusted Cash Conversion | 50% | 0× if ≤50%; 2× if ≥90%; linear in-between | 85% | Contributed to 152% overall payout |
PSUs (Program design and 2022–2024 outcomes)
- PSU metrics: EPS 60%, Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP 25%, GHG Emissions 15%; three one-year tranches per grant; dividend equivalents; cliff vest ~3 years (e.g., 2024 grant vests Q1 2027) .
- 2022–2024 PSU tranches payout: Tranche A (2022) 68%; Tranche B (2023) 191%; Tranche C (2024) 109%; combined ~123% of target .
| PSU Tranche | EPS Target/Actual/Payout | Relative Organic Sales Growth Target/Actual/Payout | GHG Target/Actual/Payout | Final Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 (A) | $6.0 target / $4.4 actual / 20% | 4pp target / 6.6pp actual / 165% | 430 KTon actual / 100% | 68% |
| 2023 (B) | $6.0 target / $8.19 actual / 200% | 4pp target / 8.0pp actual / 200% | 358 KTon actual / 140.5% | 191% |
| 2024 (C) | $8.0 target / $8.32 actual / 116% | 4pp target / 1.6pp actual / 40% | 306 KTon actual / 194.1% | 109% |
2024 Equity Granted to Westin
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Shares (Target) | Shares (Max) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024 Tranche A; plus 2023B/2022C accounted) | 02/20/2024 | 2,225 | 4,450 | $220,701 | Cliff vest ~Q1 2027 (PSUs), subject to service; double-trigger CIC |
| RSUs | 02/20/2024 | 673 | — | $74,138 | Cliff vest 3 years; dividend equivalents |
| Annual LTI “full grant value” for Westin | 2024 | — | — | $300,000 (LDCC full value basis) | PSU 75% / RSU 25% mix for executives |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 7,261 shares; “<1%” of outstanding |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 1,444 units; $135,433 market value at $93.79 |
| Unearned PSUs (2024 grants) | 1,381 units (target assumption); $129,524 market/payout value |
| Additional 2023 PSU C (uneared) | 822 units; $77,095 market/payout value |
| Options outstanding | None; no options granted since 2015 and none outstanding |
| Pledging/hedging | Company policy prohibits hedging, short-selling, and pledging by officers/directors |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO 2× salary; other executive officers 1× salary with 75% net shares retention until met |
Note: 2024 vesting activity included 2,634 shares acquired on vesting by Westin valued at $293,638 (RSU/PSU vestings timing indicates Q1 events often drive settlement-related flows) .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment start date (CFO) | May 2020 |
| Notice period | 6 months (Westin); continued salary during notice; reciprocal resignation notice 6 months |
| Non-compete | 12 months post-termination; company pays monthly salary differential up to 60% cap, max 12 months; not owed if retirement |
| Severance (no-cause or Good Reason) | Lump sum 1.5× base salary |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | Double-trigger acceleration for unvested equity if awards assumed; if not assumed, vest at CIC; post-2019 awards have double-trigger constructs |
| Tax gross-up | No §280G excise tax gross-ups |
| Clawback/recoupment | Board may recoup beyond NYSE minimums; harmful conduct and restatement triggers |
Estimated Payments (Westin; hypothetical as of 12/31/2024)
| Component | Resign w/o Good Reason | Termination w/o Cause or Resign for Good Reason | Termination for Cause | CIC Only | CIC + Qualifying Termination | Death or Retirement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lump sum cash severance | — | $844,777 | — | — | $844,777 | — |
| Salary/annual incentive during notice | $281,592 | $281,592 | — | — | $281,592 | — |
| Non-compete salary differential | $337,911 | — | $337,911 | — | — | — |
| Health/welfare/retirement benefits | $100,286 | $100,286 | — | — | $100,286 | — |
| Vesting of equity | $338,301 | $338,301 | — | $0 | $989,016 | $989,016 |
| Company car | $7,946 | $7,946 | — | — | $7,946 | — |
| Total | $1,066,036 | $1,572,902 | $337,911 | $0 | $2,223,617 | $989,016 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and trends: Executives’ LTI is 75% PSUs and 25% RSUs; CEO 100% PSUs; no stock options since 2015 (de-risks option repricing and leverage) . Westin’s LTI “full grant value” rose from $280,000 (2023) to $300,000 (2024) while base increased 3.5% in SEK; target bonus remained 50% of salary .
- Metrics tightened toward sustainability: PSUs include GHG reduction metric since 2022; annual bonus emphasizes Adjusted Operating Income and Cash Conversion to align pay with cash and profitability .
- Clawback scope exceeds listing minimums and formal equity grant timing policy adopted in 2024 (reduces timing/manipulation risk) .
- Peer benchmarking: LDCC targets market median vs Swedish peer group (Volvo, Ericsson, Sandvik, etc.) for Sweden-based executives; U.S.-based executives benchmarked vs an updated U.S. peer group (Lear, BorgWarner, Parker-Hannifin, etc.) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Aspect | Insight |
|---|---|
| Ownership vs guidelines | Executive officers must reach 1× salary in stock; until met, must retain 75% of net shares from RSU settlements . |
| Alignment features | Dividend equivalents on RSUs/PSUs; three-year cliff vesting; double-trigger CIC; prohibition on pledging/hedging . |
| Potential selling pressure | Regular cliff vesting cycles (Q1) and dividend equivalents increase unvested counts; 2024 realized vesting value $293,638 may indicate settlement flows rather than discretionary selling . |
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Approval |
|---|---|
| 2022 | 97.6% |
| 2023 | 97.1% |
| 2024 | 97.0% |
Expertise & Qualifications
- MBA (INSEAD, France) and MSc Mechanical Engineering (RWTH Aachen, Germany) .
- Global industrial finance leadership across automotive and mining sectors; extensive cross-border finance operations experience .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 2024 annual bonus at 152% and PSUs above target reflect robust AOI ($1,007m) and Net Income ($648m) coupled with advancing sustainability metrics; this supports confidence in execution under the current CFO .
- Retention risk appears moderate: meaningful unvested RSUs/PSUs with three-year cliff schedules, stock ownership requirements, and double-trigger CIC provisions encourage tenure; severance at 1.5× base plus non-compete salary differential mitigates abrupt departure risk but may create Q1 settlement-related trading flows around vesting dates .
- Governance signals are shareholder-friendly: prohibition on pledging/hedging, no 280G gross-ups, independent LDCC with external consultant and formal equity grant policy; say-on-pay support >97% for three years underscores investor acceptance of the structure .