Jonas Jademyr
AUTOLIVAbout Jonas Jademyr
Jonas Jademyr, age 58, is Executive Vice President, Quality and Program Management at Autoliv (ALV). He joined Autoliv in February 2021 as VP & Head of Program Management and was promoted to EVP in January 2023. He holds an Engineering degree from Gothenburg Upper School of Technology (Sweden) and an MBA from Henley Business School, University of Reading (UK) . During his tenure, Autoliv’s pay-versus-performance disclosures show CAP tracking TSR, with FY2024 cumulative TSR translating to $125 on a $100 base vs $76 for the peer index; FY2024 Net Income was $648m and Adjusted Operating Income $1,007m, with PSU and bonus outcomes aligned to EPS, Relative Organic Sales Growth, GHG, Adjusted Operating Income and Adjusted Cash Conversion .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AB Volvo – Volvo Trucks | VP, Head of Powertrain Product Management | Dec 2020–Feb 2021 | Led product management for heavy-duty powertrain portfolio |
| AB Volvo – Volvo Trucks | VP, Head of Global Commercial Launches | Oct 2018–Nov 2020 | Drove global commercial launch execution for truck programs |
| AB Volvo – Product Line FH | VP, Head of Product Line FH | Jan 2017–Sep 2018 | Managed FH product line strategy and lifecycle |
| AB Volvo – Heavy Duty Powertrain Range | VP, Head of Range | Dec 2016–Dec 2017 | Oversaw heavy-duty powertrain range strategy |
| Volvo Construction Equipment | SVP, Head of Quality, Safety & Sustainability; Exec Team member | Nov 2013–Nov 2016 | Led QSS functions; senior leadership team member |
| Autoliv | VP & Head of Program Management | Feb 2021–Dec 2022 | Portfolio/program governance before promotion to EVP |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flexound Augmented Audio Oy (private) | Board Director | Sep 2022–Jun 2024 | Private Finnish audio company |
Fixed Compensation
- Not individually disclosed in the 2025 proxy (Jademyr was not an NEO). Company context: base salaries set near market median by location; 2024 NEO base salaries were increased 3.5%–14.0% based on market, performance, responsibilities, and retention . Compensation currencies align with country of service; equity grant values set in USD; FX movements can affect USD comparisons .
Company Annual Incentive Design (2024) – context for executive management
| Component | Weight | Targeting/Design | Actuals/Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | Group measure | FY2024 Adjusted Operating Income: $1,007m |
| Adjusted Cash Conversion | 50% | Group measure; adjusted for specified items | FY2024 Adjusted Cash Conversion: 85% (77% reported + 8% adjustments) |
| Payout Result | — | Executives outside Europe Division | 152% of target |
| Payout Result (Europe Division) | — | Division Europe structure: Div AOI (50%), Group AOI (25%), Group Cash Conversion (25%) | 153% of target |
Performance Compensation
Autoliv uses PSUs (CEO 100% of LTI; other executive officers 75% PSUs/25% RSUs) with three one-year performance periods per grant (EPS 60%, Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP 25%, GHG Emissions 15%), cliff vesting ~3 years after grant (e.g., Q1 2027 for 2024 tranche A). All PSUs/RSUs accrue dividend equivalents and have minimum three-year vesting .
PSU Outcomes (covering 2022–2024 performance periods; earned/used for vesting on respective schedules)
| Tranche (Year) | Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 (Tranche A) | EPS (Adjusted) | 60% | $4.0 | $6.0 | $8.0 | $4.40 | 20% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 0 pp | 4 pp | 8 pp | 6.6 pp | 200%×0.825=165% | |
| GHG Emissions (kTon) | 15% | 451 | 430 | 409 | 430 | 100% | |
| Final Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 68% | |
| 2023 (Tranche B) | EPS (Adjusted) | 60% | $4.0 | $6.0 | $8.0 | $8.19 | 200% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 0 pp | 4 pp | 8 pp | 8 pp | 200% | |
| GHG Emissions (kTon) | 15% | 410 | 373 | 336 | 358 | 140.5% | |
| Final Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 191% | |
| 2024 (Tranche C) | EPS (Adjusted) | 60% | $6.0 | $8.0 | $10.0 | $8.32 | 116% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 0 pp | 4 pp | 8 pp | 1.6 pp | 40% | |
| GHG Emissions (kTon) | 15% | 372 | 338 | 304 | 306 | 194.1% | |
| Final Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 109% |
Notes:
- Company states PSUs grant/earn per tranche with vesting at roughly the third anniversary (e.g., 2024 tranche A vests Q1 2027, subject to service) .
- 2022–2024 three-tranche PSU cycle paid a combined 123% of target (A 68%, B 191%, C 109%) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Ownership/Guidelines: Executive officers must hold stock equal to 1x base salary (CEO: 2x). Executives must retain 75% of net shares until compliant. Hedging, short-selling, and pledging are prohibited for employees and directors . Equity awards accrue dividend equivalents and generally have a minimum three-year vesting period .
- Insider activity and holdings (recent disclosures):
- 2024-02-21: Form 4 filed (RSU/PSU-related; shows direct beneficial ownership; contemporaneous summary indicates 285 direct shares) .
- 2025-02-25: Open-market sale of 401 shares at $98.85; post-transaction holdings 685 shares (Form 4) . Media summary attributes sale to a pre-arranged 10b5-1 plan adopted 2024-11-11 and notes tax-related selling; total value $39,637 .
- 2025-09-23: Form 4 reports additional credited and/or earned RSUs/PSUs (including performance-based tranches and dividend equivalents); reporting title “EVP Quality and Proj. Mgmt” . Third-party summary enumerates 1,439.629 shares from 2023 performance RSUs, 474.7352 shares from 2024 performance RSUs, and time-based RSU tranches totaling 1,407.8713 shares (all as direct ownership) .
Implications:
- The modest open-market sale and clear ongoing RSU/PSU accumulation suggest limited selling pressure historically; however, cliff vesting cycles in 2026–2027 can create episodic supply at vesting dates .
Employment Terms
- Equity change-in-control protection: Double-trigger acceleration applies where awards are assumed; immediate vesting if not assumed. Historical plan terms pre-2019 differed (single-trigger on CiC under the 1997 plan) .
- Clawback: NYSE-compliant recoupment for restatements plus broader “harmful conduct” clawback authority (e.g., violations of code, securities law) .
- Equity grant timing: Annual grants occur in Q1 on/after Q4 results; company does not time grants with MNPI; prohibits backdating .
- Note: The proxy discloses specific severance/notice/non-compete economics for NEOs (e.g., 6–12 months’ notice, 1.5x salary lump-sum severance for involuntary termination/Good Reason, 12-month non-compete supported by up to 60% salary differential payments), but does not disclose Jademyr’s individual agreement. Use NEO terms as a benchmark only, not as confirmed terms for Jademyr .
Additional Governance and Shareholder Feedback
- Say-on-Pay support: ~97.0% (2024), 97.1% (2023), 97.6% (2022) approval .
- Related-party transactions are reviewed and pre-approved; policy and insider trading policy noted (insider trading policy filed as Exhibit 19 to 2024 10-K) .
- No stock options granted since 2015; equity plan prohibits option repricing without shareholder approval; no 280G excise tax gross-ups for CiC .
Investment Implications
- Pay mix and metrics (EPS, Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP, GHG, Adjusted Operating Income and Cash Conversion) explicitly link pay to financial and sustainability outcomes, with PSU outcomes averaging 123% over 2022–2024—aligning management rewards with shareholder value creation and operational performance .
- Ownership policy (1x salary), 75% net-share retention until compliant, and prohibitions on pledging/hedging enhance alignment and reduce downside governance risk .
- Insider signals: Jademyr’s Form 4 history shows small net sales (e.g., 401 shares at $98.85) and continued RSU/PSU accrual, which points to limited selling pressure; watch for potential liquidity around PSU/RSU cliff dates (notably Q1 2026–Q1 2027 cycles) .
- Retention risk moderates with multi-year vesting and dividend-equivalent accruals; governance practices (double-trigger, strong clawback, no gross-ups) are shareholder-friendly, and say-on-pay support is consistently high, limiting compensation-policy overhang .