Magnus Jarlegren
AUTOLIVAbout Magnus Jarlegren
Magnus Jarlegren is President, Autoliv Europe (appointed June 1, 2023). He is 46 years old, studied Mechanical Engineering at Chalmers University of Technology, and previously served as EVP, Operations (2019–2023). Prior roles include leadership positions at Sandvik Coromant (VP Production; VP Supply) and earlier career at Solving EFESO and McKinsey & Co. . Company performance context during his tenure: Autoliv FY revenue/EBITDA trends are shown below. Autoliv’s 2024 pay-versus-performance shows CAP declining year over year alongside a TSR pullback from 2023 highs; 2024 TSR value of initial $100 was $125 vs $143 in 2023 .
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues (USD) | $8,842,000,000* | $10,475,000,000* | $10,390,000,000* |
| EBITDA (USD) | $1,034,000,000* | $1,485,000,000* | $1,380,000,000* |
| Values retrieved from S&P Global. |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv | President, Autoliv Europe | 2023–present | Leads European division execution; division AOI tied to annual bonus metrics . |
| Autoliv | EVP, Operations | 2019–2023 | Led operational excellence and Autoliv Production System step change . |
| Sandvik Coromant | VP Production; VP Supply | 2014–2019 | Led global production and supply functions . |
| Solving EFESO | Consultant | ~3 years | Operations consulting experience . |
| McKinsey & Co. | Consultant | ~10 years | Strategy/operations consulting . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships disclosed for Jarlegren in the latest proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024) | Amount/Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $720,142 |
| Target Annual Bonus % (of salary) | 50% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid | $550,908 |
| Perquisites/Other | $229,528 total; includes car allowance ($23,266), temporary housing ($48,256), moving/home leave, health insurance and transport subsidies; plus tax reimbursement of $3,246 for certain relocation benefits |
| Retirement Contributions | Participates in Swiss defined contribution plan; total contribution rate 18.57% of base salary (70% company/30% employee) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Non-Equity Incentive (2024 program for Europe)
- Structure and weights: Division Europe Adjusted Operating Income (50%); Group Adjusted Operating Income (25%); Adjusted Cash Conversion (25%) .
- Outcomes (2024): Division Europe AOI $161.1 million; adjusted cash conversion 85%; group adjusted operating income $1,007 million. Overall payout for Europe Division participants was 153% of target .
| Metric | Weight | Target (plan design) | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Division Europe Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | Linear scale; threshold to max with 2x cap | $161.1m | 153% of target (overall program outcome for Europe) |
| Adjusted Operating Income (Group) | 25% | 0x at ≤70% of 2023 AOI; 2x at ≥130% | $1,007m | Included in overall outcome |
| Adjusted Cash Conversion (Group) | 25% | 0x at ≤50%; 2x at ≥90% | 85% | Included in overall outcome |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
- Mix: 75% PSUs / 25% RSUs for executives (CEO: 100% PSUs) .
- RSUs: cliff vest after 3 years .
- PSUs: 3 one-year performance tranches (EPS 60%, Relative Organic Sales Growth 25%, GHG Emissions 15%); earned by year but vest at ~3 years (e.g., 2024 Tranche A vests Q1’27) .
- 2024 grants to Jarlegren: PSUs target 1,669; RSUs 561 (grant-date fair values $166,388 and $61,800, respectively) .
| LTI Element | Grant Date | Target Shares | Vesting | Performance Metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024) | Feb 20, 2024 | 1,669 | Tranches A/B/C for CY24/25/26; vest Q1’27 if earned | EPS (60%), Relative Organic Sales Growth (25%), GHG (15%) |
| RSUs (2024) | Feb 20, 2024 | 561 | Cliff vest on 3rd anniversary (Feb 2027) | Time-based |
2022 PSUs Payout Cert (applies to executives): Tranche A 68%, Tranche B 191%, Tranche C 109% based on EPS, relative organic sales growth vs LVP, and GHG results .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial Ownership: 6,142 shares as of March 12, 2025; less than 1% of outstanding shares .
- Outstanding/Unvested Awards (12/31/2024):
- 2024 RSUs not vested: 1,203 ($112,829) .
- 2024 PSUs unearned (B & C tranches at target): 1,151 ($107,952) .
- 2023 RSUs not vested: 2,351 ($220,500) .
- 2023 PSUs unearned (C tranche at target): 587 ($55,055) .
- 2022 RSUs not vested: 2,577 ($241,697) .
- Option Awards: No options outstanding; company has not granted options since 2015 .
- Ownership Policy: Executives must hold stock equal to 1x base salary; must retain 75% of net shares until compliant .
- Hedging/Pledging: Company prohibits hedging, short-selling, and pledging by executive officers .
- Insider Activity Indicators: In 2024, Jarlegren had 1,949 shares vest; no option exercises disclosed for him . Section 16(a) late filings disclosure identified an issue for another executive (Nellis), none for Jarlegren .
Employment Terms
- Appointment/Role: President, Autoliv Europe effective June 1, 2023 (from EVP, Operations) .
- Notice Period: 6 months notice by either party (CEO has 12) .
- Severance (non‑CoC): Lump-sum 1.5x base salary upon involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason, plus salary/benefits during the 6‑month notice period .
- Non-Compete: 12 months post-termination; company pays up to 12 monthly “salary differential” capped at 60% of annual salary aggregate (ceases if cap reached) .
- Change-in-Control: Double-trigger equity acceleration (if awards assumed); no 280G excise tax gross-ups; if awards not assumed, vest upon CoC .
- Illustrative Payments (as of 12/31/2024, USD): Termination without cause: $1,796,745 total; CoC + termination: $2,320,562; Death/Retirement: $765,514 (equity vesting values per proxy methodology) .
Compensation Structure Notes (alignment and risk)
- Pay Mix: Heavy at-risk pay; PSUs are 75% of LTI for executives; RSUs 25% with 3-year cliff vesting; no stock options since 2015 .
- Annual Bonus Metrics: Limited, formulaic metrics emphasize profitability (Adjusted Operating Income), cash discipline (Adjusted Cash Conversion), and divisional performance where applicable .
- LTI Metrics: EPS, relative organic sales growth vs global LVP, and GHG emissions support strategic and sustainability priorities; 3-year vesting supports retention .
- Clawbacks: NYSE-compliant recoupment plus broader company policy for harmful conduct, code violations, or conduct leading to restatements .
- Say‑on‑Pay Support: 97.0% in 2024; 97.1% in 2023; 97.6% in 2022 .
Performance & Track Record
- Division Performance Signal: Europe Division AOI of $161.1m underpinned a 153% payout of target for 2024 Europe program participants, indicating outperformance against divisional and corporate thresholds .
- Company TSR/Profitability Context: 2024 CAP decreased vs 2023 while Autoliv TSR slipped from $143 (2023) to $125 (2024) on a $100 basis; Net income and Adjusted Operating Income were $648m and $1,007m, respectively, in 2024 .
- Role-Specific Strengths: Operational excellence background highlighted at appointment; led the step-change of the Autoliv Production System and plant improvement initiatives .
Compensation Peer Group (context for LDCC decisions)
- Swedish Peer Group for Sweden-based executives includes: AB Volvo, Ericsson, SSAB, Alfa Laval, Sandvik, Stora Enso, Assa Abloy, Scania, Volvo Cars, Atlas Copco, Skanska, Electrolux, SKF .
- U.S. Peer Group for U.S.-based executives includes: Continental, Johnson Controls, Yazaki, Stanley Black & Decker, BorgWarner, Dana, Rockwell Automation, Terex, Timken, Trinity, Parker-Hannifin, Trane, Dover, Adient, Lear .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: Jarlegren’s 2024 bonus tied 50% to divisional AOI and 50% to group AOI/Cash Conversion; Europe delivered an above-target 153% payout, signaling operational execution in his scope .
- Equity overhang/flow: Significant unvested RSUs/PSUs vest on 3-year cadence (notably Q1 2026 and Q1 2027), which can create periodic selling windows, though hedging/pledging is prohibited and options are absent (reducing exercise-driven supply) .
- Retention risk mitigants: No options; high PSU weighting and 3-year vesting; robust severance and 12-month non-compete economics (with capped salary differential) reduce flight risk during transitions; double‑trigger CoC avoids single-trigger windfalls and aligns with investors .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%); however, the 1x salary ownership guideline and 75% net‑share retention policy drive ongoing accumulation and alignment over time .
- Governance/recourse: Broad clawback provisions beyond NYSE minimums and consistent say‑on‑pay support (~97%) suggest low governance risk around pay .
References: Executive bio and compensation program details ; appointment press release ; ownership and policy disclosures ; pay-versus-performance/TSR .