Mikael Hagström
AUTOLIVAbout Mikael Hagström
Mikael Hagström, age 58, is Autoliv’s Vice President, Corporate Control, a role he has held since September 2020. He previously served as CFO of DongFeng Commercial Vehicles (a JV of DongFeng and AB Volvo) from 2016–2019 and as SVP, Head of Corporate Financial Reporting for the Volvo Group from 2006–2016; he holds a B.Sc. in Business Administration from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden . Autoliv reported 2024 Net Income of $648 million and Adjusted Operating Income of $1,007 million, and its cumulative TSR value moved from $96 (2022) to $125 (2024) on a $100 base, outperforming its peer group in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv, Inc. | Vice President, Corporate Control | Sep 2020–present | Corporate control leadership for global safety supplier |
| DongFeng Commercial Vehicles (AB Volvo JV) | Chief Financial Officer | 2016–2019 | JV finance leadership in China operations |
| Volvo Group | SVP, Head of Corporate Financial Reporting | 2006–2016 | Group reporting oversight for global OEM |
External Roles
- No public company board roles or external directorships disclosed for Mikael Hagström .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail | Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | SEK 1,896,000 (2020 level) | Annual review starting 2021 |
| Annual bonus target | 25% of base salary | Max payout 2.0x target |
| Pension | Covered by Swedish ITP occupational plan | Per collective agreement |
| Perquisites | Company car eligibility; annual health exam | Per policy |
| Holiday | 30 days per year | Swedish terms |
Performance Compensation
Autoliv’s executive LTI uses RSUs and PSUs with minimum three-year vesting; RSUs cliff-vest three years after grant, and PSUs vest on or about the third anniversary with three one-year performance tranches (EPS 60%, Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP 25%, GHG Emissions 15%). Annual grants occur in Q1 following publication of Q4 results (e.g., Feb 20, 2024) .
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | 2022 Actual | 2022 Payout | 2023 Actual | 2023 Payout | 2024 Actual | 2024 Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS ($) | 60% | 4.0 | 6.0 | 8.0 | 4.40 | 20% | 8.19 | 200% | 8.32 | 116% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth (pp vs LVP) | 25% | 0 | 4 | 8 | 6.6 | 165% | 8.8 | 200% | 1.6 | 40% |
| GHG Emissions (Kton) | 15% | 451 | 430 | 409 (2022 scale) | 430 | 100% | 358 (2023 scale) | 141% | 306 (2024 scale) | 194% |
| Final PSU tranche payout | — | — | — | — | 68% | — | 191% | — | 109% | — |
Notes:
- CD&A indicates “each executive officer” earned a combined 123% of target PSUs for the 2022–2024 performance tranches (A 68%, B 191%, C 109%) .
- Regular executive RSU grants cliff-vest at 3 years; PSUs include double-trigger CIC acceleration if awards are assumed (full vesting only upon qualifying termination post-CIC), or single-trigger if not assumed .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 2x salary; other executive officers 1x salary; executives must retain 75% of net shares until meeting guidelines .
- Policy prohibits hedging, short-selling, and pledging of Autoliv securities by executive officers and directors .
- Rule 10b5-1 plan: On Nov 7, 2024, Mikael Hagström adopted a plan to sell 50% of shares acquired upon the vesting of RSUs/PSUs in Feb 2025 to cover taxes, with sales scheduled between Feb 24–Mar 7, 2025 .
- Aggregate executive group ownership: Autoliv’s directors, NEOs, and executive officers as a group (24 individuals) held 231,485 shares as of Mar 12, 2025; individual holdings for Hagström were not disclosed in the proxy .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Employer/Role | Employed by Autoliv AB as VP Financial Control starting Aug 17, 2020; Stockholm-based |
| Notice | 3 months by either party; company may release duties during notice (with consent, may take new employment) |
| Side-line/Competition | Prohibition on competing activities and compensated side roles during employment without written consent |
| Insider rules | Acknowledgement and adherence to company insider trading rules |
| IP assignment | Work results IP assigned to company per agreement |
| Equity plan eligibility | Eligible for Autoliv’s Stock Incentive Plan 2021 (subject to Board approval and employment by vesting) |
Performance & Company Context
| Measure | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv TSR – value of $100 | 110 | 126 | 96 | 143 | 125 |
| Peer Group TSR – value of $100 | 116 | 139 | 101 | 100 | 76 |
| Net Income ($mm) | 188 | 437 | 425 | 489 | 648 |
| Adjusted Operating Income ($mm) | 482 | 683 | 598 | 920 | 1,007 |
Additional compensation governance features:
- Clawback (recoupment): Board can claw back compensation beyond NYSE mandates, including harmful conduct, policy/code violations, fraud, and misconduct contributing to restatements .
- Use of PSUs since 2019; PSUs 100% of CEO LTI and 75% for other executives; minimum 3-year vesting .
- Equity grant timing policy and annual grant processes; 2024 grants occurred on Feb 20, 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and discipline: Ownership guidelines and a strict no-hedging/pledging policy support long-term alignment and reduce red-flag risk; clawback provisions exceed minimum NYSE requirements, enhancing governance quality .
- Selling pressure: Hagström’s 10b5-1 plan indicates tax-driven, programmatic sales around vesting dates (Feb–Mar 2025), reducing discretionary selling risk; monitor for subsequent 10b5-1 adoptions or Form 4 activity around future vesting windows .
- Retention risk: His employment terms feature standard Swedish executive constructs (3-month notice, no post-employment non-compete disclosed), while Autoliv uses multi-year vesting on RSUs/PSUs and a broad executive base tied to company-wide metrics (EPS, cash conversion, GHG), which collectively incentivize continuity but do not create hard-lock retention .
- Pay-for-performance: Executive incentives are tied to EPS (60%), relative organic growth (25%), and GHG reductions (15%); 2022–2024 tranches paid above target on average (123%), evidencing linkage to delivery and sustainability goals; this supports a bias to earnings, growth outperformance vs LVP, and ESG execution .