Staffan Olsson
AUTOLIVAbout Staffan Olsson
Staffan Olsson, age 57, is Executive Vice President, Operations at Autoliv since June 2024; he joined Autoliv in June 2020 as Vice President of Seatbelt Operations. Prior to Autoliv, he served at Haldex on its management team as EVP, Operations & Supply Chain (Mar 2019–May 2020) and earlier as SVP, Global Operations (Jan 2014–Feb 2019); he previously held various director positions in operations and R&D at Scania. Olsson holds an MSc in Industrial Engineering and Management from Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden . Company performance context tied to executive incentives: 2024 Net Income $648 million and Adjusted Operating Income $1,007 million; Autoliv’s cumulative TSR value for a $100 initial investment was $125 in 2024, with PSUs for the 2022–2024 cycle paying out a combined 123% of target, reflecting EPS, Organic Sales Growth vs LVP, and GHG Emissions outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact / Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autoliv | EVP, Operations | Since Jun 2024 | Executive officer leading global operations |
| Autoliv | VP, Seatbelt Operations | Jun 2020–Jun 2024 | Led seatbelt operations globally |
| Haldex | EVP, Operations & Supply Chain | Mar 2019–May 2020 | Executive management team role at global brake systems supplier |
| Haldex | SVP, Global Operations | Jan 2014–Feb 2019 | Led global manufacturing operations |
| Scania | Various director roles in operations and R&D | Not disclosed | Director-level operations/R&D leadership at global CV manufacturer |
| Education | MSc, Industrial Engineering & Management (Chalmers) | — | Technical and managerial foundation |
External Roles
No external directorships or board roles disclosed for Olsson .
Fixed Compensation
- Executive salaries are set in local currencies; for 2024 the LDCC increased base salaries between 3.5% and 14% guided by market median objectives and retention considerations .
- Specific base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus paid for Staffan Olsson are not disclosed; however, executive management participates in annual non‑equity incentive programs based on company metrics (see Performance Compensation) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Non‑Equity Incentive Program (Company-wide design and outcomes)
| Metric | Weight | Definition / Targeting | 2024 Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | EBIT adjusted for antitrust and capacity alignment; payout linearly scaled between 70% and 130% of 2023 AOI | $1,007 million | Executives outside Europe earned 152% of target (Europe Division 153%) |
| Adjusted Cash Conversion | 50% | Free cash flow (OpCF − Capex, net) / Net Income adjusted; 0% payout ≤50%, max payout at ≥90% | 85% (after adjustments) | Executives outside Europe earned 152% of target (Europe Division 153%) |
Note: The program applies to executive officers broadly; payout rates disclosed for executive officers outside Europe indicate 152% of target for 2024 .
PSU Award Structure and Tranche Outcomes (Company-wide)
- Executive officers other than the CEO receive LTI split 75% PSUs / 25% RSUs; CEO receives 100% PSUs. RSUs cliff‑vest after 3 years; PSUs earn annually (tranches) and cliff‑vest around the 3rd anniversary (e.g., 2024 PSUs vest Q1 2027) .
| Metric | Weight | 2022 Actual | 2022 Payout | Vesting | 2023 Actual | 2023 Payout | Vesting | 2024 Actual | 2024 Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPS (Adjusted) | 60% | $4.40 | 20% | Q1 2025 | $8.19 | 200% | Q1 2026 | $8.32 | 116% | Q1 2027 |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth vs LVP | 25% | 6.6 pp over LVP | 165% | Q1 2025 | 8.8 pp over LVP | 200% | Q1 2026 | 1.6 pp over LVP | 40% | Q1 2027 |
| GHG Emissions | 15% | 430 KTon | 100% | Q1 2025 | 358 KTon | 141% | Q1 2026 | 306 KTon | 194% | Q1 2027 |
- Combined PSU payout across 2022–2024 tranches was 123% of target (Tranche A 68%, B 191%, C 109%) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO 2× base salary; other executive officers 1× base salary; retain 75% of net shares until guideline met |
| Hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging, short‑selling, and pledging by executive officers and directors |
| Dividend equivalents | RSUs and PSUs accrue dividend equivalents subject to the same vesting and earn‑out schedule |
| Vesting cadence | RSUs cliff‑vest at 3 years; PSUs earn annually and cliff‑vest at ~3 years (e.g., 2024 grants vest in Q1 2027) |
| Change‑in‑control (CIC) | Double‑trigger acceleration for awards granted since 2021 if assumed; if not assumed, vest at CIC; earlier plan documentation provided target vesting mechanics for PSUs at CIC |
| Grant timing | Annual LTI grants in Q1 on or after publication of Q4 results; no backdating or timing around MNPI |
Note: Total beneficial ownership, vested/unvested balances, and any pledged shares for Olsson are not disclosed in the proxy’s ownership tables; the company bans pledging by policy .
Employment Terms
- Role and tenure: Executive Vice President, Operations since June 2024; at Autoliv since June 2020 .
- Contracts: Company discloses executive officer severance/CIC structures (double‑trigger equity, no Section 280G excise tax gross‑ups) for NEOs; individual terms for Olsson are not separately disclosed .
- Clawbacks: Compensation recoupment policy updated to comply with NYSE; Board can recoup beyond restatements for harmful conduct and policy violations .
- Retirement: Newly hired/promoted senior executives participate in defined contribution plans rather than defined benefit plans; U.S. legacy DB applies only to certain executives, not generally .
Performance & Pay Versus Performance (Company-level context)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($USD millions) | $425 | $489 | $648 |
| Adjusted Operating Income ($USD millions) | $598 | $920 | $1,007 |
| Autoliv TSR (value of $100 initial investment) | $96 | $143 | $125 |
| Peer Group TSR (Dow Jones U.S. Auto Parts Index) | $101 | $100 | $76 |
Compensation Peer Groups (Benchmarking used by LDCC)
| Peer group | Members |
|---|---|
| Swedish Peer Group | AB Volvo; Alfa Laval; Assa Abloy; Atlas Copco; Electrolux; Ericsson; Sandvik; Scania; Skanska; SKF; SSAB; Stora Enso; Volvo Cars |
| U.S. Peer Group | Continental AG; Johnson Controls International; Yazaki; Stanley Black & Decker; BorgWarner; Dana; Rockwell Automation; Terex; Timken; Trinity Industries; Parker‑Hannifin; Trane Technologies; Dover; Adient; Lear |
Say‑on‑Pay & Governance Signals
- Advisory vote to approve executive compensation received ~97.0% (2024), 97.1% (2023), and 97.6% (2022) approval .
- Board prohibits hedging/short‑selling/pledging and enforces stock ownership guidelines for executive officers and directors .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Olsson’s compensation structure (75% PSUs / 25% RSUs for executive officers) and 3‑year cliff vesting create strong retention and pay‑for‑performance linkage tied to EPS, organic growth vs LVP, cash conversion, and GHG metrics; 2022–2024 PSUs paid above target overall, evidencing incentive alignment to delivered performance .
- Selling pressure risk: Ownership guidelines and 75% net share retention until guideline compliance, plus prohibition on hedging/pledging, mitigate near‑term selling pressure and improve alignment with shareholders .
- CIC/severance economics: Double‑trigger vesting reduces windfall risk; absence of excise tax gross‑ups is shareholder‑friendly; individual severance multiples for Olsson are not disclosed, implying limited headline risk vs NEO disclosures .
- Execution risk: As EVP Operations (since 2024) with prior global operations leadership at Haldex/Scania, Olsson’s role is central to quality, delivery, and cost programs; company performance improvements in AOI and PSU outcomes indicate operational execution momentum tied to incentive structures .