Farshad Haghighi
AMKOR TECHNOLOGYAbout Farshad Haghighi
Executive Vice President, Chief Sales Officer at Amkor Technology (AMKR). As of April 1, 2024 he was 61 years old; he holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from San Jose State University and has 35+ years of semiconductor sales and engineering experience, including prior roles at National Semiconductor and Fairchild Semiconductor . He has served as EVP, Chief Sales Officer since August 2022 and joined Amkor in 1994; prior roles include EVP Worldwide Sales & Marketing (Oct 2021–Aug 2022) and multiple senior sales leadership positions . Company performance inputs tied to his incentive pay in 2024 included revenue of approximately $6,318 million and operating income of approximately $438 million, which translated to below-target attainment on the financial components of the annual incentive plan and 89% of target payout for NEOs after applying individual performance factors .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amkor Technology | EVP, Chief Sales Officer | Aug 2022–present | Leads global sales; senior NEO |
| Amkor Technology | EVP, Worldwide Sales & Marketing | Oct 2021–Aug 2022 | Oversees sales and marketing |
| Amkor Technology | Corporate VP, West Region Sales | Mar 2018–Oct 2021 | Regional sales leadership |
| Amkor Technology | Corporate VP, U.S. Fabless Sales | Jan 2011–Mar 2018 | U.S. fabless customer sales |
| Amkor Technology | Senior VP, Western Sales | 2010–2011 | Western region sales |
| Amkor Technology | Various sales management and engineering roles | 1994–2010 | Sales/engineering roles since joining Amkor |
| National Semiconductor; Fairchild Semiconductor | Engineering and sales roles | Not disclosed | Pre‑Amkor semiconductor experience |
External Roles
- No external public company board or committee roles disclosed for Haghighi in the DEF 14A executive officer biographies reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 525,000 | 550,000 | 560,000 |
| Target bonus (% of base) | 85% (NEO level) | 85% (NEO level) | 85% (NEO level) |
| Actual annual cash bonus ($) | 491,400 | 303,875 | 423,640 |
| Total compensation ($) | 1,710,564 | 1,930,322 | 2,303,043 |
Performance Compensation
- Annual Incentive Plan design (2024): Revenue 35% weighting; Operating Income 35%; Individual/Discretionary 30% .
- Plan financial goals (2024): Revenue threshold/target/max = $5,800M / $6,500M / $7,000M; Operating Income threshold/target/max = $375M / $500M / $600M .
- Actual attainment and payout (2024): Revenue attainment ~74%; Operating Income ~51%; Individual performance set at 150% for all NEOs; aggregate payout approved at 89% of target (Haghighi actual $423,640) .
| Annual incentive component (2024) | Weighting | Target | Actual attainment | Payout impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 35% | $6,500M | ~74% | Below target |
| Operating Income | 35% | $500M | ~51% | Below target |
| Individual/Discretionary | 30% | Committee set | 150% for NEOs | Above target |
| Total payout | — | 100% | — | 89% of target |
Performance Compensation – Equity Awards (Grants and Vesting)
| Grant component | Grant date | Target shares | Grant date fair value ($) | Performance range | Vesting/measurement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 2/20/2024 | 22,268 | 642,877 | n/a | 33.33% annually over 3 years (service-based) |
| EPS PSU – Year 1 (2024 EPS) | 2/20/2024 | 11,134 | 321,439 | 0%–225% of target | Earned based on 2024 EPS; 83% of Year 1 PSUs vested on 2/19/2025 |
| EPS PSU – Year 2 (2025 EPS) | 2/20/2024 | 11,134 | Included above | 0%–225% | Earned based on 2025 EPS |
| EPS PSU – Year 3 (2026 EPS) | 2/20/2024 | 11,135 | Included above | 0%–225% | Earned based on 2026 EPS |
| rTSR PSU (vs SOX) | 2/20/2024 | 12,236 | 331,229 | 0%–150% (capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative) | Earned over 2/20/2024–2/20/2027 |
Notes
- PSU calibration examples: rTSR vesting at 25th/55th/85th percentile corresponds to 50%/100%/150% of target (linear between points) . Year 1 EPS PSUs 0% below 40%, 100% at target, 225% at 175% of goal (linear between points) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | 9,911 (as of Mar 1, 2023) | 18,265 (as of Mar 1, 2024) | 20,146 (as of Mar 20, 2025) |
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 300% of salary; other NEOs 100% of salary, with 5 years to comply. As of the record date, each NEO either met or was in compliance with the guidelines .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Hedging and pledging of company securities are prohibited for directors, officers, and employees .
- Clawback: Policy adopted Nov 15, 2023; company will recover erroneously awarded incentive comp in the event of an accounting restatement for the preceding three fiscal years, applicable to current and former executive officers .
Outstanding/unvested equity context
- As of Dec 31, 2023, Haghighi held unvested RSUs and PSUs from 2021–2023 grants; example positions include RSUs from 2022 and 2023 and PSUs from 2022, 2023, and Dec 2023 grants as disclosed in the outstanding awards table . Option positions for Haghighi appear largely historical; he exercised 43,438 options during 2021 per the 2022 proxy’s “Option Exercises and Stock Vested” table .
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash severance | Bonus treatment | Health benefits | Equity treatment | Trigger |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / for good reason (non‑CIC) | Continuation of then‑current base salary + target bonus for 12 months | Pro‑rata bonus for year of termination based on actual plan result | Payment of COBRA premiums for 12 months | Time‑vesting equity scheduled to vest within 18 months accelerates in full; PSUs per award terms | Involuntary/Good Reason only |
| CIC + qualifying termination | Lump sum 1.5x base salary + target bonus | Pro‑rata target bonus for year of termination | COBRA premiums for 18 months | Full acceleration of time‑based equity; 2023 & 2024 PSUs accelerate at target | Double‑trigger: termination in connection with CIC (within 3 months before to 24 months after) |
Additional provisions
- Excise tax cutback to maximize after‑tax value (280G/4999) .
- No pledging; clawback policy applies to incentive compensation .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Variable cash was tied 70% to financial metrics (revenue and operating income) and 30% to individual performance; 2024 below-target financial results drove an 89% payout overall, indicating discipline in the plan design . PSU structure mixes multi‑year EPS growth and relative TSR with capped upside when absolute TSR is negative, supporting shareholder alignment .
- Vesting and selling pressure: 2024 RSUs vest ratably over three years starting Feb 2025; Year 1 EPS PSUs vested at 83% on Feb 19, 2025. Expect periodic supply from RSU vesting and potential PSU conversions across 2025–2027, tempered by stock ownership retention requirements .
- Retention and change‑of‑control: For non‑CEO NEOs like Haghighi, severance equals 12 months (non‑CIC) and 1.5x base+target (CIC) with double‑trigger equity acceleration, which is market‑standard and mitigates golden‑parachute risk while providing retention .
- Governance risk: Anti‑hedging/pledging and clawback policies reduce alignment and accounting restatement risk; say‑on‑pay support in 2024 exceeded 98%, suggesting low external governance friction on executive pay practices .
Key takeaway: Haghighi’s incentives are balanced between operational execution (revenue and operating income) and multi‑year shareholder value (EPS/TSR PSUs), with disciplined bonus outcomes in cyclical conditions, meaningful unvested equity promoting retention, and governance guardrails (no pledging, clawback) that support alignment.