Steven B. Ketchum, Ph.D.
Executive Vice President, President of R&D and Chief Scientific Officer at
AMARIN CORP PLC\UK
Executive
About Steven B. Ketchum, Ph.D.
Executive Vice President, President of R&D and Chief Scientific Officer at Amarin (AMRN); age 60, with 25+ years in late‑stage product development and clinical/regulatory strategy. He joined Amarin in February 2012, and was named Chief Scientific Officer in January 2016; education includes a Ph.D. in Pharmacology (University College London) and B.S. in Biological Sciences (Stanford) . Company performance context for 2024: nine consecutive quarters of cash positive or neutral operations, year‑end cash of $294 million with no debt, and 2024 revenues “over $200 million,” with continued U.S. share leadership and EU expansion—key milestones that frame incentive outcomes for management, including R&D leadership .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Viracta Therapeutics, Inc. (formerly Sunesis Pharmaceuticals) | SVP, R&D (and Director until Feb 2021) | 2008–2012 (director through Feb 2021) | Led R&D strategy across clinical, regulatory, and pharmaceutical development . |
| Reliant Pharmaceuticals | SVP, R&D and Medical Affairs | 2005–2008 | Led development and support for Lovaza and other commercialized CV products . |
| IntraBiotics Pharmaceuticals | SVP, Operations and Regulatory Affairs | Pre‑2005 | Senior leadership in operations and regulatory . |
| ALZA Corporation | Regulatory Affairs roles (nearly 8 years) | Pre‑2005 | Supported development/commercialization of multiple products, including Concerta . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sunesis/Viracta | Director | Through Feb 2021 | Board service concurrent with/external to Amarin . |
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $645,840 | $669,090 | 2024 merit increases across NEOs were 3.6%–4.8% . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (2024)
| Executive | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | Weighting (Corp/Indiv) | Corporate Goal Achievement | Individual Goal Achievement | Payout (% of Target) | Actual Bonus (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steven B. Ketchum, Ph.D. | 50% | 75% / 25% | 99.5% | 100% | 99.6% | $333,290 |
2024 Corporate Performance Scorecard (Drives Bonus Outcomes)
| Metric Category | Weight | Outcome (Assessment) |
|---|---|---|
| Financial | 60% | Achieved 98% vs plan; weighted 59% . |
| Commercial | 20% | Mixed: EU market access 75% (7.5% weighted); U.S. payer share 100% (4%); regulatory approvals 100% (2%); advance filings 100% (2%); supply readiness 100% (2%) . |
| Pipeline & Medical | 10% | MOA/data generation 133% (9% weighted); strategic evaluations 100% (3%) . |
| People & Culture | 10% | Cyber/ERM 100% (4%); engagement 133% (4%); retention goal 100% (3%) . |
| Total | 100% | Corporate goals achieved at 99.5% . |
Long‑Term Equity (granted in 2024)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares/Units | Exercise/Price | Grant‑Date Fair Value | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/1/2024 | Stock Options | 418,000 | $1.21/sh | $422,293 | 33% at 1‑yr; balance quarterly over next 8 quarters . |
| 2/1/2024 | RSUs | 116,000 | — | $140,360 | 3 equal annual installments starting 2/2/2025 . |
Notes:
- AMRN reweighted LTI mix to 75% options / 25% RSUs in 2024 to strengthen stock‑price linkage; peer benchmarking targets at market median .
- Company‑wide, options were underwater at 12/31/2024, limiting near‑term monetization pressure .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of 2/28/2025) | 1,984,154 shares/derivatives in total; includes 747,001 shares directly owned and 1,237,153 options exercisable/vesting within 60 days; <1% of outstanding . |
| In‑the‑Money Status | As of 12/31/2024, all NEO options were underwater (zero intrinsic value) . |
| Upcoming Vesting (from 2024 grants) | Options: 33% vest 2/1/2025; remaining quarterly thereafter . RSUs: three annual tranches starting 2/2/2025 . Certain performance RSUs had a tranche vesting 1/30/2025 . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must hold equity equal to 1x salary (CEO 3x); NEOs have satisfied or are within the 5‑yr compliance window . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited without Audit Committee approval; policy restricts hedging and pledging to align with long‑term value . |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback adopted Oct 2023; covers incentive comp for current/former executive officers . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms (Ketchum) |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | NEOs (other than CFO) have written employment agreements; at‑will, with non‑compete, non‑solicit, confidentiality obligations; no fixed term . |
| Severance (Non‑CIC) | Under Executive Severance Plan: 12 months base salary; 6 months acceleration of time‑based equity; up to 12 months health benefits (cost‑shared); subject to release . |
| Severance (Double‑Trigger CIC) | 1.5x (base + target bonus) in lump sum; full vesting of all equity; up to 18 months health benefits (cost‑shared); subject to release . |
| Illustrative Potential Payments | If terminated without cause/for good reason within 24 months post‑CIC (as of 12/31/2024): Base $1,003,635; Bonus $501,818; RSU acceleration $240,382; Health $53,428; Total $1,799,263 . If terminated outside CIC window: Base $669,090; Bonus $334,545; RSU acceleration $64,190; Health $35,619; Total $1,103,444 . |
| Double‑Trigger Policy | CIC alone does not trigger severance or acceleration; requires qualifying termination (company‑wide policy) . |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 operations: nine consecutive quarters cash positive/neutral; U.S. IPE market share ~53%, EU launches advancing (pricing/reimbursement in additional markets), regulatory approvals in China and Australia; year‑end cash $294 million, no debt—factors used by the Remuneration Committee in evaluating compensation outcomes .
- Scientific leadership and data generation: Ketchum underscored ongoing REDUCE‑IT data mining, mechanistic evidence (anti‑inflammatory pathways, protein expression), and consistent presence at major congresses to reinforce differentiation and complement LDL‑lowering therapies, aligning R&D focus with long‑term value in ex‑U.S. markets with IP through 2039 .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: 2024 LTI tilt to 75% options increases pay‑for‑performance sensitivity; annual bonuses tied 75% to corporate outcomes and 25% to individual goals, with corporate goals achieved at 99.5% and Ketchum’s payout at 99.6% of target .
- Governance enhancements: Independent consultant engagement (Aon, then Pearl Meyer), refined peer groups, and shareholder outreach to simplify programs and better align metrics/weights with strategy; say‑on‑pay support improved to approximately 80% at the 2024 AGM .
- Clawback/hedging/pledging: Robust guardrails reduce misalignment risk and discourage excess risk‑taking .
- Compliance note: Three late Form 4s (including Dr. Ketchum) were due to administrative error related to annual grants .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High equity weighting and underwater options at year‑end 2024 increase leverage to share‑price recovery; ownership guidelines and anti‑hedging/pledging policies reinforce long‑term alignment .
- Near‑term flow dynamics: Scheduled 2025–2027 RSU and option vesting may create periodic tax‑related selling or liquidity events; however, options’ underwater status at 12/31/2024 tempers immediate selling pressure .
- Retention and change‑of‑control: Double‑trigger CIC benefits (1.5x salary+bonus and full equity acceleration for NEOs) plus standard severance outside CIC reduce retention risk amid strategic transition and activist influence; payouts for Ketchum are moderate in dollar terms, reflecting prior share price levels .
- Execution focus: R&D leadership emphasizes sustained evidence generation and differentiation in protected geographies (EU patent runway), supporting the strategy to shift growth ex‑U.S.; incentive design ties to EU commercialization, cash discipline, and pipeline milestones, indicating clear operating KPIs for 2025+ .
- Governance/say‑on‑pay: Improving support (≈80%) suggests shareholders view recent compensation changes as directionally better, lowering risk of future pay controversies if performance tracks disclosed priorities .