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Cheryl R. Blanchard

Cheryl R. Blanchard

President and Chief Executive Officer at Anika Therapeutics
CEO
Executive
Board

About Cheryl R. Blanchard

Cheryl R. Blanchard, Ph.D., age 60, has served as President and CEO of Anika Therapeutics since April 2020 (interim CEO from February–April 2020) and as a director since August 2018; she is not an independent director and does not serve on board committees . She holds a Ph.D. and M.S. in Materials Science and Engineering (UT Austin) and a B.S. in Ceramic Engineering (Alfred University) . During 2024, Anika delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $15.5M and operating cash flow of $5.4M, divested two non-core businesses, grew international OA pain management revenue 16% YoY, and repurchased $10.9M of stock; however, 2024 TSR (value of $100 investment) was $32, and revenue was $120M, reflecting multi‑year stock underperformance despite operational progress .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Anika TherapeuticsPresident & CEO (interim CEO Feb–Apr 2020; CEO since Apr 2020)2020–presentStrategic realignment to core HA assets; divested Arthrosurface (Q4’24) and Parcus (Q1’25); pipeline progress (Hyalofast PMA modules; Cingal regulatory)
Blanchard Consulting, LLCPrincipal2012–2020Scientific, regulatory, and business strategy advisory to medtech and PE clients
Microchips Biotech, Inc.President & CEO2014–2019Regenerative medicine/drug delivery company sold to Daré Bioscience in Nov 2019
Zimmer, Inc.SVP, Chief Scientific Officer; GM Zimmer Biologics2000–2012Built a $100M+ regenerative medicine business; leadership in R&D/biologics

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Vigil Neuroscience (NASDAQ: VIGL)Director2020–presentPublic biotech board service
Daré Bioscience (NASDAQ: DARE)Director2019–2024Former director through June 2024
Neuronetics (NASDAQ: STIM)Director2019–2020Former director
SeaSpine (NASDAQ: SPNE)Director2015–2019Former director

Fixed Compensation

  • Summary Compensation (CEO)
Metric202220232024
Salary ($)$695,100 $726,000 $743,943
Bonus ($)$590,835 $583,160 $497,513
Stock Awards ($)$2,306,779 $1,614,708 $1,918,049
Option Awards ($)$2,323,562 $1,509,736 $1,915,059
All Other ($)$24,446 $26,196 $28,902
Total ($)$5,940,722 $4,459,800 $5,103,466
  • Salary and Target Bonus
Item2024 Value
Annualized base salary$750,000
Target bonus (% of salary)85%
Target bonus ($)$637,500
Actual bonus paid for 2024$498,000 (78% of target)

Key features: No guaranteed raises; no perquisites; no tax gross‑ups; clawback policy adopted Nov 27, 2023 covering three prior years upon restatement .

Performance Compensation

  • Annual Bonus Structure and Outcome (2024)
Metric categoryWeightTargetingAchievementPayout factor
Financial (Revenue, global Regenerative Solutions sales, Adjusted EBITDA)70%Company goals80% 0.80
Strategic (realignment/divestitures, cost reduction, EBITDA growth focus)30%Strategic goals75% 0.75
Corporate payout100%78%
CEO bonus resultTarget $637,500Paid $498,000
  • Long-Term Incentives (Grants in 2024)
Grant dateTypeShares/OptionsExercise priceVesting
Mar 15, 2024Phantom RSUs75,395 3 equal annual installments starting 1st anniversary
Mar 15, 2024Premium-priced stock options182,699 $27.98 3 equal annual installments starting 1st anniversary

Program design: CEO’s 2024 LTI split ~50% RSUs / 50% premium-priced options (exercise at 110% of grant-date price) to align with long-term value creation and retention . Premium-priced options were “underwater” as of 12/31/2024, reducing near-term exercise/sale pressure . For 2025, Anika replaced premium-priced options with performance-based RSUs tied to strategic and stock-price targets; CEO’s performance-based share mix was increased to two‑thirds .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial Ownership (as of April 21, 2025)
HolderShares/rights detail% Outstanding
Cheryl R. Blanchard6.10% of common stock
Included within: stock options exercisable within 60 days709,257
Trust holdings11,724 (Blanchard Revocable Trust)
  • Outstanding and Unvested Awards (12/31/2024 snapshot)
AwardExercisableUnexercisableStrikeRSUs unvested (#)Notes
Options (2021 grant)108,398 $37.40 10-year term
Options (2022 grant)139,214 69,607 $28.14 30,060 RSUs valued at $16.46 at 12/31/24
Options (2023 grant)43,666 87,332 $29.60 40,003
Options (2024 grant)182,699 $27.98 75,395

Insider trading, hedging/pledging: Company prohibits hedging and pledging; exceptions to pledge require CFO approval; board reports full compliance and has pre-clearance procedures for insiders . Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 3x base salary; NEOs 1x; all executive officers are compliant or within phase-in period; directors also meet or are within their phase-in periods .

Vesting cadence and selling pressure: RSUs and options vest in equal thirds starting one year after grant; with 2021–2024 grants outstanding, annual vesting continues through 2027; options remain out-of-the-money at 12/31/24 ($16.46 stock vs $27.98–$37.40 strikes), limiting exercise-driven selling in the near term .

Employment Terms

  • Employment Agreement (entered April 23, 2020; auto-renews annually): Initial term through Dec 31, 2021 with automatic one‑year renewals; includes initial equity awards (2020) and standard benefits .

  • Severance and Change-of-Control (CIC)

TriggerCash severanceHealth benefitsEquity vestingNotes
Termination without cause / good reason (no CIC)18 months’ salary 18 months at active rates Non‑compete/non‑solicit 12 months; release required
Qualifying termination 3 months before to 12 months after a CIC (double trigger)2x (salary + target bonus) 18 months at active rates Equity accelerates per plan; performance awards at target or actual; TSR awards measured to CIC

Estimated payouts as of 12/31/2024 (illustrative): Non‑CIC termination $1.16M; CIC termination $5.20M; both include health benefits and, for CIC, equity vesting valued at $2.39M at $16.46 share price . No 280G excise tax gross‑ups; “cut-back” to avoid excise tax if better after‑tax outcome . Company-wide clawback policy effective Nov 27, 2023 per SEC rules .

Board Governance

  • Board service and roles: Director since 2018; not independent; no committee assignments; separate independent Chair (John B. Henneman III) with delineated duties; independent directors meet in executive session . Board met 16 times in 2024; all directors met the 75% attendance threshold .

  • Committee structure (all independent): Audit; Compensation; Governance & Nominating; Capital Allocation; no standing committee includes the CEO .

  • Director compensation: Only non‑employee directors receive cash retainers and RSUs (e.g., $50,000 director retainer; $149,988 annual RSU grant of 5,771 units in 2024); as CEO/employee director, Dr. Blanchard does not receive director fees .

  • Policies: Majority voting with resignation policy; hedging/pledging prohibitions; stock ownership guidelines; no poison pill; all directors in compliance with guidelines .

Dual‑role implications: Anika separates the Chair and CEO roles with an independent Chair, which mitigates typical CEO/Chair concentration concerns; the board explicitly reports independence of all non‑CEO directors and routine executive sessions without management .

Performance & Track Record

  • Operational/financial highlights (2024): Adjusted EBITDA $15.5M; operating cash flow $5.4M; OA Pain Management international revenue +16% YoY; Integrity Implant ramp; divested Arthrosurface (Q4’24) and Parcus (Q1’25); $10.9M buybacks under 10b5‑1 .

  • Pay vs Performance snapshot

YearTSR value of $100Revenue ($mm)Net income ($mm)
2022$57 $156 ($15)
2023$44 $167 ($83)
2024$32 $120 ($56)

Say‑on‑pay and investor feedback: 89% approval at 2024 AGM; 2025 plan changes (shift to PSUs, higher performance-weighting for CEO) reflect investor input and strategic restructuring .

Compensation peer group (2024 decisions): Avid Bioservices, Collegium Pharma, Heron Therapeutics, Karyopharm, MacroGenics, Organogenesis, Rigel, Travere, Vanda, Vericel; medical device peers include Artivion, Atrion, AxoGen, Bioventus, Orthofix, Surmodics; rationale blends biotech and device comparables . Independent consultant: Willis Towers Watson; independence assessed .

Related‑party/other risks: No reportable related‑party transactions in 2024–Apr 21, 2025 . Compliance and insider reporting processes highlighted; one Form 4 filing delay disclosed for another officer due to vendor issue .

Director-Specific Items (for completeness)

  • Committees, chair roles, independence, attendance, director retainers, and equity grants summarized above. Director stock ownership guidelines and compliance reported; executive sessions held; no overboarding exceptions noted .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and incentives: CEO compensation is predominantly at-risk (85% variable in 2024) with multi‑year vesting and (historically) premium-priced options that were underwater as of 12/31/24, reducing near-term monetization risk; 2025 transition to PSUs increases line‑of‑sight alignment to strategic and price milestones .

  • Ownership and potential selling pressure: With 6.10% beneficial ownership and a large block of out‑of‑the‑money options (strikes $27.98–$37.40 vs $16.46 at year‑end), forced selling pressure appears limited; RSU vesting in annual tranches may cause routine, tax‑related sales, but hedging/pledging prohibitions and pre‑clearance reduce risk of opportunistic trades .

  • Retention/transition risk: Double‑trigger CIC protections (2x salary+bonus; 18 months benefits; equity acceleration) and standard non‑compete/non‑solicit support retention while avoiding shareholder‑unfriendly gross‑ups; estimated CIC package of ~$5.2M underscores manageable parachute scale for a micro/small-cap medtech .

  • Execution track record: Management executed portfolio pruning and pipeline/regulatory milestones with improving cash flow; yet TSR has been weak and revenues decreased in 2024, elevating the importance of milestone execution (Hyalofast 2026 U.S. launch target; Cingal pathway) and of 2025 PSU metrics as forward catalysts .

  • Governance: Separation of Chair/CEO, independent committees, majority voting policy, robust trading/ownership policies, and strong say‑on‑pay support (89%) collectively reduce governance risk around the CEO’s dual role as director .