Stephen O'Brien
About Stephen O’Brien
Stephen D. O’Brien is Senior Vice President, President and General Manager – North America Water Heating at A. O. Smith (AOS). He was promoted to president of the North America Water Heating business unit in 2024, reflecting expanded P&L responsibility over the company’s largest segment . As a named executive officer, his compensation is tied to both corporate and business unit performance, with 2024 corporate outcomes of $534M net income and $708M EBIT, and five-year company TSR growing an initial $100 investment to $157 (down from $186 in 2023) . He is subject to a 3x base salary stock ownership guideline and is “on track” to meet it given his recent promotion; A. O. Smith prohibits executive hedging and pledging of Company stock .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. O. Smith | President & GM – North America Water Heating (also SVP) | 2024–present | Promotion expanded accountability for unit EBIT/PEBIT and growth targets within executive incentive plans . |
| A. O. Smith | Senior VP & General Manager – North America Water Heating (prior role) | Pre-2024–2024 | Led North America Water Heating prior to promotion; bonus plan emphasis on PEBIT and net sales for the business unit . |
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 | 2025 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $470,000 | $510,000 | 2024 salary set below market median; 2025 +8.5% recognizing advancement . |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | 60% | — | Target as % of base for 2024; market comparator at 92% of median . |
| Executive Life Insurance (Current Death Benefit) | $940,000 | — | New executives eligible for 2x salary during employment; no post-retirement eligibility . |
| Company Retirement/Savings Contributions (2024) | $36,557 | — | Includes 401(k) match/non-match and non-qualified contributions . |
| Perquisite Allowance | $0 | — | Not eligible for grandfathered allowance; eligible for executive physicals and limited reimbursements . |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive (Plan Design and Outcome)
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual Attainment | Result/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate portion | EBIT | 80% (of corporate portion) | $799.1M EBIT goal | 68.1% of target | Drives corporate portion factor . |
| Corporate portion | Net Sales | 20% (of corporate portion) | $4.0258B net sales goal | 72.7% of target | Corporate portion overall 69.0% . |
| Business Unit portion (N.A. Water Heating) | PEBIT | 80% (of BU portion) | BU PEBIT target | 74.6% of target | Drives BU portion factor . |
| Business Unit portion (N.A. Water Heating) | Net Sales | 20% (of BU portion) | BU net sales target | 74.5% of target | BU portion overall 74.5% . |
| Weighting between BU vs Corporate for O’Brien | — | 70% BU / 30% Corporate | — | — | — |
| Individual target bonus ($) | — | — | $282,000 | — | — |
| Actual bonus paid ($) | — | — | — | — | $206,000 |
2024 Long-Term Incentives (Grant Structure, Metrics, Vesting)
| Instrument | 2024 Grant (O’Brien) | Performance Metric(s) | Payout Curve | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) | 4,075 units; $330,157 FV | Time-based with minimum 3-year average ROE threshold (≥5%) | Vest only if ROE threshold met | Vests 2/12/2027 . |
| Performance Stock | Target 1,220; Max 1,830; $98,844 FV | Strategic ESG – Water savings (2024–2026) | 0% at 0; 100% at 16M gallons; 150% at 20M gallons | 3-year performance period 2024–2026 . |
| Performance Cash Units | Target $231,000 | ROIC vs cost of capital over 2024–2026 | 0% at 20.3%; 100% at 30.8%; 200% at 36.5% | 3-year performance period 2024–2026 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (12/31/2024) | 2,104 Common Shares; 10,020 RSUs; 3,127 options exercisable within 60 days; <1% of outstanding . |
| Unvested RSUs (counts; market value at 12/31/24) | 1,100; 1,930; 2,905; 4,075 units with market values $90,684; $159,109; $239,488; $335,943 respectively . |
| Unvested Performance Stock (max potential) | 1,305 (2023–25) and 1,830 (2024–26) max; target 870 (2023–25) and 1,220 (2024–26) . |
| Stock options (status/prices) | 3,127 exercisable; strike $74.265; plus 1,563 unexercisable at $60.820; expirations as disclosed (latest 02/07/32) . |
| Scheduled near-term vests (supply watch) | RSUs vest: 2/7/2025 (1,110); 4/1/2025 (1,930); 2/13/2026 (2,905); 2/12/2027 (4,075) . |
| Ownership guidelines | 3x base salary; O’Brien “on track” to meet, given recent role change . |
| Hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging for all directors, officers, and employees . |
Note: 2024 stock vested for O’Brien totaled 3,455 shares ($276,314 value realized), and no option exercises occurred in 2024 .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment contract | No individual fixed-term employment agreement; serves at Board’s pleasure . |
| Severance (Qualifying Termination) | 18 months continuation of base salary and target bonus; pro rata actual annual bonus; medical continuation; outplacement (up to 25% of salary); pro rata/continued vesting as specified . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) + QT | Lump sum equal to 15 months of base+target bonus, plus 9 months base+target bonus for non-compete; pro rata target bonus; equity: options/RSUs vest; performance awards paid at target (pro rata); medical/outplacement benefits . |
| Clawback | Company-wide clawback compliant with SEC/NYSE; extends to equity recipients and detrimental conduct, beyond accounting restatements . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executives . |
| Estimated payout illustrations (as of 12/31/2024) | QT total: $2,214,292 (includes severance $1,128,000; pro rata bonus $206,000; RSU $309,617; performance units $396,000; performance stock $36,220; benefits/outplacement) . CIC+QT total: $3,074,746 (includes severance $1,504,000; pro rata bonus $282,000; RSU $275,978; performance units $169,000; performance stock $67,255; outplacement $27,940; modified 280G gross-up $748,573) . |
| Non-compete/Non-solicit | Participation conditioned on signing non-compete, non-solicitation, confidentiality; CIC severance includes separate non-compete consideration . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix and leverage: For NEOs, 65–80% of total target comp is variable; O’Brien’s target bonus is 60% of base and his 2024 LTI target was $660,000 (86% of market median), with 50% RSUs, 35% performance cash, and 15% performance stock, adding meaningful multi-year retention and performance linkage .
- Performance calibration: Annual bonus emphasizes profitability (EBIT/PEBIT at 80% of the respective portion) with a smaller revenue component (20%), balancing growth and margin; 2024 corporate payout was 69% and BU payout 74.5% .
- ESG and capital efficiency in LTI: ROIC governs performance cash; strategic ESG (water savings) anchors performance stock; RSUs include a 3-year average ROE threshold (≥5%) .
- Governance flags: A modified 280G “gross-up” may apply upon CIC for certain executives, with O’Brien’s illustrative CIC+QT scenario including a $748,573 excise tax gross-up at year-end 2024 assumptions; company-wide hedging/pledging bans and clawback mitigate alignment risk .
Say-on-Pay & Benchmarking Context
- Say-on-pay approval was ~97% at the 2024 Annual Meeting; the committee targets market median using WTW market data and maintains caps (200% of target) on variable plans .
- Peer method: Broad-based WTW database (regressed to size), not a fixed named peer group; corporate revenue comparator used $3.75B/$3.85B for 2024/2025 benchmarking .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Significant unvested RSUs and performance awards vesting through 2027, plus 18-month severance (and enhanced CIC economics), support retention in a key profit center; upcoming RSU vests on 2/7/2025 and 4/1/2025 may create mechanical selling (tax withholding) but also reflect growing in-the-money retention value .
- Incentive quality: Heavy weighting to EBIT/PEBIT and ROIC favors returns-focused execution, while ESG-linked performance stock may modestly diversify incentives; the ROE threshold on RSUs adds a baseline profitability guardrail .
- Governance watchpoints: The presence of modified 280G gross-up provisions (illustrative values disclosed) is an investor-relations negative in many governance frameworks, though balanced by robust clawback and prohibitions on hedging/pledging .
- Execution risk: 2024 corporate payout below target (69%) and BU payout at 74.5% indicate moderated growth/margin realization versus plan; as the leader of North America Water Heating, O’Brien’s 2025 results versus PEBIT/net sales targets will be a key signal for compensation outcomes and stock support through pay-versus-performance optics .
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