Eric R. Colson
Artisan Partners Asset ManagementAbout Eric R. Colson
Eric R. Colson, age 56, has served as CEO and director of Artisan Partners Asset Management since March 2011 and will transition to Executive Chair and Chair of the Board immediately following the June 4, 2025 annual meeting; Jason A. Gottlieb will become CEO, with no material change to Colson’s compensation framework disclosed . Under his leadership, 2024 revenue grew 14% to $1,111.8 million and net income rose to $259.7 million, while GAAP operating margin expanded to 33.0% and adjusted operating margin to 33.8% . Over 2020–2024, APAM’s TSR increased from $170.96 to $202.51 per $100 initial investment, outpacing the Dow Jones U.S. Asset Managers Index peer TSR in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. | Chief Executive Officer and Director | 2011–present (CEO; director) | Led strategy, talent-driven model; revenue and margin stabilization; succession to Executive Chair announced |
| Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. | President | 2011–2021 | Oversaw corporate leadership during platform scaling |
| Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. | Chairman of the Board | 2015–2021 | Board leadership; governance continuity |
| Artisan Partners (operating entity) | Chief Executive Officer | 2010–present | Investment platform leadership; strategy formation |
| Artisan Partners (investment operations) | COO, Investment Operations | 2007–2010 | Built operations, vehicles, oversight and analytics capabilities |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artisan Partners Funds, Inc. | Director | 2013–2022 | Oversight of registered fund complex; investor vehicle governance |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (USD) | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $500,000 | $500,000 | $500,000 |
| Performance-Based Cash Award | $4,235,000 | $4,000,000 | $4,600,000 |
Performance Compensation
Equity Awards by Year (grant-date fair value)
| Equity Element | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard Restricted Shares | $997,040 | $753,434 | $945,940 |
| Career Restricted Shares | $997,040 | $753,434 | $945,940 |
| PSUs (2021 grant assessed in 2024) | 28,211 PSUs granted; performance met for service and relative adjusted operating margin but not TSR; 50% delivered in Feb 2024; 50% remain subject to career vesting |
2024 Plan Mechanics and Metrics
| Metric/Feature | 2024 Outcome/Design | Role in Payout |
|---|---|---|
| AUM | Ending AUM $161.2B; average AUM $160.2B | Inform performance-based awards via long-term growth/value creation lens |
| Revenue | $1,111.8M (+14% YoY) | Aligns compensation to firm results |
| GAAP Operating Margin | 33.0% | Stability/predictability measure |
| Adjusted Operating Margin | 33.8% (+220 bps YoY) | Stability/predictability measure; informs equity grant sizing |
| Weighted Avg Management Fee | 68.6 bps | Stability/predictability measure |
| Sales/Flows | Net client cash flows $(3,699)M (+9.2% improvement) | Growth vector considered in discretion |
| Equity Mix | 29% of CEO’s performance-based pay in equity; remainder cash | Aligns interests, manages liquidity pressure |
| Award Caps | Aggregate exec performance-based comp capped at 8% of adjusted operating income; individual max cash awards set, with negative discretion applied |
Vesting and Career Awards Structure
| Award Type | Vesting | Career Vesting Terms | CIC/Termination Triggers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard Restricted Shares | Pro-rata over 5 years post-grant | N/A | Full vest on death/disability; double-trigger vest within 2 years of CIC on termination without cause/for good reason |
| Career Restricted Shares | 20% becomes eligible each of 5 years; vest on qualified retirement (≥10 years service; 18 months’ notice for NEOs) | If age+service ≥70 at qualified retirement, 2024+ grants vest without pro-rata eligibility; post 5th anniversary, if terminated without cause and ≥10 years service, eligible career shares vest | Same as above |
| PSUs (2021 cohort) | 3-year performance period (service + relative adjusted operating margin and TSR vs peer); half delivered at determination; half subject to career vesting | Career PSU vest on qualified retirement; post 5th anniversary, if terminated without cause and ≥10 years service, remaining career PSUs vest (if previously deemed eligible) | Same as above |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership and Alignment | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 (record date Apr 10, 2025) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Class A Shares Beneficially Owned | 291,057 | 291,057 (disclosed basis remains consistent) | 387,785 (Class A) |
| Class B Shares Beneficially Owned | 482,463 | 482,463 | 482,463 (39.5% of Class B) |
| Ownership Guideline Compliance (multiple of base salary) | 68x base salary | 68x base salary | 73x base salary |
| Shares Subject to Stockholders Agreement (committee voting) | Employees’ granted shares voted by committee (Colson, Daley, Ramirez) comprising ~10.3% of combined voting power (2024); ~9.8% (2025) | ||
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted (no pledging during MNPI or blackout periods) |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreements | None; at-will employment; no guaranteed severance agreements |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non-compete and non-solicit for one year post-employment per equity award agreements; enforceability may vary by circumstances |
| Severance/Change-in-Control Economics | Double-trigger vesting on termination without cause/for good reason within two years of a CIC; accelerated vesting on death/disability; post-5th anniversary “no cause” vesting for eligible career awards with ≥10 years service |
| Potential Value of Accelerated/Career Vesting (as of Dec 31, 2024, at $43.05/share) | Standard RS: $1,754,374 (death/disability/CIC); Career Shares: $4,204,780 (death/disability/CIC); Standard PSUs: $774,383 (death/disability/CIC); Career PSUs: $2,350,272 (death/disability/CIC); Qualified Retirement values: RS $773,006; Career Shares $2,450,406; Career PSUs $1,575,888 |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation post-accounting restatement on “no fault” basis; three fiscal years lookback |
| Tax Gross-Ups | No golden parachute tax gross-ups per program features |
| Perquisites/Deferred Comp | Standard employee benefits (health, HSA, match); no defined benefit pension; no nonqualified deferred comp |
Board Governance
- Role and Independence: Director; will become Executive Chair and Chair post-annual meeting; not independent; Board will have Lead Independent Director (DiMarco), and committees remain 100% independent .
- Committees/Attendance: Colson is not a member of board committees; all directors attended ≥75% of meetings in 2024; independent sessions occur each regular meeting .
- Dual-role implications: CEO-to-Executive Chair transition consolidates board leadership; mitigated by Lead Independent Director responsibilities and independent committee oversight .
Director Compensation
- Colson receives no additional compensation for board service (director pay applies only to non-employee directors) .
Compensation & Ownership Details (multi-year)
| Metric (USD unless noted) | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Performance-Based Compensation | $6,229,080 | $5,506,868 | $6,491,880 |
| Equity Granted (Standard + Career) | $1,994,080 | $1,506,868 | $1,891,879 |
| Restricted Shares Granted (#) | — | 56,990 (Jan 25, 2023) | 35,912 (Jan 25, 2024) |
| Shares/Units Scheduled Vest (next 5 years) | See “Vesting Schedule” below | See “Vesting Schedule” below | See “Vesting Schedule” below |
Vesting Schedule (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Vest Date | Restricted Stock (#) | Performance Share Units (#) |
|---|---|---|
| Feb 2025 | 9,290 | 26,982 |
| Feb 2026 | 9,290 | — |
| Feb 2027 | 9,290 | — |
| Feb 2028 | 9,290 | — |
| Feb 2029 | 3,592 | — |
| Qualified Retirement | 97,672 | 63,588 |
Compensation Committee Analysis and Peer Group
- Process: Annual framework sets aggregate cap at 8% of adjusted operating income; individual max cash awards; negative discretion applies after evaluating strategic objectives, financial results, and market analysis; independent consultant McLagan engaged .
- Peer group (PSU performance measurement): AllianceBernstein, Affiliated Managers Group, BlackRock, Federated Hermes, Franklin Resources, Invesco, Janus Henderson, Lazard, T. Rowe Price, Victory Capital, Virtus Investment Partners .
- Benchmarking: Committee does not target specific percentile pay benchmarking; peer data used as reference .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
| Year | Say-on-Pay Approval |
|---|---|
| 2023 | ~92.5% approval |
| 2024 | ~96% approval |
Performance & Track Record (financial context over Colson’s tenure)
| Metric | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 899,567,000 | 1,227,236,000 | 993,285,000 | 975,131,000 | 1,111,802,000 |
| EBITDA ($) | 365,820,000* | 547,424,000* | 353,307,000* | 312,940,000* | 377,470,000* |
| Net Income ($) | 212,617,000 | 336,516,000 | 206,755,000 | 222,289,000 | 259,748,000 |
| TSR (Value of $100) | 170.96 | 175.58 | 120.64 | 193.23 | 202.51 |
Values marked with * are retrieved from S&P Global Capital IQ via GetFinancials.
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Positive alignment: High equity exposure (73x base salary), career vesting discourages short-term selling; clawback enforced on no-fault basis .
- Governance mitigants: Lead Independent Director and 100% independent audit/compensation/governance committees offset Executive Chair dual-role concerns .
- Share pledging/hedging: Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted—no pledges disclosed (reduces misalignment risk) .
- Severance economics: No guaranteed severance agreements; value realization primarily via equity vesting on specific triggers, limiting cash parachute risk .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment appears robust: equity and cash awards scale with strategic execution (AUM/revenue growth) and margin outcomes, with negative discretion and tight aggregate caps tempering upside—supporting capital discipline .
- Retention and succession: Career vesting and outsized equity exposure reduce near-term selling pressure and promote orderly succession as Colson moves to Executive Chair; strong say-on-pay support suggests investor confidence in program design .
- Governance balance: Executive Chair + Chair structure may heighten independence scrutiny, but Lead Independent Director and independent committees provide counterweights; double-trigger CIC terms and absence of tax gross-ups are shareholder-friendly .