Samuel B. Sellers
Artisan Partners Asset ManagementAbout Samuel B. Sellers
Samuel B. Sellers is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Artisan Partners Asset Management (APAM), appointed in January 2023 after serving as Head of Investment Operations (Jan 2021–Jan 2023) and previously Deputy General Counsel; he was named a managing director in January 2022 and joined the firm as Associate Counsel in April 2013 . He is 42 years old per the latest proxy’s executive officer roster . Under the leadership team’s 2024 priorities, APAM delivered 14% revenue growth (to $1,111.8M), +220 bps adjusted operating margin expansion (31.6% → 33.8%), and higher adjusted EPS ($2.89 → $3.55), alongside AUM growth and distribution model execution; these firm-level outcomes frame the context for executive pay decisions and management evaluation .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact / scope |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artisan Partners Asset Management | Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer | Jan 2023–present | Senior operating leadership; COO role established via Board appointment . |
| Artisan Partners Asset Management | Head of Investment Operations | Jan 2021–Jan 2023 | Led investment operations; part of leadership pipeline into COO . |
| Artisan Partners Asset Management | Deputy General Counsel | Pre-2021 (noted as prior role) | Legal leadership preceding investment operations leadership . |
| Artisan Partners Asset Management | Assistant Secretary | Jan 2018 (designation noted) | Corporate governance/legal function responsibility . |
| Artisan Partners Asset Management | Associate Counsel | Apr 2013 (joined) | Entry to firm; foundation of internal tenure and experience . |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or committee roles are disclosed for Mr. Sellers in the executive officer biographies of the latest proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Disclosure for Sellers | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | Not disclosed (Mr. Sellers was not a 2024 Named Executive Officer) | The 2024 NEO list comprises Colson (CEO), Daley (CFO), Gottlieb (President), Krein (Head of Global Distribution), and Kwei (CAO); Sellers is not included in NEO compensation tables . |
| Salary change YoY | Not disclosed for Sellers | Base salaries for NEOs were unchanged for 2024; this statement applies to named officers only . |
| Perquisites/other | Not disclosed for Sellers | NEO “All Other Compensation” is itemized in the Summary Compensation Table; Sellers not a NEO . |
Program structure context (applies to executive officers broadly):
- Cash salary plus performance-based cash awards and long-duration equity awards; for NEOs, the majority of pay is performance-based (CEO 93%; other NEOs 87–94% for 2024) .
- No employment agreements, no bonus guarantees, no pension beyond broad 401(k), no “golden parachute” tax gross-ups .
Performance Compensation
Program mechanics and metrics relevant to executive officers (including non-NEOs):
- Performance-Based Cash (Incentive Plan): The Compensation Committee sets a maximum aggregate pool (8% of adjusted operating income, further adjusted) and individual maximum cash opportunities (200% of prior-year total performance-based compensation), then applies negative discretion after assessing strategic priorities and results; awards can be zero .
- Equity Awards: Restricted stock split equally between “standard” five-year pro-rata vesting and “career” shares with career-vesting terms (see vesting below). PSUs use a service condition, an adjusted operating margin condition, and a total shareholder return (TSR) market condition (Monte Carlo) for grant-date valuation .
Detailed incentive design and vesting
| Element | Metric/Condition | Weighting | Target/Definition | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance-based cash | Committee assessment vs strategic objectives; pool sized off adjusted operating income | Not formulaic (committee discretion) | Aggregate cap = 8% of adjusted operating income (adjusted further); individual max = 200% of prior-year total performance-based comp | Committee applies negative discretion; can award zero | Paid following fiscal year-end under the Performance-Based Cash Incentive Compensation Plan . |
| Standard restricted shares | Time-vest | N/A | Granted annually | N/A | Pro-rata over 5 years following the year of grant . |
| Career shares | Career-vesting after eligibility and qualifying retirement | N/A | Eligibility: 20% of each award becomes eligible in each of 5 years following grant | N/A | Vest upon Qualifying Retirement (≥10 years service; 18-month notice for executive officers; company may accept shorter; additional “Traditional Retirement” provision for age+service ≥70); otherwise forfeit if termination precedes vesting . |
| PSUs | Service condition + adjusted operating margin + TSR (Monte Carlo) | Not disclosed | As defined per award; valuation reflects probable outcomes | Earned awards remain subject to qualified retirement vesting provision | Vests per plan/award terms; earned PSUs can remain subject to retirement vesting . |
2024 firm-level performance context used by the Committee (not an explicit payout formula): revenue +14% YoY; adjusted operating margin +220 bps; AUM and distribution model progress; adjusted EPS up; sustainability execution noted .
Change-in-control and recovery
- Double-trigger vesting applies to equity awards for NEOs (and is a stated program feature) .
- The 2023 Omnibus Plan defines Good Reason and change-in-control mechanics; Good Reason includes material adverse role change post-CIC, >50-mile relocation, or >10% salary cut (with cure and notice periods) .
- Clawback: mandatory recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation after accounting restatements for the prior three fiscal years on a no-fault basis .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Disclosure for Sellers | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (direct/indirect) | Not individually enumerated | The beneficial ownership table lists NEOs, directors, certain >5% holders, and “directors and executive officers as a group”; Sellers is not listed individually . |
| Ownership % of outstanding | Not disclosed | N/A . |
| Vested vs. unvested equity | Not disclosed for Sellers | Outstanding unvested awards/vesting schedules are disclosed for NEOs; Sellers not a NEO . |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | No option awards disclosed for NEOs | NEO equity mix is restricted stock and PSUs; options available under the plan but not shown for NEOs . |
| Pledging/hedging | Hedging prohibited; pledging restricted (no pledging while in possession of MNPI or during blackout) | Policy also lists “Impose restrictions on the pledging of Company stock” among program features . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers (5-year compliance window) | CEO 8x; other executive officers 3x; NEO compliance multiples are shown, not including Sellers . |
| Voting of employee shares | Irrevocable voting proxy to Stockholders Committee for equity acquired from the company | Committee (Colson, Daley, Ramirez) votes employee-granted shares; scope and governance detailed in Stockholders Agreement . |
Implication for selling pressure and retention: career-vesting awards defer realizability until qualifying retirement and eligibility thresholds are met, structurally reducing near-term selling pressure and enhancing retention incentives .
Employment Terms
| Term | Disclosure | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None (program states “What we don’t do: Employment agreements”) | No company-specific employment agreement disclosure for executives; applies as a program feature . |
| Severance multiples | Not disclosed | N/A in retrieved documents. |
| Change-in-control | Double-trigger equity vesting; plan-based definitions and protections | Double-trigger feature stated; Omnibus Plan governs CIC/Good Reason mechanics . |
| Non-compete / non-solicit / garden leave | Not disclosed | N/A in retrieved documents. |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery policy post-restatement (3 prior fiscal years; no-fault) | Applies to executive officers . |
Performance & Track Record (Context)
- 2024 outcomes cited by the Compensation Committee include distribution model execution, strategic fundings for early-stage strategies, 220 bps adjusted operating margin expansion, and dividend actions; these inform pay decisions for executives broadly .
- Investment and business management accomplishments were highlighted as core to long-term value creation; payouts are not tied to a formula but to holistic assessment vs strategic objectives .
Compensation Committee and Governance Context
- Compensation Committee members: Jeffrey A. Joerres (Chair), Jennifer A. Barbetta, Tench Coxe .
- Executive compensation program features: align pay with performance; require career-vesting on half of equity; double-trigger CIC; ownership guidelines; clawback; independent consultant; restrictions on pledging/ban on hedging; no employment agreements/bonus guarantees/pension/gross-up .
- Say-on-Pay: At the 2023 Annual Meeting, advisory vote on NEO compensation was approved (For: 64,550,176; Against: 5,137,778; Abstain: 125,383; Broker non-votes: 4,820,942) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: The career-vesting construct (eligibility accrues over five years; vest on qualifying retirement with tenure and notice requirements) materially extends duration of equity at risk, reducing near-term selling pressure and strengthening retention incentives for executives like Sellers; this is a tailwind for continuity in operating execution .
- Risk safeguards: Hedging is prohibited; pledging is restricted; double-trigger CIC terms and a no-fault clawback limit agency risk and mitigate windfall outcomes, supporting governance quality .
- Disclosure gap: Sellers was not a 2024 NEO; individual base/bonus/equity grant detail and personal ownership levels are not disclosed, limiting precision in pay-for-performance calibration and trading signal inference for his personal incentives; analysts should monitor future proxies or Form 4s for updates .
- Program leverage to firm KPIs: While payouts are discretionary, the pool sizing and PSU metrics (adjusted operating margin, TSR) tether incentives to profitability and shareholder outcomes; 2024 revenue growth and margin expansion provide a constructive backdrop for continued performance expectations under the current compensation philosophy .