Matt Christian
About Matt Christian
Matt Christian was appointed President of Apogee’s Architectural Services Segment on August 7, 2025, after 23 years at the company; he most recently served as Vice President, Products in the Architectural Metals Segment and previously spent more than 19 years in the Architectural Services Segment . Company context for performance: in fiscal 2025 Apogee delivered consolidated net sales of $1.36B, operating income of $118.1M, and annualized TSR of -14.65% (1-year), 12.08% (5-year), and 2.22% (10-year) . The company’s executive incentive design emphasizes cumulative Adjusted Diluted EPS and average Adjusted ROIC for multi‑year awards, and Adjusted EBIT/net sales for the annual plan . Education and age for Mr. Christian were not disclosed in filings reviewed.
Past Roles
| Organization/Segment | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apogee – Architectural Metals | Vice President, Products | Not disclosed (prior to Aug 7, 2025) | Product leadership in Metals; part of leadership pipeline preceding Services presidency |
| Apogee – Architectural Services | Various roles | >19 years | Deep business/industry knowledge; experience base for Services leadership |
Fixed Compensation
Note: Apogee had not disclosed a compensation table for Mr. Christian as of his appointment. The table below provides FY2025 context for a segment president (Services) role.
| Executive (FY2025) | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | Bonus Payout (% of Target) | Annual Cash Incentive Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Troy R. Johnson (Services President) | 428,000 | 60.00% | 170.22% | 437,125 |
Performance Compensation
Program design (FY2025, applies to segment presidents in NEO group; Mr. Christian’s specific FY2026+ awards not yet disclosed):
- Annual cash incentive: segment presidents’ targets set as a percent of salary (e.g., 60% for Services), with metrics typically weighted across Consolidated Adjusted EBIT, Segment Net Sales, and Segment Adjusted EBIT; payouts range from 0% to 200% of target based on goal attainment .
- Long-term incentives: 50% time-based restricted stock (RS) vesting in three equal annual installments starting the April 30 following grant; 50% three-year performance awards (settle 50% in cash/50% in stock) based on 3-year cumulative Adjusted Diluted EPS (60% weight) and average Adjusted ROIC (40% weight); fiscal 2023–2025 cycle paid at 200% of target on Adjusted ROIC outperformance .
Example (FY2025 Services president metrics and results for context):
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated Adjusted EBIT | 25% | $136.0M | $148.2M | $155.0M | $146.617M | 93.51% of metric target |
| Services Segment Net Sales | 25% | $374.3M | $394.0M | $423.0M | $419.861M | 187.37% of metric target |
| Services Segment Adjusted EBIT | 50% | $22.9M | $26.0M | $28.6M | $29.557M | 200.00% of metric target |
| Resulting Annual Payout | — | — | 60% of salary target | — | — | 170.22% of target (Services president) |
Vesting cadence (context):
- RS: three equal installments on or about April 30 following grant (e.g., May 1/April 30 schedules) .
- PSUs: settle at end of 3-year period; FY2023–2025 achieved 200% on Adjusted ROIC, with stock and cash components paid at that level (example payouts shown for NEOs) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Status | Details |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | Segment presidents are required to hold equity equal to 2x base salary; CEO 5x; CFO 3x; other corporate executives 1x. Executives have 5 years to comply (plus 3 years for increased targets after promotions) . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Company prohibits hedging and pledging by directors and executive officers; none of the named executive officers have pledged shares . |
| Clawback | Incentive compensation recovery policy adopted October 2023 to comply with SEC/Nasdaq; also legacy policy covers broader population . |
| Dividend treatment | Dividends accrue on RS and are paid only upon vest; performance awards dividends accrue and pay only on earned shares . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Economics/Terms |
|---|---|
| Change-in-control (CIC) agreements (NEOs) | “Double trigger”: upon CIC plus qualifying termination within 2 years, cash severance equals 2x (base salary + annual cash incentive at target); continuation or reimbursement of medical/dental for 24 months; RS vests at termination; PSU performance period ends at CIC date and adjusted by Committee; best-net-benefit cutback (no tax gross-ups) . |
| Non-compete/solicit | To receive CIC severance benefits, executive agrees to non-solicitation of customers/suppliers/employees and non-compete in certain geographies for 12–24 months post-termination . |
| Insider trading policy | Section 16 officers must pre-clear trades, transact only in prescribed windows, and may use Rule 10b5‑1 plans; anti‑tipping enforced . |
Say‑on‑Pay, Committee, and Peer Benchmarking
- Say‑on‑pay support: 97.12% approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting; no program changes made in response .
- Compensation Committee: chaired by Patricia K. Wagner; assisted by independent consultant WTW (independence affirmed, fees de minimis) .
- Peer group (FY2025): includes American Woodmark, Armstrong World, AZZ, Eagle Materials, EnPro, Gibraltar, Graco, Griffon, H.B. Fuller, Insteel, Masonite, PGT Innovations, Quaker Chemical, Quanex, Tennant; market data used to target median/near-median pay levels with at‑risk mix .
Additional Context on Company Performance (FY2025)
| Metric | Result |
|---|---|
| Net Sales | $1.36B |
| Operating Income | $118.1M |
| Diluted EPS | $3.89 |
| Operating Margin | 8.7% |
| Operating Cash Flow | $125.2M |
| Shareholder Returns | TSR: -14.65% (1-yr), 12.08% (5-yr), 2.22% (10-yr) |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment and retention: Segment leaders’ variable comp is tightly linked to Adjusted EBIT, segment sales, and multi-year Adjusted EPS/ROIC, which can drive disciplined project selection and margin improvement; PSU metrics (EPS/ROIC) and 3-year overlapping cycles create retention hooks and medium-term focus .
- Ownership alignment: 2x-salary ownership guideline for segment presidents, combined with anti-hedging/anti-pledging and clawback, reduces misalignment risks and encourages long-term value creation .
- Potential selling pressure windows: Time-based RS typically vest in equal installments beginning the April 30 following grant; while Mr. Christian’s grants have not been disclosed, typical vesting cycles across the NEO group suggest periodic liquidity events for executives, subject to trading windows and pre‑clearance under the insider trading policy .
- Leadership execution risk: Mr. Christian brings deep Services-segment experience (19+ years within Services) and product leadership from Metals, which should aid continuity; formal performance against segment goals will become visible as FY2026 disclosures emerge post‑appointment .