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Shane Trigg

Shane Trigg

President and Chief Executive Officer at APPFOLIOAPPFOLIO
CEO
Executive
Board

About Shane Trigg

Shane Trigg is President & CEO of AppFolio and a Class III director (non‑independent), age 50, serving as a director since 2023; he holds a B.S. in Human Ecology (Ohio State) and an MBA (University of Notre Dame) . He became CEO on March 1, 2023 after leading AppFolio’s Real Estate segment (Apr 2020–Feb 2023) and previously held senior leadership roles at Salesforce (SVP, Commerce Cloud; SVP, Marketing Cloud, 2012–2020) and MRI Software/Intuit Real Estate Solutions (2004–2011) . Under pay‑versus‑performance disclosures, APPF’s cumulative TSR value (fixed $100 base as of 12/31/2019) moved from 158 in 2023 to 224 in 2024 while revenue rose from $620,445k in 2023 to $794,202k in 2024; reported net income improved to $204,068k in 2024 (all figures per the company’s PVP table) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
AppFolioPresident & General Manager, Real Estate2020–2023Senior operating leadership in core real estate software segment
SalesforceSVP, Commerce Cloud; SVP, Marketing Cloud2012–2020Senior leadership in cloud software platforms
MRI Software / Intuit Real Estate SolutionsVarious roles; last VP, Global Sales & Marketing2004–2011Senior leadership in real estate and investment management software

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
AppFolioDirector (Class III)2023–presentNon‑independent; employee director may not serve on board committees
  • Board governance overlay: Independent Chair; all board committees chaired by independent directors; independent directors meet in executive session; the board held seven meetings in 2024 with all directors attending ≥75% of meetings .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary (set/annualized) ($)440,000 511,223 550,000
Salary actually paid (SCT) ($)440,000 511,223 545,765
Target Cash Bonus ($)525,000 550,000
Corporate Bonus Paid ($)488,400 552,161 671,291

Notes:

  • 2024 Corporate Bonus Plan was based on a blended achievement of 123% .
  • 2024 SCT “Bonus” column includes $300,000 2023 CEO sign‑on bonus recognized once clawback contingency lapsed plus a one‑time $480,000 2024 performance bonus .

Performance Compensation

2024 Annual Incentive Plan (Corporate Bonus Plan)

MetricWeightThreshold (Attain/Payout)Target (Attain/Payout)Max (Attain/Payout)Actual Payout
Booked Residential Units40% 85% / 50% 100% / 100% 120% / 200% 102%
GAAP Revenue30% 97% / 75% 100% / 100% 106% / 150% 123%
Adjusted GAAP Operating Margin30% 85% / 50% 100% / 100% 115% / 150% 150%
Blended Payout123%

2024 Long‑Term Equity (Grant date: January 24, 2024)

  • RSUs: 6,888 shares; grant date fair value $1,200,096; vests quarterly over four years starting May 10, 2024, subject to continued service .
  • PSUs (target): 10,332 shares; grant date fair value $1,800,144; performance period CY2024 on the same metrics/curves as the AIP; certified payout at 123% (12,709 shares earned); 1/3 vested on Feb 10, 2025; remaining 2/3 vests in equal quarterly installments through Feb 10, 2027, subject to continued service .
2024 Equity AwardGrant DateShares/Target (#)Earned (#)Grant Date Fair Value ($)Vesting
RSU1/24/20246,888 1,200,096 Quarterly over 4 years from 5/10/2024
PSU1/24/202410,332 12,709 1,800,144 1/3 on 2/10/2025; remaining quarterly to 2/10/2027

Additional outstanding CEO equity and options:

  • CEO option grant: 120,000 options at $129.74, granted 3/1/2023; vest 1/3 on each of 12/31/2025, 12/31/2026, and 12/31/2027; expiration 3/1/2033 .
  • As of 12/31/2024, CEO realized 49,092 shares from vesting in 2024 (value realized $11,321,506 per SEC methodology) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of 3/31/2025)Class A Shares% of Class ANotes
William Shane Trigg31,777 <1% Based on 23,038,832 Class A and 12,981,324 Class B outstanding; employee director
  • Hedging/pledging: Insider Trading Policy prohibits hedging and pledging, and restricts margin/short sales and derivatives; prohibitions also extend to household members .
  • Ownership guidelines: No specific multiple disclosed; company emphasizes limiting dilution and alignment via equity and at‑risk pay; no formal peer benchmarking or consultant engaged (uses survey data) .
  • Snapshot of key unvested awards at 12/31/2024 (select items): 2024 PSUs 12,709 units ($3,135,564 mv); 2024 RSUs 5,596 units ($1,380,645 mv); multiple 2023 RSU/PSU tranches and earlier awards remain unvested; see Outstanding Equity Awards table .

Employment Terms

  • Structure: At‑will; minimum base salary $525,000; target annual bonus 100% of base; 2023 sign‑on cash $300,000 (clawback if departure before 3/1/2024); special 2023 RSUs ($1.5m) and 120,000 options; annual equity (RSUs+PSUs) at least $3.0m (2024–2025) and $3.5m (2026–2027), subject to Board approval .
ScenarioCashCOBRAEquity Treatment
Death/DisabilityPrior‑year earned bonus; pro‑rated current‑year bonus ≤ target Up to 12 months All RSUs and PSUs fully accelerate; options accelerate pro‑rata by time served; 18‑month post‑termination exercise (or to expiry)
Termination without Cause or Good Reason (non‑CIC)12 months base salary; prior‑year earned bonus; pro‑rated current‑year bonus ≤ target Up to 12 months RSUs: portion equal to next 12 months’ vesting accelerates (timing depends on termination date); PSUs: if un‑certified, pro‑rata based on months served and Board‑forecast achievement ≤ target; if certified, next 12 months’ portion accelerates; options: pro‑rata by time served; 18‑month exercise window (or to expiry)
CIC + Qualifying Termination within 12 months (double trigger)Same as above Up to 12 months All RSUs and PSUs fully accelerate (PSUs at Board‑determined forecast ≤ target); if awards not assumed in the transaction, they fully accelerate immediately prior to close
  • Illustrative values (as of 12/31/2024, stock $246.72): Death/Disability equity acceleration $23,228,594; non‑CIC qualifying termination equity acceleration $17,177,292; CIC qualifying termination equity acceleration $16,178,911; cash severance+bonus in non‑CIC or CIC $1,221,291; COBRA ~$26,618 .

  • Clawback: Executive Compensation Recovery Policy (Dodd‑Frank Section 10D/Nasdaq 5608) requires recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation received in the 3 prior completed fiscal years if the company must prepare a restatement .

Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence)

ItemDetail
Board class/termClass III; term expires 2027 annual meeting
IndependenceNot independent (current executive officer)
Committee serviceEmployee directors may not serve on board committees
LeadershipIndependent Chair; all committees chaired by independent directors
Meetings/attendanceBoard held 7 meetings in 2024; each director attended ≥75% of meetings/committees served
  • Director compensation: Employee directors receive no additional director compensation .

Performance & Track Record (Selected Disclosures)

Metric20202021202220232024
Revenue ($000s)310,056 359,370 471,883 620,445 794,202
Net Income ($000s)158,403 1,028 (68,119) 2,702 204,068
Company TSR (Value of $100)164 110 96 158 224
Peer Group TSR (Value of $100)150 207 133 221 301
  • Pay ratio: CEO total compensation $5,018,965; median employee $200,472; 25:1 ratio (2024) .

Compensation Committee and Policy Notes

  • Committee members: Andreas von Blottnitz (Chair), Janet Kerr, Alex Wolf .
  • No formal peer group and no compensation consultant; committee references survey data and emphasizes at‑risk pay and limiting dilution .

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment: 2024 long‑term equity mix is weighted 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs, with PSUs tied entirely to measurable 1‑year performance metrics and a realized payout at 123%; AIP uses the same metrics with a 123% blended payout, reinforcing line‑of‑sight performance orientation .
  • Vesting‑driven liquidity windows: Ongoing quarterly vesting of 2024 RSUs and PSUs through Feb 2027, plus option cliffs on 12/31/2025–2027, create recurring potential insider selling windows that traders should monitor alongside 10b5‑1 plans and blackout periods .
  • Retention and change‑in‑control economics: Multi‑year minimum equity grant commitments (through 2027) and robust (but capped‑at‑target) severance/acceleration design lower near‑term retention risk while providing standard double‑trigger protection in a sale, with significant unvested equity value tied to continued service .
  • Ownership alignment and risk controls: Direct beneficial ownership is modest (<1%), but hedging and pledging are prohibited; no disclosed stock ownership guideline multiple, though the program stresses equity and at‑risk pay to align incentives .
  • Governance checks on dual roles: While CEO also serves as a director, concentration risk is mitigated by an independent Chair and independent committee leadership; employee directors cannot sit on committees .