Kelly Slieter
AdvanSixAbout Kelly Slieter
Kelly J. Slieter is Senior Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer at AdvanSix. She is 50 and has been an executive officer since 2020, following HR leadership roles at Honeywell and earlier positions at Bristol-Myers Squibb and Tyco International . Recent pay-for-performance outcomes: 2024 short‑term incentive (STI) paid at 92% of target (vs. 32% in 2023), with STI metrics weighted to Adjusted EBITDA (60%), Free Cash Flow (20%) and strategic objectives (20%), shifting in 2025 to heavier EBITDA weighting (80%) and removal of FCF from STI to LTI, reinforcing profitability focus . Long‑term incentives (LTIs) emphasize cumulative EPS and average three‑year ROI (50%/50%) with a relative TSR modifier, aligning awards to multi‑year value creation; AdvanSix discloses total stockholder return benchmarking versus the S&P Small Cap 600 Materials Index and its compensation peer group .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Honeywell International | Vice President, Human Resources (UOP business) | 2015–2018 | Led HR for UOP; enterprise HR leadership roles supported talent, org design, leadership development |
| Honeywell International | Vice President, Human Resources | 2018 | Enterprise HR leadership; talent and organizational effectiveness |
| Honeywell International | Director-level HR roles (corporate and business units) | 2005–2015 | HR functional excellence; organization development & learning; HR for Honeywell Building Solutions |
| Bristol-Myers Squibb | Human Resources Manager | 2003–2004 | HR business partnership in pharma environment |
| Tyco International | Organization Development Manager | 2004–2005 | OD initiatives and change management |
| Honeywell International | Early HR roles (incl. M&A integration leader, HR manager) | 1997–2003 | M&A integration; multi‑BU HR management |
External Roles
- No public company directorships for Ms. Slieter are disclosed in AdvanSix filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 400,000 | 430,000 | 430,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 60% | 70% | 70% (unchanged) |
| Actual STI Paid ($) | 76,800 | 276,920 | — |
Notes: 2025 target opportunities unchanged; 2025 STI threshold increased to 50% of target metric performance and EBITDA weighting increased to 80% .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (STI) – Design and Outcomes
| Year | Metric | Weighting | Target (as % of Salary) | Company Result | Payout to Slieter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Adjusted EBITDA | 60% | 70% | Company achieved 92% of target overall | $276,920 |
| 2024 | Free Cash Flow | 20% | 70% | Included in 2024 STI; moved to LTI in 2025 | $276,920 (aggregate) |
| 2024 | Strategic Objectives | 20% | 70% | Part of 92% aggregate payout | $276,920 (aggregate) |
| 2023 | Adjusted EBITDA, FCF, Strategic Objectives | 60% / 20% / 20% | 60% | Company achieved 32% of target overall | $76,800 |
2025 changes: FCF removed from STI and included in LTI; EBITDA weighting increased to 80%; STI threshold raised to 50% from 25% .
Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) – Grants, Metrics, and Vesting
| Grant Year | Instrument | Shares Granted | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Key Metrics/Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | RSU | 11,513 | 314,996 | Time‑based; RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; options eliminated from 2024 mix |
| 2024 | PSU (target) | 11,513 | 322,364 | 3‑yr performance: cumulative EPS (50%) and avg. 3‑yr ROI (50%) with relative TSR ±10% modifier |
| 2023 | RSU | 2,942 | 121,210 | RSUs generally cliff‑vest at 3 years (pre‑2024 design) |
| 2023 | PSU (target) | 5,885 | 251,172 | 3‑yr performance on EPS/ROI with rTSR modifier |
| 2023 | Stock Options | 6,721 (ex. price $41.20; 10‑yr) | 121,247 | Options vest ratably over 3 years |
Program design notes:
- 2024 equity mix shifted to 50% PSUs and 50% RSUs; stock options eliminated to emphasize retention and multi‑year performance; RSUs moved from 3‑yr cliff to 3‑yr ratable vesting .
- PSU metric rationale: EPS viewed as valuation driver; ROI aligns with capital intensity; rTSR serves as market‑based modifier .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (4/1/2025) | 44,571 common shares; less than 1% of class |
| Vested Stock Options (Right to Acquire) | 18,825 shares via vested options (aggregate across grants) |
| Unvested Equity at 12/31/2024 | RSUs: 11,513; PSUs (target): 11,513 |
| Outstanding Options at 12/31/2024 | 2021: 8,100 exercisable @ $29.21 exp. 2/24/2031; 2022: 4,163 ex./2,082 unex. @ $39.15 exp. 2/28/2032; 2023: 2,240 ex./4,481 unex. @ $41.20 exp. 2/28/2033 |
| Option/RSU Vesting Activity | 2024: 14,838 shares vested ($407,307); no option exercises. 2023: 4,657 shares vested ($160,434); no option exercises |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must hold stock = 1x base salary (non‑CEO/CFO); RSUs count; PSUs and options do not; 5‑yr compliance window |
| Compliance Status | As of April 1, 2024, all executive officers other than the newly hired CFO satisfied guidelines (implies Slieter in compliance) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging of AdvanSix securities prohibited; short sales and options trading prohibited |
| Clawback | Policy adopted Sept 2023 covering incentive comp tied to financial reporting for 3 prior fiscal years, consistent with SEC/NYSE rules |
Implications:
- Material unvested RSUs/PSUs through 2026 create retention hooks. Upcoming annual vest tranches and PSU certification dates may create periodic liquidity windows; the company’s pre‑clearance/blackout policy mitigates ad hoc trading risk .
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash Severance | STI for Year of Termination | COBRA Lump Sum | Equity Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason (non‑CIC) | $731,000 | — | — | Per plan/award terms (no automatic acceleration) |
| Death | — | $276,920 | — | RSUs/options vest in full; PSUs prorated based on service with payout on actual performance; shown value $785,747 |
| Disability | — | $276,920 | — | Same as death; shown value $785,747 |
| Change in Control (no termination) | — | — | — | Awards remain outstanding if assumed/substituted; no acceleration |
| CIC + Termination (double‑trigger within 24 months) | $1,161,000 | $301,000 | $42,335 | RSUs/options vest in full; PSUs at greater of target or actual; shown value $1,032,361 |
Plan structure:
- Executive Severance Plan: Outside CIC, non‑CEO participants receive 1x (base salary + prior year target bonus); during CIC period, 2x (base salary + target bonus) with COBRA subsidy; “net best” 280G mitigation; benefits subject to release and restrictive covenants; Committee may cancel benefits for detrimental conduct .
- Equity Plan: Double‑trigger acceleration upon qualifying termination within two years post‑CIC; if awards not assumed, acceleration on CIC at target or actual as specified .
Performance & Track Record
- Company STI outcomes: 2023 payout at 32% of target; 2024 improved to 92%, reflecting better performance against profitability/cash/strategic goals .
- Strategic initiatives (2023 examples): S/4HANA milestones, brand initiative, safety culture programs, improved EcoVadis Platinum rating (top 1%), and ESG/cyber maturity progress; site‑level safety improvements cited .
- TSR context: Company discloses TSR vs S&P Small Cap 600 Materials Index and peer group since 2016 listing, and uses rTSR modifier in PSUs to link payouts to shareholder returns .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift toward RSUs in 2024 (options removed), increasing guaranteed time‑based equity and retention value; Slieter’s 2024 LTI target rose 30% to $630,000 from $485,000 in 2023 to maintain competitiveness and reinforce long‑term focus .
- STI design places largest weight on Adjusted EBITDA; 2025 increase to 80% further tightens linkage to through‑cycle profitability; raising STI threshold to 50% makes payouts harder to achieve at low performance .
- Governance guardrails: robust stock ownership guidelines, prohibition on hedging/pledging, and a Dodd‑Frank/NYSE‑compliant clawback policy reduce misalignment and risk-taking incentives .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Prior outcome: ~95% approval in 2023 advisory vote, indicating strong support for executive compensation program; peer group unchanged in 2023 review .
Compensation Committee & Peer Group Notes
- Base salaries are set with reference to market data but not targeted to a specific competitive position; 2024 increases brought selected NEOs in line with peers; 2025 base salaries unchanged given competitive positioning .
- Peer group reviewed with consultant; no changes in 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Slieter’s incentives are anchored to multi‑year EPS/ROI with an rTSR modifier and meaningful ownership requirements, supporting long‑term value creation .
- Retention risk: Significant unvested RSU/PSU over a 3‑year horizon plus option overhang (legacy 2021–2023 grants) provide retention hooks; double‑trigger CIC mitigates involuntary acceleration and selling pressure absent termination .
- Trading signals: Annual vesting and PSU certifications create predictable potential supply; however, strict insider trading, blackout and pre‑clearance rules, and a no‑hedge/pledge policy reduce opportunistic selling risk .
- Downside protection: Clawback, ownership guidelines, and capped payouts (generally 200% of target) constrain risk-taking; severance is formulaic with “net best” 280G treatment .