Craig Wright
About Craig Wright
Craig Wright is Senior Vice President and Head of Asset Management at AerSale (ASLE). He has served in senior commercial and asset roles at AerSale since 2010 and in his current role since December 2019; he was previously President (2019), Chief Commercial Officer (2017–2019), and SVP Aircraft Leasing (2010–2017) . He is 56 years old . Company performance context for incentive alignment in 2024: revenue was ~$345.1M (up ~$10.6M YoY) and net income was $5.9M; Adjusted EBITDA reached $33.4M versus a $34.1M target, which influenced annual bonus outcomes for executives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic/Execution Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AerSale | Senior Vice President & Head of Asset Management | Dec 2019–present | Leads aircraft/engine asset management; central to trading/leasing monetization cycle |
| AerSale | President (AerSale Corp.) | Jan 2019–Dec 2019 | Transitional leadership ahead of current organization structure |
| AerSale | Chief Commercial Officer | Jun 2017–Jan 2019 | Commercial leadership during product/segment expansion |
| AerSale | SVP, Aircraft Leasing | 2010–2017 | Built leasing portfolio; feedstock-to-USM monetization |
| Macquarie AirFinance | Vice President, Fleet | 2006–2010 | Portfolio/fleet management at global lessor |
| GATX Capital | Director, Corporate Finance | 2001–2006 | Structured finance across rail/IT/aviation verticals |
| Lin & Associates | Consulting Engineer | 1990–1998 | Technical/structural engineering foundation |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No current public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Wright |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Status for Craig Wright | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | Not individually disclosed | Company discloses base salaries for NEOs, but not for Wright; he is an SVP and current executive officer |
| Target annual bonus % | Not individually disclosed | Annual cash incentive plan based primarily on Adjusted EBITDA; 2024 target for company was $34.1M; 0–200% payout framework, with Board discretion between 0–80% if ≥80% of target is achieved |
| Perquisites | Not disclosed for Wright | Limited perquisites disclosed primarily for CEO; no Wright-specific perquisite disclosure |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting/Design | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Payout Mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual cash bonus | Adjusted EBITDA (company) and individual performance | Company uses Adjusted EBITDA as pre-requisite; Board discretion for partial payouts if ≥80% of target; 0–200% of Target Bonus framework | $34.1M | $33.4M | At 98% of target, Board discretion applied; CEO took 0%; other NEO payouts ranged 28%–78% of target; Wright’s payout not disclosed | Cash in year following performance |
| PSUs (LTI) | 3-year cumulative Adjusted EBITDA (2024–2026) | 50% of 2024 LTI mix for senior executives | Company-set multi‑year goals | In‑progress (2024–2026) | 0–200% payout contingent on performance | Cliff based on 3-year goal achievement; converts to shares on vest |
| Stock options (LTI) | Stock price appreciation | 25% of 2024 LTI mix; strike not less than FMV; no repricing permitted | N/A | N/A | Value only if price > exercise price; plan prohibits repricing without shareholder approval | Pro rata over 3 years; 10-year term typical |
| RSUs (LTI) | Time-based retention | 25% of 2024 LTI mix | N/A | N/A | Time-based retention element | Pro rata over 3 years |
- Plan/Policy features affecting incentives: no dividends on unvested awards; clawback policy effective Dec 1, 2023; hedging prohibited under insider trading policy .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Status/Details |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (Craig Wright) | Not individually disclosed in security ownership table (individual figures provided for directors and NEOs; Wright not included) |
| Vested vs unvested | Not disclosed for Wright (NEO award balances are disclosed; Wright not an NEO in 2024) |
| Pledging/Hedging | Hedging and similar transactions are prohibited by policy; no pledging policy disclosure noted |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Not disclosed for executives |
| Plan governance | No evergreen; no discounted option grants; no repricing without shareholder approval; clawback applies to awards; no dividends on unvested awards |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms (Company-wide policy; applicability to Wright as SVP) |
|---|---|
| Severance (non‑CIC) | If terminated without cause or for good reason: salary continuation for a number of years equal to “Severance Multiple,” prorated annual bonus based on actual, continued medical/welfare benefits for Severance Multiple years; for SVP+ with ≥3 years’ service, full vesting of outstanding equity (PSUs vest based on actual performance). Individual Severance Multiple for Wright not disclosed . |
| Severance (Change‑in‑Control, double trigger) | Within 1 year post‑CIC: cash severance = Severance Multiple × (base salary + target bonus), prorated bonus based on actual, continued benefits for Severance Multiple years, full vesting of outstanding equity (PSUs vest based on actual performance) for SVP+ with ≥3 years’ service . |
| Restrictive covenants | Perpetual confidentiality and non‑disparagement; non‑compete for employment period plus years equal to Severance Multiple; non‑solicit of employees/clients/suppliers during employment and 2 years after . |
| “Good reason” / “Cause” | Detailed definitions include material breach by company, salary reduction, relocation >40 miles, material adverse role change (good reason); cause includes felony/moral turpitude, willful failure to perform, dishonesty, policy breaches, lack of cooperation in internal investigations . |
| Accelerated vesting on qualified retirement | If age ≥65, ≥5 years continuous service, 12‑month notice and 12‑month non‑compete: unvested stock units continue vesting on schedule after retirement; PSUs still subject to performance . |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Senior executive LTI mix (50% PSUs on 3-year EBITDA, 25% options, 25% RSUs) and EBITDA-based annual bonus create strong linkage to operating outcomes and stock performance; clawback and no-repricing fortify governance .
- Retention and overhang: Three-year vesting across RSUs/options and PSU multi-year performance window support retention; 2020 Plan share reserve increased to 10.2M (subject to approval), with recent burn rates of 1% (2023) and 3% (2024), average 2%—moderate dilution profile .
- Visibility gap on individual exposure: Lack of public disclosure on Wright’s individual salary, bonus payout, and share ownership limits precision on insider selling pressure and skin-in-the-game analysis; however, SVP eligibility for severance/CIC protection and retirement vesting suggests lower near-term voluntary attrition risk for a long-tenured executive .
- Performance context: 2024 revenue growth with near‑target EBITDA implies annual bonus sensitivity to marginal performance; with PSUs tied to 2024–2026 cumulative EBITDA, execution in Asset Management and feedstock monetization will be a key lever for realized pay outcomes .
Key gaps to monitor: any Form 4 ownership changes or pledging disclosures, 2025 say‑on‑pay voting outcomes and shareholder feedback, and PSU goal calibration updates once disclosed in future filings .