Joseph Walland
Alphatec HoldingsAbout Joseph Walland
Joseph Walland is Senior Vice President, Imaging Solutions at Alphatec (ATEC), serving in this role since January 2022 after joining ATEC in December 2020 as Vice President, Sales Channel Development; he is 47 and holds a B.A. in History from Yale University . During his tenure, ATEC delivered 2024 revenue of $612 million (+27% YoY), expanded adjusted EBITDA margin by ~690 bps, and generated $9 million of free cash flow in Q4 2024, with peer-relative ranks of 90% (1-year revenue growth), 85% (3-year revenue growth), 19% (1-year TSR), and 75% (3-year TSR) as of 12/31/2024 . The company also launched EOS Insight, an imaging-driven software platform, aligning with Walland’s Imaging Solutions remit .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alphatec (ATEC) | VP, Sales Channel Development | Dec 2020–Jan 2022 | Built commercial channel ahead of Imaging leadership transition |
| Medicrea | U.S. Chief Executive Officer | – Nov 2020 | Led sale of Medicrea to Medtronic in Nov-2020 |
| Stryker Spine | Sales & Marketing leadership; Area VP Sales–West | 2004–2017 | Scaled U.S. West sales channel and marketing leadership in spine |
Fixed Compensation
- ATEC does not disclose individual fixed pay for non-NEO executives like Walland; for context, 2024 NEO base salaries reflected market adjustments (e.g., CEO +7%, CFO +6%; other NEOs +3%–12%) effective Feb 1, 2024 .
- Executive employment agreements are at-will and set base salary, target bonus eligibility, and equity participation; all ATEC executive officers (including Walland) have such agreements .
Performance Compensation
- Annual bonus plan design (applies to executive officers): 2024 metrics were Revenue (75% weight) and Adjusted EBITDA (25% weight); revenue payout required ≥96% of target, with targets set aggressively (revenue target ~36% above prior year's target) .
- 2024 actual corporate performance produced an aggregate 105% payout before individual modifiers; bonuses for the senior leadership team were paid 50% in cash and 50% in RSUs (RSUs vesting Dec 5, 2025, with share count based on a 30-day average price and a 1.2x conversion factor) .
| Metric | Weight | Target design | Actual result | Weighted payout | Vesting/payment mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 75% | Threshold ≥96% of target; target set +36% vs prior-year target | 102% payout factor | 76% | Annual bonus: 50% cash, 50% RSUs vest 12/5/2025; RSU conversion at 30-day avg price with 1.2x factor |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 25% | Challenging threshold/target set by Comp Committee | 114% payout factor | 29% | Same as above |
| Aggregate | 100% | — | — | 105% | — |
- Long-term incentives: 2024 PRSUs are tied to one-year global revenue growth with a matrix (≤20% growth = 0x; 25% = 1.0x; ≥35% = 2.5x, linear in between), followed by time-based vesting over three years; time-based RSUs also vest ratably over three years .
- 2024 PRSU outcome: ATEC achieved 27% YoY global revenue growth (107% of goal), resulting in 127% of target PRSUs earned for NEOs; earned PRSUs vest one-third on March 5, 2025/2026/2027 (continued service required) .
| LTI vehicle | Performance/vesting design | 2024 outcome | Vesting cadence |
|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs (Global Revenue Growth) | 0x–2.5x based on revenue growth matrix; performance period 1 year; requires continued service | 27% growth → 127% of target earned | 1/3 each on 3/5/2025, 3/5/2026, 3/5/2027 |
| RSUs (time-based) | No performance condition; service-based | N/A (grant/values not disclosed for Walland) | 1/3 per year over 3 years |
Note: Walland’s individual award levels and payouts are not disclosed; tables reflect plan design and disclosed corporate/NEO outcomes .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x base salary; Section 16 officers 1x base salary; non-employee directors 3x retainer; counts shares and time-based RSUs; PRSUs count only when earned; five-year compliance window .
- Hedging/pledging/derivatives: Insider Trading Policy prohibits short sales; use of company securities for margin or other loans; collars/straddles/other risk-reduction devices; and transactions in publicly traded options, except with prior approval in limited cases .
- Clawback: Dodd-Frank compliant Clawback Policy adopted 12/1/2023; applies to current and former executive officers and incentive-based compensation received after 10/2/2023; recoupment if financial statements are restated due to material noncompliance .
- Beneficial ownership: ATEC’s beneficial ownership table covers directors and NEOs; as Walland is not an NEO or director, no specific share count or ownership percentage is disclosed for him in the 2025 proxy .
| Alignment mechanism | Policy/Status |
|---|---|
| Ownership guidelines | CEO 5x; Section 16 officers 1x; 5 years to comply |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited under Insider Trading Policy (short sales, pledging, collars, options) |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery of excess incentive comp after restatement; covers execs |
| Walland ownership | Not disclosed (table covers directors/NEOs only) – |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment status | All executive officers (including Walland) are at-will and have written employment agreements setting base, bonus eligibility, and equity participation |
| Severance (without cause) | Executive Severance Agreement (effective 7/19/2023) covers Walland; lump-sum cash equal to 1x the higher of (i) annual target total cash (base + target bonus) or (ii) average annual total cash over prior 3 years; 18 months COBRA premiums; extended option exercise to the later of 90 days post-termination or the remaining term; subject to release and other conditions |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | Cash severance requires “double trigger” (CIC + qualifying termination) |
| Equity on CIC | Equity award arrangements provide for automatic accelerated vesting upon a change in control (single-trigger for equity) |
| Clawback | Applies as noted above |
| Say-on-pay signal | 85% support in 2024 advisory vote |
| Related party transactions | None to report per policy review |
Performance & Track Record
- Role-relevant milestones: Company launched the EOS Insight imaging platform in 2024, enhancing pre-op to post-op spine care workflows—strategically aligned with Imaging Solutions .
- Company performance during tenure: 2024 revenue $612M (+27% YoY), adjusted EBITDA margin +~690 bps; peer-relative ranks strong on growth and solid on 3-year TSR .
- Board/governance context: Compensation Committee comprised of independent directors oversees pay; clawback policy enforced; hedging/pledging prohibited, supporting investor alignment .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay-for-performance linkage: Executive bonuses tied 75% to revenue and 25% to adjusted EBITDA, with 2024 aggregate outcome at 105%, indicating above-target corporate execution; LTI PRSUs earned at 127% on 27% revenue growth .
- Retention mechanics: Multi-year vesting (three annual tranches) on PRSUs/RSUs extends retention horizon; bonus RSUs further defer value to 12/5/2025, moderating short-term selling pressure .
- CIC economics: Double-trigger cash mitigates windfalls, while single-trigger equity acceleration raises M&A equity overhang considerations typical in medtech .
- Governance safeguards: No hedging/pledging; clawback in force; no change-in-control excise tax gross-ups (shareholder-friendly) .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: Walland operates under an executive program heavily geared to revenue growth and profitability, with 2024 corporate outcomes yielding an above-target 105% cash/RSU bonus funding and 127% PRSU earning—supportive of growth and operating discipline signals .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Three-year vesting on PRSUs/RSUs and 2024 bonus RSUs vesting 12/5/2025 extend retention but may create episodic liquidity events around vest dates; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risk .
- Change-in-control dynamics: Double-trigger cash limits cash severance risk; single-trigger equity acceleration can increase acquisition consideration/dilution but aligns management to transaction completion (standard for sector) .
- Disclosure gap to monitor: As Walland is not an NEO, individual salary/bonus/ownership levels are not disclosed in the proxy; monitor Section 16 filings for any insider transactions and evolving ownership alignment, alongside Say-on-Pay outcomes (85% in 2024) and Compensation Committee practices for ongoing pay-for-performance integrity – .