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John Asbury

John Asbury

President and Chief Executive Officer at Atlantic Union Bankshares
CEO
Executive
Board

About John Asbury

John C. Asbury, 59, is President and CEO of Atlantic Union Bankshares (AUB) since January 2017 and a director since 2016; he previously served as President of the Company and CEO of the Bank beginning October 2016. He holds a B.S. in Business from Virginia Tech and an MBA from William & Mary, and prior roles included CEO of First National Bank of Santa Fe, senior executive positions at Regions Bank, and SVP roles at Bank of America . Under his tenure, AUB grew total assets from $19.63B in 2020 to $24.59B in 2024 while maintaining double‑digit operating ROTCE and paying rising dividends per share . AUB’s TSR (value of $100 invested) was $91.10→$120.12 from 2020 to 2024 versus the KBW Regional Banking Index’s $91.29→$130.90, and operating ROTCE ranged 11.18%→16.12% over that period .

Performance summary (GAAP views aligned to incentive constructs):

Metric20202021202220232024
Total Assets ($B)$19.63 $20.06 $20.46 $21.17 $24.59
Net Income ($M)$158.23 $263.92 $234.51 $201.82 $209.13
ROA (%)0.83% 1.32% 1.18% 0.98% 0.88%
Operating ROTCE (%)11.18% 16.72% 17.33% 14.85% 13.35%
Efficiency Ratio (%)60.19% 61.91% 57.46% 61.32% 62.09%
Dividends/Share ($)$1.00 $1.09 $1.16 $1.22 $1.30
TSR – AUB ($100 basis)$91.10 $106.14 $103.35 $111.76 $120.12
TSR – KBW Regional Bank Index ($100 basis)$91.29 $124.74 $116.10 $115.64 $130.90

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
First National Bank of Santa FePresident & CEOFeb 2015–Aug 2016 Led turnaround and operations of a regional bank
Regions BankSEVP, Head of Business Services Group; Business Banking Division ExecutiveMay 2010–Jul 2014; joined Mar 2008 Built business banking and services across a large franchise
Bank of AmericaSenior Vice PresidentVarious roles (years not specified) Led businesses in multiple SVP roles at a national bank

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
None disclosed for Asbury

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Change YoYTarget Short-Term Incentive (% of salary)Actual Non-Equity Incentive ($)Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value, $)Total ($)
2022859,733 Not listed977,766 1,381,053 3,326,195
2023894,213 +4.0% (inferred)Not listed180,000 1,644,042 3,554,480
2024975,000 +10.0% 100% 1,205,820 1,932,272 4,255,285
2025 (set)1,024,650 +3.5% 110% LTIP target 200% of salary

Stock award mix and values (2024):

  • Time-based restricted stock: $836,979; TSR PSU: $570,466; ROATCE PSU: $524,827 (target basis) .

Perquisites in 2024 (examples): executive wellness allowance (e.g., $27,322 for Asbury), country club dues, vehicle personal use; retirement/ESOP contributions and dividends on restricted stock also reported .

Performance Compensation

Short-term annual incentive (MIP) structure and outcomes (2024):

MetricWeightThresholdTargetSuperiorActual% of Target AchievedNotes
Net Operating Income ($M)25% 228 285 399 264.694 93% Adjusted for merger-related and special items
Operating ROA (%)20% 0.97 1.21 1.69 1.11 92%
Operating ROTCE (%)30% 14.82 18.53 25.94 16.69 90% Relative ROTCE modifier added in 2024
Operating Efficiency Ratio (%)25% 57.22 52.02 46.82 53.31 98% Adjusted expense/revenue definitions

Payout mechanics:

  • Absolute corporate performance payout calculated at 81%, then multiplied by relative ROTCE modifier (AUB ranked 82nd percentile vs peer group), lifting corporate component to 121% .
  • Individual/divisional performance payout for NEOs (including Asbury) at 125% .
  • Asbury’s total incentive payout equaled 122% of base salary ($1,205,820) .

Long-term incentives (2024 grants):

  • Mix: CEO 60% PSUs / 40% time-based RS; 3-year vesting for RS; PSUs on a 3-year performance period .
  • PSU metrics: 50% TSR rank vs KBW Regional Banking Index; 50% Core ROATCE rank vs same; payout 50–200% of target with straight-line interpolation; below 25th percentile earns 0% for the metric .
  • 2022 PSU cycle earned at 98% of target (49th percentile TSR), paid Jan 29, 2025; Asbury earned 19,444 units .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total beneficial ownership264,089 common shares (<1%)
Restricted stock included in ownership51,527 shares (no investment power until vest)
Unvested RS at 12/31/20244,409 (2022 TRS), 11,477 (2023 TRS), 24,146 (2024 TRS), 1,337 (Mar 2024 TRS)
Unvested PSUs at target25,824 (2023–2025), 36,220 (2024–2026)
Earned PSU pending/paid19,444 (2022–2024) earned and paid 1/29/2025
Stock optionsNone outstanding; company does not currently grant options
Ownership guidelineCEO must hold ≥5× base salary; all NEOs compliant or within 5-year window
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for directors and executive officers
Dividends on unearned performance awardsNot paid until performance is met (clawback and governance aligned)

Vesting schedules:

  • 2024 TRS: 1/3 vesting on Feb 22, 2025/2026/2027 .
  • March 2024 TRS: fully vested Mar 15, 2025 .
  • 2023 TRS: remaining 1/2 vests Feb 23, 2026 .
  • PSUs: 2023 cycle ends Dec 31, 2025; 2024 cycle ends Dec 31, 2026; settlement within 60 days post‑period certification .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey Terms
Employment agreementA&R agreements (Jan 14, 2022); auto-renews annually unless notice by Sept 30
Base pay reviewAnnually by Board; MIP and LTIP participation at Committee discretion
Severance (no CIC): termination without cause or good reason2× base salary paid over 24 months plus lump-sum welfare benefit (24× company health subsidy), subject to release
Failure to renew1× base salary over 12 months plus welfare benefit (12× subsidy), subject to release
Death (no CIC)6 months’ base salary to beneficiary
Change in Control (CIC) – management continuityTwo-year protection; if terminated without cause or for good reason within 2 years: lump-sum of (a) accrued obligations + prorated bonus, (b) 2× (current base + highest bonus of prior 2 years), (c) welfare benefit; with tax cutback provisions; subject to release
Equity accelerationDouble-trigger principle when awards are assumed: acceleration only upon qualifying termination within 2 years post‑CIC; otherwise, awards may be cashed out, adjusted, or assumed; Committee retains flexibility
ClawbackIncentive Compensation Recovery Policy applies to all awards; restatement-based recovery per SEC/NYSE rules

Illustrative potential payments (as of 12/31/2024):

  • CIC with qualifying termination: Cash $5.62M; RS acceleration $2.30M; PSU $2.35M; Total ~$10.28M .
  • Without cause (no CIC): Cash $3.21M; RS $2.30M; PSU $1.11M; Total ~$6.63M .

Board Governance

  • Director since 2016; currently non-independent due to executive status; committee: Executive Committee member .
  • Board leadership: CEO separate from non-management Chair; Chair (Ronald Tillett) presides over quarterly executive sessions of independent directors, enhancing oversight independence .
  • Board/committee activity: 9 regular and 2 special meetings in 2024; all directors met ≥75% attendance; annual self-evaluation process overseen by Nominating & Corporate Governance .
  • Director compensation: Asbury receives no additional cash/equity for board service beyond executive pay .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Pay-for-performance: MIP links to net operating income, operating ROA/ROTCE, and operating efficiency, with a new relative ROTCE modifier to align rewards to peer outperformance; corporate payout adjusted to 121% in 2024 based on 82nd percentile ROTCE rank .
  • Equity mix shift to PSUs: CEO LTIP ≥50% PSUs (Asbury at 60%), with 3-year TSR and Core ROATCE relative performance—higher at-risk, peer‑relative alignment .
  • Governance features: No option repricing; no discounted options; dividends not paid on unearned performance awards; double-trigger CIC acceleration encouraged; independent Compensation Committee with Meridian as consultant .
  • Ownership/clawback: 5× salary stock ownership for CEO; clawback policy applies; hedging/pledging prohibited .

Compensation Peer Group & Say-on-Pay

  • Peer group (2024): 21 regional banks including Ameris, SouthState, Old National, UMB, United Bankshares, Trustmark, Hancock Whitney, WesBanco, WSFS, etc. .
  • Target positioning: Each compensation element generally targeted to median; superior performance yields above-median pay; substandard performance below median .
  • Say-on-Pay: 93% approval at 2024 annual meeting; Committee considered vote in maintaining program design .

Equity Supply and Insider Selling Pressure

  • No pledged shares; hedging/pledging prohibited—reduces alignment risk .
  • Scheduled vesting creates periodic deliverable supply: TRS tranches in Feb 2025–27; PSUs settle 60 days post period end (early 2026 and early 2027 cycles), subject to performance and certification .
  • Options not used—limits forced exercises; outstanding equity is primarily RS/PSUs .

Employment & Contracts – Restrictive Covenants

  • Executive severance requires release; PSU vesting upon certain terminations may require compliance with non‑competition provisions per award agreements; non‑solicit obligations under severance plan are required to receive severance .

Performance & Track Record

  • Strategic execution: Completed acquisition of American National (Apr 1, 2024); pending merger with Sandy Spring (all approvals received; expected close Apr 1, 2025), supporting scale in Mid-Atlantic markets .
  • Financial outcomes: Sustained profitability and ROTCE; growing dividend; efficiency ratio elevated in 2024 amid integration and rate/credit dynamics .

Equity Ownership & Alignment (Detailed Table)

CategoryShares / Units
Beneficial common shares264,089 (<1%)
Restricted stock included51,527
Unvested RS (counts)4,409 (2022) ; 11,477 (2023) ; 24,146 (2024) ; 1,337 (Mar 2024)
Unvested PSUs (target)25,824 (2023–25) ; 36,220 (2024–26)
Earned PSU paid (2022 cycle)19,444 (paid 1/29/2025)

Director Compensation (For Directors; Asbury exception noted)

  • Non-employee director cash/equity structure (Asbury excluded as CEO): Cash retainer $50,000 in 2024, rising to $60,000 in 2025; equity retainer $65,000 rising to $80,000; committee/chair fees detailed; Executive Committee per‑meeting fees for non-management directors .
  • Asbury receives no director compensation .
  • Director ownership guidelines: ≥5× cash retainer; all directors compliant or within 5‑year window .

Governance and Risk Indicators

  • Clawback policy aligned with SEC/NYSE rules; banking regulatory overlay on awards .
  • No tax gross-ups; no single-trigger cash severance; annual compensation risk assessment; no dividends on unearned performance awards .
  • Section 16 compliance: One director reported an administrative late Form 4 for phantom stock due to deferral; otherwise compliant .

Investment Implications

  • Strong alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay (PSUs with relative TSR and Core ROATCE), ownership guideline (5× salary), and clawback/anti-hedging policies indicate high alignment with shareholders .
  • Retention risk manageable: Double-trigger CIC treatment and sizable severance economics create retention through change; scheduled RS/PSU vesting supports long-term alignment but implies periodic supply; no options reduces forced selling .
  • Performance signals: Relative ROTCE modifier lifted 2024 MIP payouts to reflect peer-beating returns, while absolute metrics were modestly below targets—suggests balanced use of relative measures to sustain pay-for-performance credibility .
  • M&A execution: American National integration and Sandy Spring combination (if closed) expand scale; equity plan refresh (2.5M shares) implies future grant capacity—monitor dilution (~3.88% potential on new plan) and grant discipline over next ~5 years .

Notes: All data from AUB’s 2025 DEF 14A unless otherwise cited above.