Matthew Buckhalter
About Matthew Buckhalter
Matthew Buckhalter, age 36, is Chief Financial Officer of Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. (AVAH). He joined Aveanna at formation in 2017, served as Interim CFO starting July 7, 2023, and was appointed CFO effective January 1, 2024; he holds a B.A. in Finance from Florida State University . Aveanna’s annual executive incentives emphasize Revenue (30%) and Adjusted EBITDA (70%), with Buckhalter’s 2024 bonus paying out at 171% of target, underscoring pay-for-performance tied to operating metrics . Company “pay versus performance” disclosures note negative Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and negative Compensation Actually Paid (CAP) in 2021–2022, with CAP positive in 2023; the company also reaffirmed FY2023 guidance of at least $1,840 million revenue and at least $130 million Adjusted EBITDA during his interim CFO period .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. | Chief Financial Officer | Jan 1, 2024–present | Finance leadership; previously led Investor Relations; progressed from FP&A to SVP Finance to CFO |
| Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. | Interim Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) | Jul 7, 2023–Dec 2023 | Oversaw corporate/operational finance, BI, FP&A, IR during transition |
| Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. | Senior Vice President of Finance | Prior to Jul 2023 | Led Investor Relations Group; broader finance leadership |
| Aveanna Healthcare Holdings Inc. | Vice President, Financial Planning & Analysis | Prior to SVP Finance | Built FP&A capability pre-SVP |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| RT Capital | Vice President of Finance | Pre-2017 (prior to joining Aveanna) | Private investment/finance leadership role prior to Aveanna |
| Gentiva Health Services | Senior Financial Analyst | 2012–2015 | Healthcare services finance experience (public company setting) |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | Bonus ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 425,000 | 75% | – | 546,338 |
| 2023 | 312,500 | 50% (upon Interim CFO appointment) | 150,000 retention bonus (paid Jul 2023; clawback if not employed through Jun 2024) | 156,500 |
Additional 2024 base salary context: Buckhalter’s 2024 base salary was $425,000, up 31% from 2023, per the compensation discussion .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout ($) | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 30% | Not disclosed | Contributed to 171% of target overall | 546,338 (total cash incentive) | Paid on/around Apr 11, 2025 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 70% | Not disclosed | Contributed to 171% of target overall | 546,338 (total cash incentive) | Paid on/around Apr 11, 2025 |
Notes:
- Participants may earn 50%–200% of target based on performance; Buckhalter’s 2024 target opportunity was 75% of base salary .
Long-Term Equity Incentives (structure and vesting)
- RSUs granted in 2022–2024 vest on three-year cliff schedules; RSUs granted on Dec 29, 2021 vest on a four-year cliff .
- 2017 Plan options: time-based options vest ratably over five years; performance-vesting options are tied to share-price hurdles; 10-year term .
- Performance-vesting options vest based on 90-day VWAP hurdles: 50% at $10.13, 75% at $12.79, 100% at $15.52 (with straight-line interpolation between 75% and 100%) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of March 11, 2025)
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | Ownership % | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Matthew Buckhalter | 81,147 | <1% | Beneficial ownership includes options/RSUs exercisable/vesting within 60 days |
- Ownership guidelines: Other NEOs (incl. CFO) must hold 3x base salary within 5 years of appointment; unvested and unexercised options and PSUs do not count .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited (no hedging, short sales, margin purchases, or pledging) .
Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal Year-End (Dec 28, 2024)
Option awards (2017/2020 plans):
| Grant Date | Type | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration | Vesting Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12/1/2017 | Options | 21,297 | 21,297 | 4.88 | 11/30/2027 | Time-based options vest ratably over five years; separate pool of performance-vesting options also exists |
| 11/24/2020 | Options | 24,600 | 36,900 | 15.00 | 11/23/2030 | 10-year term; time-based vesting applies |
Stock awards (RSUs/PSUs):
| Grant Date | RSUs Unvested (#) | RSUs Market Value ($) | PSUs Unearned (#) | PSUs Market/Payout Value ($) | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12/29/2021 | 115,000 | 535,900 | – | – | Four-year cliff (2021 grant) |
| 2/14/2022 | 22,820 | 106,341 | – | – | Three-year cliff |
| 2/14/2023 | 78,125 | 364,063 | 15,625 | 72,813 | Three-year cliff (RSUs); PSUs performance-based |
| 2/14/2024 | 199,862 | 931,357 | 99,931 | 465,678 | Three-year cliff (RSUs); PSUs performance-based |
Additional notes:
- No option exercises and no RSU vesting occurred for NEOs in fiscal 2024, reducing near-term selling pressure in that period .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Standard executive form; initial 3-year term with auto-renewal for 1-year periods; eligibility for base salary, annual bonus, benefits, and equity awards . |
| Severance (Termination without Cause / Good Reason) | Cash severance equal to 1x base salary; plus an amount equal to prior-year annual bonus; continuation of health and welfare benefits for COBRA-eligible period (up to one year, or up to two years if Company elects to extend restrictive period) . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality, non-disparagement, non-compete, and non-solicit apply during employment and for 1 year post-termination (extendable to 2 years at Company’s election; if extended, severance increases to 2x salary and 2x prior-year bonus) . |
| Equity Treatment (2017 Plan) | Vested options generally exercisable for 90 days post-termination; forfeiture upon termination for Cause or restrictive covenant breach; 12 months post-termination exercisability on death/disability; death/disability triggers immediate vesting of an additional 40% of time-vested options (capped at 100% total) . |
| Equity Treatment (2021 Plan) | No automatic acceleration upon termination, death, disability, or change in control under the 2021 Plan; agreements provide for acceleration of equity awards upon certain circumstances in a change of control . |
| Change in Control (historical example) | Prior disclosure (FY2021 as of Jan 1, 2022) reflected automatic vesting of remaining unvested time-based options under the 2017 Plan upon CIC in summarized termination benefits . |
| Interim CFO Appointment Terms (June 2023) | Base salary $325,000; target bonus 50% of base; $150,000 cash retention bonus paid July 2023, subject to clawback if not employed through June 2024 . |
Compensation Peer Group (context)
Aveanna’s 2024 compensation study peer group included 14 healthcare companies such as Addus HomeCare, Amedisys, Option Care Health, ModivCare, Enhabit, Chemed, RadNet, Surgery Partners, and The Pennant Group; the committee applies judgment rather than targeting a specific percentile .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Buckhalter’s 2024 cash bonus paid at 171% of target on Revenue/Adjusted EBITDA metrics, indicating above-target operating performance emphasis; long-term equity uses multi-year vesting and performance-conditioned PSUs/options to align with shareholder outcomes .
- Selling pressure and vesting overhang: Three-year cliff RSUs from 2022–2024 (and four-year cliff for 2021 grant) imply step-function vesting in 2025–2027 and 2025, respectively; no 2024 vesting suggests deferral of potential liquidity events into upcoming years .
- Ownership alignment and risk controls: Beneficial ownership is modest in absolute share count (81,147; <1%); however, stock ownership guidelines require 3x salary over five years, and hedging/pledging is prohibited, mitigating misalignment/pledge risk .
- Retention and transition risk: Standard severance (1x salary + prior-year bonus, extendable to 2x if restricted period extended) and non-compete/non-solicit terms provide continuity incentives; the 2023 $150k retention bonus with clawback through June 2024 signals prior retention focus during the CFO transition .
- Change-in-control dynamics: 2021 Plan lacks automatic acceleration (reducing windfall risk), while 2017 Plan options have defined CIC and termination provisions; performance-vesting option hurdles ($10.13/$12.79/$15.52 90-day VWAP) concentrate upside on sustained share-price improvement .
Overall, Buckhalter’s incentive mix is heavily at-risk and levered to Adjusted EBITDA and multi-year equity vesting, with governance guardrails (no hedging/pledging, ownership guidelines) and standard severance terms. The pending vesting cliffs and performance option hurdles will be key markers for potential insider selling windows and for translating operating execution into realized pay outcomes .