Benoit Gourdier
AvantorAbout Benoit Gourdier
Benoit Gourdier (age 54) is Executive Vice President, Bioscience Production at Avantor (AVTR), a role he has held since January 2024 after joining as EVP, Biopharma Production in October 2023; he previously spent 23 years at Merck KGaA (MilliporeSigma), most recently as SVP & GM, BioReliance Contract Testing Services (2017–2023) . In 2024, his segment (Bioscience Production) exceeded internal plans and outperformed targets on both revenue and adjusted operating income, driving above‑target annual incentive funding for his role (Company/Segment funding 126.8%) . Company PSUs for the 2022–2024 performance cycle paid 0% on both cumulative adjusted EPS and relative TSR, underscoring a pay-for-performance framework with meaningful downside risk .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avantor | EVP, Bioscience Production | Jan 2024–present | Led BPS segment; BPS revenue ($2,177M) and BPS adjusted operating income ($560M) exceeded targets (funding 126.8%); expanded leadership of NuSil, launched Bridgewater Innovation Center, and assumed oversight of manufacturing organization . |
| Avantor | EVP, Biopharma Production | Oct 2023–Dec 2023 | Named as part of new 2‑segment operating model effective Jan 1, 2024 . |
| Merck KGaA (MilliporeSigma) | SVP & GM, BioReliance Contract Testing Services | Sep 2017–Sep 2023 | Ran BioReliance CTS; part of 23‑year tenure across leadership roles at Merck KGaA . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in filings reviewed.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric (USD) | FY 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $550,000 (up from $475,000; +15.8%) . |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 80% (EVP agreement) . |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $512,210 (reflects Company/Segment funding 126.8% and individual 95%) . |
| All Other Compensation | $20,000 (financial planning services; no 401(k) company match elected) . |
| Total Reported Compensation | $3,733,064 (Summary Compensation Table) . |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (ICP) – Benoit Gourdier design and outcome
| Metric | Weight | Target | Stretch | Actual | Achievement vs Target | Funding Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Revenue | 20% | $6,908.0M | $7,426.0M | $6,795.0M | 98% | 89% . |
| BPS Segment Revenue | 20% | $2,135.0M | $2,295.0M | $2,177.0M | 102% | 126% . |
| Enterprise Const‑Currency Adj. Op. Inc. | 10% | $1,109.0M | $1,247.0M | $1,092.0M | 98% | 94% . |
| BPS Segment Adj. Op. Inc. | 10% | $529.0M | $595.0M | $560.0M | 106% | 147% . |
| Free Cash Flow | 10% | $615.0M | $738.0M | $768.3M | 140% | 200% . |
| GHG Emissions Reduction | 5% | 7% | 8% | 8% | 109% | 160% . |
| Inclusion Index | 5% | 7.8 | 8.2 | 7.9 | 101% | 125% . |
| Individual Strategic Goals | 20% | — | — | — | — | 95% (earned) . |
| Company/Segment Funding (applies to his role) | — | — | — | — | — | 126.8% . |
Notes:
- Gourdier’s individual assessment cited strong BPS commercial execution, NuSil leadership, new product innovation, Bridgewater Innovation Center launch, and expanded manufacturing oversight (earned 95%) .
- ICP structure for his role: 50% enterprise, 30% BPS segment, 20% individual; payouts capped at 200% per component .
2024 Long‑Term Incentives (granted Feb 23, 2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Grant‑date Fair Value | Vesting | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) | 2/23/2024 | 25,667 target | $1,434,785 | Cliff after 3‑yr perf. period (2024–2026) | Metrics: 50% adjusted EPS growth (annualized 3‑yr averaging methodology), 50% relative TSR vs comparator group; payout 0–200% . |
| Stock Options (NQ) | 2/23/2024 | 62,753 | $625,020 | Ratable 1/3 per year over 3 years | Exercise price $24.35; expiration 2/23/2034 . |
| RSUs | 2/23/2024 | 25,667 | $624,991 | Ratable 1/3 per year over 3 years | Time‑based; no dividend payment before vest . |
Company PSU calibration signal: The 2022–2024 PSUs (companywide) paid 0% on both 3‑yr cumulative adjusted EPS and 3‑yr relative TSR (13th percentile), demonstrating downside rigor .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Outstanding Equity (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 39,089 shares; “*” less than 1% of 681,397,790 shares outstanding . |
| Options exercisable within 60 days (included above) | 30,528 shares (within 60 days) . |
| 10/02/2023 Options | 9,820 exercisable; 29,461 unexercisable; strike $20.85; expire 10/02/2033 . |
| 10/02/2023 RSUs (unvested) | 12,590 units; market value basis $265,271 at $21.07 close . |
| 2/23/2024 Options | 62,753 unexercised; strike $24.35; expire 2/23/2034 . |
| 2/23/2024 RSUs (unvested) | 25,667 units; market value basis $540,804 at $21.07 . |
| 2/23/2024 PSUs (at next‑higher attainment ref.) | 51,334 units; market value basis $1,081,607 at $21.07 . |
| Reference stock price at 12/31/2024 | $21.07 (NYSE close) . |
- Moneyness: 2023 option strike ($20.85) was slightly in‑the‑money vs $21.07 year‑end price, while 2024 options ($24.35) were out‑of‑the‑money as of 12/31/2024 .
- Stock Ownership Guidelines: Segment leaders required to hold 3x base salary; at 12/31/2024, Gourdier was “on track” to meet within five years .
- Hedging, short sales, margin, and pledging: Prohibited for directors and officers; pledging disallowed (policy references include prohibition and pre‑clearance constructs) .
Vesting cadence (time‑based awards):
- 2023 grants: 25% per year on each anniversary of grant (10/2/2024–10/2/2027) .
- 2024 grants: one‑third per year on each anniversary of grant (2/23/2025–2/23/2027) .
Employment Terms
Legacy EVP Employment Agreement (effective July 19, 2023)
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Target annual bonus | 80% of base salary (ICP) . |
| Severance (termination without cause; no CIC) | 1x base salary; 1x target bonus (pro‑rated); 12 months medical benefits . |
| Severance (double‑trigger within 2 yrs after CIC) | 1.5x base salary; 1.5x target bonus; 18 months medical benefits . |
| Restrictive covenants | Non‑compete during employment and 1 year post‑termination; non‑solicit of employees/customers for 2 years post‑termination; confidentiality and non‑disparagement . |
| Clawbacks | Company‑wide Dodd‑Frank restatement recovery policy plus incremental recoupment (covers cash and time‑based equity) for misconduct, breaches of restrictive covenants, etc. . |
Updated Executive Severance & CIC Policy (adopted May 12, 2025; supersedes legacy terms)
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Severance (Qualifying Termination) | 12 months base salary; 1x target annual bonus; pro‑rated target bonus for year of termination; 12 months benefits; paid in installments over 12 months . |
| CIC Double‑Trigger (within 2 yrs post‑CIC) | 24 months base salary; 2x target annual bonus; pro‑rated target bonus; 18 months benefits; installments over 12 months . |
| 280G treatment | Best‑net: receive greater of (a) full payment less 20% excise tax or (b) cut‑back to avoid excise tax . |
| Equity vesting treatment (transition) | For terminations prior to May 5, 2027, unvested RSUs/PSUs scheduled to vest within 12 months receive service credit through first anniversary; PSUs measured on actual performance (if award agreement is not more favorable) . |
2025 Retention Award
| Detail | Term |
|---|---|
| Grant | 162,866 RSUs on May 9, 2025; vest on the second anniversary (May 9, 2027) subject to continued employment . |
| Forfeiture/acceleration | Forfeits upon termination except vests if death, disability, or involuntary termination without cause; if not assumed in a CIC, RSUs vest . |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 BPS execution: BPS revenue of $2,177.0M vs $2,135.0M target (102% achievement; 126% funding) and BPS adjusted operating income of $560.0M vs $529.0M target (106% achievement; 147% funding) .
- Individual priorities: Exceeded internal plan for BPS; expanded NuSil leadership; launched Bridgewater Innovation Center; assumed broader manufacturing oversight (individual goal payout 95%) .
- Innovation/commercialization signals: Led launches supporting gene therapy harvest (J.T.Baker Cell Lysis Solution and Endonuclease) and advanced sterile sampling/PUPSIT solutions; public statements emphasized process performance, sustainability, and speed‑to‑market for biopharma .
- Company PSU outcome (2022–2024): 0% payout on cumulative adjusted EPS and relative TSR (13th percentile), reinforcing pay‑for‑performance stringency .
Compensation Committee, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay
- Independent consultant FW Cook supports design and benchmarking; peer set includes life sciences tools/HC names (e.g., Agilent, Baxter, Bruker, Waters, etc.) .
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support: 93% approval; 2024 plan changes tied to investor feedback (e.g., operating income and FCF in ICP, reduced individual cap, double‑trigger equity) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: For NEOs (ex‑CEO), 2024 long‑term incentives comprised 50% PSUs, 25% options, 25% RSUs, emphasizing multi‑year performance, upside/downside, and retention .
- Metric rigor: 2024 ICP included enterprise and segment P&L plus FCF, and human capital metrics; PSUs based on relative TSR and adjusted EPS growth with 0–200% payout, and company’s recent PSU cycle paid 0% .
- Governance: Double‑trigger CIC, robust clawbacks, and prohibitions on hedging/margin/pledging reduce agency risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of at‑risk pay (segment revenue/AOI, FCF, TSR/EPS PSUs) and clawbacks support pay‑for‑performance; recent 0% PSU cycle underscores downside exposure if targets are missed .
- Retention vs selling pressure: Time‑based RSUs and options vest through 2027; a large 2025 retention RSU grant (162,866) vests in 2027 (accelerates on certain terminations/CIC if not assumed), supporting retention but creating potential supply around vesting dates; 2024 options were underwater at year‑end, reducing near‑term exercise pressure .
- Execution risk and levers: 2024 BPS outperformance contributed to above‑target ICP payout for his role (126.8%), suggesting operational traction; sustaining BPS growth/innovation cadence (e.g., new solutions in gene therapy and sterile sampling) is key to future payouts and value creation .
- Downside protections and costs: Updated severance/CIC policy increases cash protections (especially post‑CIC: 24 months base + 2x target bonus), modestly elevating termination costs but with double‑trigger and best‑net 280G treatment .
Citations: **[1722482_0001722482-25-000143_avtr-20250508.htm:1]** **[1722482_0001722482-25-000143_avtr-20250508.htm:2]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:4]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:6]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:13]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:18]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:34]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:35]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:37]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:38]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:40]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:41]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:42]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:43]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:44]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:45]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:46]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:47]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:48]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:51]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:52]** **[1722482_0000950170-25-046778_avtr-20250328.htm:55]** **[1722482_0001722482-23-000207_exhibit99.htm:1]** **[1722482_0001722482-25-000015_avtr-20241231.htm:42]** **[1722482_20251030NY10277:0]** **[1722482_0001722482-24-000012_avtr-20231231.htm:40]** **[1722482_20240701NY51723:0]**