Brent Jones
AvantorAbout Brent Jones
R. Brent Jones is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Avantor, serving since August 2023; he was 55 years old as of February 3, 2025 and holds an A.B. in Biochemistry and Asian Studies from Dartmouth College and a J.D. from Yale Law School . Under his tenure in 2024, Avantor’s annual incentive scorecard achieved mixed results: Enterprise revenue of $6,795 million vs a $6,908 million target (98% of target), Constant Currency Adjusted Operating Income of $1,092 million vs $1,109 million target (94%), Free Cash Flow of $768.3 million (200% of target), and ESG metrics between target and maximum; 2022–2024 PSUs paid out at 0% (below threshold on both Adjusted EPS and relative TSR), reinforcing pay-for-performance linkage .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact / Notables |
|---|---|---|---|
| LifeScan Global Corporation | EVP, CFO & COO | 2023 | Led global finance and operations; promoted from CFO; focus on transformation and digital health execution . |
| LifeScan Global Corporation | Chief Financial Officer | 2020–2023 | Oversaw commercial finance, corporate reporting, FP&A, IR, tax, and treasury . |
| Klöckner Pentaplast Group | Chief Financial Officer | 2016–2018 | CFO of pharma/consumer packaging supplier . |
| Pall Corporation | Interim Chief Financial Officer | 2015 | Led sale of Pall to Danaher for $13.8B . |
| Bank of America Merrill Lynch (and other firms) | Managing Director, Investment Banking | Earlier career | Senior investment banker; strategic and financing transactions experience . |
| Cravath, Swaine & Moore | Corporate Lawyer | Early career | Legal foundation in corporate transactions . |
External Roles
- No other public company board roles disclosed for Jones in Avantor’s executive officer biographies reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 221,154 | 611,519 |
| Target Bonus (%) | 80% (per offer letter) | 80% (implied by target $489,215 ÷ $611,519) |
| Target Bonus ($) | 460,000 (annual target; prorated for 2023) | 489,215 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | 18,526 (prorated) | 554,220 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 22,015 | 35,915 |
Performance Compensation
2024 ICP (Annual Cash Incentive) – Metrics, Weighting, Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual/Result | Funding outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise Revenue | 40% | $6,908.0 | $6,795.0 | 98% achievement; included in 110.8% company funding |
| Const. Currency Adjusted Operating Income | 20% | $1,109.0 | $1,092.0 | 94% achievement; included in 110.8% company funding |
| Free Cash Flow | 10% | $615.0 | $768.3 | 200% (maximum) |
| GHG Emissions Reduction | 5% | 7% | 8% | 160% |
| Inclusion Index | 5% | 7.8 | 7.9 | 125% |
| Company Funding (Enterprise) | — | — | — | 110.8% (CFO participates in Enterprise plan) |
| Individual Strategic Goals (Jones) | 20% weight | — | — | 115% assessment for Jones |
Jones’s 2024 ICP target and actual payments are shown in Fixed Compensation above; the program structure, weightings, and outcomes come from the 2025 Proxy .
Long‑Term Incentive (Equity) – Grants and Structure
| Grant Year | Grant Date | Instrument | Quantity/Target | Exercise Price | Vesting | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 02/23/2024 | PSUs | 25,667 target | — | 3‑yr cliff (2024–2026 performance) | 1,434,785 |
| 2024 | 02/23/2024 | Options (NQ) | 62,753 | 24.35 | Ratable over 3 years | 625,020 |
| 2024 | 02/23/2024 | RSUs | 25,667 | — | Ratable over 3 years | 624,991 |
| 2023 (New‑hire) | 08/07/2023 | PSUs | 123,434 target | — | 3‑yr cliff (2023–2025) | 2,817,998 |
| 2023 (New‑hire) | 08/07/2023 | Options (NQ) | 295,559 | 20.76 | 25%/yr over 4 years | 2,561,102 |
- PSU design: 50% Adjusted EPS Growth, 50% relative TSR; 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid 0% (both metrics below threshold) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 104,167 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Shares outstanding (as of Mar 3, 2025) | 681,397,790 |
| Options exercisable within 60 days (beneficial ownership inclusion) | 94,598 for Jones |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CFO must hold stock = 3x base salary |
| Compliance status | Jones on track to meet guideline within 5 years |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Hedging and short sales prohibited; pledging generally prohibited except limited pre‑approval with demonstrated capacity to repay without resort to pledged securities |
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Grant | Options Exercisable | Options Unexercisable | Exercise Price | RSUs Unvested | PSUs (next higher attainment count) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08/07/2023 (Jones) | 73,889 | 221,670 | 20.76 | — | 123,434 → table shows 51,334 at next level for 2024 grants; 2023 PSU outstanding reflected in separate line |
| 02/23/2024 (Jones) | — | 62,753 | 24.35 | 25,667 | 51,334 |
- Vesting mechanics: 2021–2023 options/RSUs generally vest 25% per year; 2024 options/RSUs vest 1/3 per year; PSUs cliff‑vest after a 3‑year performance period .
Employment Terms
- Start date and role: EVP & CFO since August 7, 2023 .
- Offer letter economics (on hire): Base salary $575,000; target bonus 80% of salary; $200,000 sign‑on bonus (repayable if voluntary departure within one year); initial LTI target $5.125M split 50% PSUs/50% options .
- 2024 salary action: Base salary increased to $635,000 (10.4%); peers noted for context .
Severance and Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Policy (Adopted May 12, 2025; supersedes prior EVP agreements)
- Qualifying termination (no CIC): 12 months base salary; target annual bonus for year of termination; prorated target bonus for partial year; 12 months benefits; limited service credit for certain pre‑2025 awards vesting within 12 months .
- Double‑trigger within 2 years post‑CIC: 24 months base salary; 2x target annual bonus; prorated target bonus; 18 months benefits; best‑net 280G treatment (no gross‑up) .
Restrictive Covenants
- Non‑compete/non‑solicit: Generally 1 year non‑compete; up to 2 years on solicitation of employees/customers; confidentiality and non‑disparagement covenants apply .
Potential Payments on Termination or CIC (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Scenario (Jones) | Cash Severance ($) | Annual Cash Incentive ($) | Equity Awards ($) | Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination without cause | 611,519 | 489,215 | — | 5,841 | 1,106,575 |
| Death/Disability | — | — | 4,291,883 | — | 4,291,883 |
| CIC (no termination) | — | — | 2,669,472 | — | 2,669,472 |
| CIC + involuntary termination/good reason | 917,279 | 733,823 | 4,291,883 | 8,761 | 5,951,746 |
Performance & Track Record (selected signals)
- 2024 operational execution: Free cash flow exceeded guidance; transformation program realized 180% of first‑year savings target; maintained SOX control compliance and launched enhanced ERM; sustainability leadership; Jones’s individual strategic goal component assessed at 115% .
- 2025 litigation overhang: Multiple plaintiff firms filed class actions alleging Avantor’s competitive positioning and guidance communications were misleading; complaints cite CFO commentary about competitive intensity and volume reductions and stock price declines of ~16% (Apr 25, 2025), ~15% (Aug 1, 2025), and ~23% (Oct 29, 2025) as alleged loss events .
- Certifications: Jones signed SOX 302 and 906 certifications on Q3 2025 10‑Q .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs. equity mix: 2024 total comp for Jones included $2.06M in stock awards and $0.63M in option awards vs. $0.61M salary and $0.55M annual bonus, emphasizing at‑risk, equity‑based pay .
- Shift in short‑term pay: 2024 bonus ($554,220) reflects company funding of 110.8% and individual assessment of 115% vs minimal payout in 2023 ($18,526) when ICP funded at 10% .
- LTI rigor: 2022–2024 PSUs paid 0% given below‑threshold Adjusted EPS and relative TSR, aligning outcomes with performance .
- Governance practices: Clawback policy in place; no tax gross‑ups of perquisites or 280G excise taxes; no option repricing .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (additional details)
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
| Alignment to shareholders | Significant PSU weighting (50% of LTI) with EPS growth and relative TSR; 0% payout for 2022–2024 cycle underscores outcome alignment . |
| Selling pressure / vesting cadence | 2023 options vest 25% annually; 2024 options and RSUs vest 1/3 annually; PSUs cliff after 3 years, creating step‑function vesting events and potential tax‑related selling windows . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited (pledging only with rare pre‑approval and demonstrated liquidity), mitigating misalignment risk . |
| Ownership guideline | CFO multiple = 3x salary; Jones on track within 5 years . |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance is intact: 0% PSU payout for 2022–2024 and metric‑driven 2024 ICP outcomes (free cash flow at maximum, revenue/income below target) indicate incentive sensitivity to financial results; 2024 bonus uplift vs 2023 reflects improved cash generation but still mixed growth .
- Retention risk moderate: New severance/CIC policy (May 2025) increases double‑trigger protection to 2x target bonus and 24 months salary, improving retention through a potential strategic review or transaction window; restrictive covenants add stickiness .
- Trading signals: Scheduled equity vesting (annual RSU/option tranches and 2023–2025 PSU cliff in early 2026) may create periodic selling windows; monitor Form 4s around February/March grant anniversaries and PSU performance tracking updates .
- Governance/legal overhang: Class action allegations tied to guidance and competitive intensity commentary could increase headline risk; watch for resolution/motions and any internal control or disclosure control updates; note CFO maintained SOX certifications in 2025 filings .
- Alignment and downside protection: Ownership guideline and anti‑hedging/pledging policy support alignment; best‑net 280G approach avoids shareholder‑unfriendly gross‑ups .