David R. Schickling
AMERICAN STATES WATERAbout David R. Schickling
Vice President – Operations of Golden State Water Company (GSWC); previously General Manager of GSWC from August 2019 to June 2022. Age 67; has held his current role since July 2022 . Company performance context during his tenure: AWR reported 2024 diluted EPS of $3.17 and delivered 10-year EPS CAGR of 7.3% and dividend CAGR of 8.0% through year-end 2024 . In 2025, GSWC’s operating revenues and operating income increased year-over-year for Q3 and the first nine months, underscoring operational execution in the regulated water utility .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Golden State Water Company (GSWC) | Vice President – Operations | Jul 2022 – present | Operational leadership over regulated water utility operations |
| Golden State Water Company (GSWC) | General Manager | Aug 2019 – Jun 2022 | Led field operations and service reliability initiatives |
External Roles
None disclosed in the 2025 proxy for Schickling .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2025 Program Detail |
|---|---|
| Target bonus % of base salary (STIP) | 33.20% (GSWC Operations Officer) |
| STIP design | Objective bonus 80% of target; Discretionary bonus 20% of target |
Performance Compensation
Schickling participates in the GSWC Operations Officers short-term incentive framework. The 2024 metric schema and realized outcomes were as follows:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Performance | Actual Payout as % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS – Regulated Water Utility (RWU) | 80% of budget | 100% of budget | 120% of budget | 101.7% of adjusted budget | 41.7% |
| Capital Expenditures – RWU | ≥ $135 million | ≥ $145 million | ≥ $165 million | $201.9 million (maximum) | 24.0% |
| Customer Complaints – RWU | ≤ 0.095% | ≤ 0.055% | ≤ 0.025% | 0.032% (between target and max) | 7.5% |
| Supplier Diversity – RWU | ≥ 27.0% | ≥ 31.0% | ≥ 35.0% | 35.3% (maximum) | 8.0% |
| Safety – Recordable Incident Rate – RWU | ≤ 3.7 | ≤ 3.0 | ≤ 2.3 | 2.9 (between target and max) | 6.3% |
| SOX Deficiencies – RU | No MW; no SD; ≤1 CD at target; none at max | No MW; no SD; ≤1 CD | No MW; no SD; 0 CD | Maximum | 7.0% |
| Objective incentive total | — | 80.0% | 115.0% | Above target | 94.5% |
Long-term incentives (company program design):
- RSUs time-vest over three years: 33%/33%/34% with dividend equivalents accruing and payable only upon vesting .
- PSUs vest 33% on Dec 31 of grant year, 33% on Dec 31 of year+1, and 34% on Dec 31 of year+2, subject to performance; retirement/CoC exceptions apply as described below .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5.0x salary; Senior Vice Presidents 1.5x salary; Vice Presidents 1.0x salary. Executives have five years to attain; sales are restricted for those below guidelines (example: an SVP was restricted from selling until meeting 1.5x) . Schickling, as a Vice President, is subject to 1.0x salary requirement .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Hedging is prohibited; pledging and margin accounts are prohibited absent pre-approved waiver. Officers and directors have represented that since policy adoption, none has hedged, held in margin, or pledged shares .
- Options: Company reported no stock options outstanding as of Q3 2025; options have not been granted in recent years .
- Beneficial ownership: Individual ownership for Schickling was not itemized; directors and executive officers as a group held 320,124 shares (0.83% of class) as of March 28, 2025 .
Vesting and acceleration terms:
- RSUs: 33/33/34; early vesting upon retirement under Rule of 75, death, disability, or double-trigger change-in-control (termination without cause or for good reason within two years of CoC) .
- PSUs: Same 33/33/34 cadence, subject to performance; early vesting under retirement/CoC conditions with performance assumed at target for CoC-triggered vesting .
Clawback:
- NYSE-compliant clawback policy effective Oct 2, 2023; recovers erroneously awarded incentive compensation following accounting restatement within the lookback window; recovery unless impracticable per defined criteria .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements: Company discloses no employment agreements with executive officers; executives are employed at-will .
- Change-in-control framework (as disclosed for named executive officers; applicability to Schickling not specified):
- Cash severance: 2.99x the sum of highest annual base salary in past three years plus target cash incentive for year of termination (double-trigger within two years of CoC) .
- Equity: Immediate vesting of unvested RSUs and PSUs; PSUs vest at target on assumed satisfaction upon CoC termination .
- Welfare benefits continuation and vehicle purchase option; additional pension/SERP related cash calculations for select executives and a one-year non-compete/non-solicit condition governing certain benefits .
- Tax: Payments reduced as needed to avoid 4999 excise tax if it results in greater after-tax amounts; 409A timing deferrals observed .
Performance & Track Record
GSWC operating results (illustrative of the operations Schickling oversees):
| Metric | Q3 2024 | Q3 2025 | 9M 2024 | 9M 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Operating Revenues ($USD thousands) | $124,043 | $132,323 | $324,732 | $354,023 |
| Operating Income ($USD thousands) | $46,846 | $49,419 | $116,578 | $126,772 |
Company-level pay vs performance context:
- AWR 2024 diluted EPS: $3.17; 10-year EPS CAGR 7.3%; 10-year dividend CAGR 8.0%; 5-year EPS CAGR 6.8% (7.2% adjusted) .
- CEO pay-for-performance alignment analyses and peer-relative TSR comparisons are monitored by the compensation committee with external consultant support .
Compensation Committee Analysis and Shareholder Feedback
- Peer group usage: Utilities spanning water, gas, and electric; current peer group includes ALLETE, Avista, California Water Service Group, Essential Utilities, IDACORP, MGE Energy, Northwest Natural, Northwestern, Otter Tail, SJW Group .
- Consultant: Pearl Meyer; independence affirmed; program targeted around 25th–50th percentile of peers .
- Say-on-pay 2025: For 28,175,605; Against 1,924,683; Abstain 200,700; Broker non-votes 4,251,087 .
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance design anchored to regulated utility KPIs (EPS, capex execution, customer complaints, supplier diversity, safety), with clear objective thresholds and capped upside; operations officer objective payouts were above target in 2024, indicating disciplined goal-setting and delivery .
- Alignment mechanisms reduce selling pressure and misalignment risks: stock ownership guidelines for VPs (1.0x salary), restrictions on sales until guideline compliance where applicable, and categorical anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies with officer attestations; absence of options further dampens near-term selling incentives .
- Retention and risk: RSU/PSU three-year vesting and double-trigger CoC acceleration promote retention yet protect value creation if control changes; clawback adds governance discipline to performance-based pay .
- Data gaps: Individual base salary, grant sizes, and personal beneficial ownership for Schickling were not itemized in public filings; investors should monitor future proxies or potential Form 4 filings for incremental signals .