Eva G. Tang
Senior Vice President – Finance, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and Treasurer at 
AMERICAN STATES WATER
AMERICAN STATES WATERExecutive
About Eva G. Tang
Senior Vice President – Finance, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and Treasurer of American States Water Company (AWR); in current role since November 2008; age 69 as of March 28, 2025 . Under her finance leadership, AWR reported 2024 GAAP diluted EPS of $3.17, a 10‑year EPS CAGR of 7.3%, and a 10‑year dividend CAGR of 8.0% . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show 2024 TSR value of a $100 initial investment at $98.24 vs a $101.00 peer group, providing context for shareholder return alignment . She serves as corporate secretary and regularly signs SEC filings, including 8-Ks releasing quarterly results .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| American States Water Company | SVP – Finance, CFO, Corporate Secretary and Treasurer | 2008–present | Leads finance, reporting, treasury; corporate secretary; SEC filing officer (e.g., earnings 8‑K) |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in proxy filings reviewed for the executive officer section .
Fixed Compensation
Base salary and changes
| Year | Base Salary ($) | YoY change |
|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 566,900 | — |
| 2024 | 599,500 | 5.8% |
Summary compensation (three-year view)
| Year | Salary ($) | Discretionary Bonus ($) | Non-Equity Incentive (Objective STIP) ($) | Stock Awards ($) | All Other Comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 531,719 | 55,418 | 179,439 | 125,156 | 22,381 | 914,113 |
| 2023 | 566,235 | 60,993 | 196,439 | 145,168 | 29,707 | 1,471,735 |
| 2024 | 598,873 | 66,413 | 212,291 | 150,161 | 23,057 | 1,050,795 |
2024 “All other compensation” detail (selected items)
| Category | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| 401(k) match | 14,850 |
| Insurance | 2,306 |
| Personal use of company car | 5,716 |
| Other (e.g., holiday bonus, physical exam) | 185 |
| Total | 23,057 |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) design and outcomes (2024)
Target STIP opportunity for Ms. Tang equals 38.2% of base salary; objective component pays 37.5% at threshold, 80% at target, 120% at max; discretionary component pays 12.5% at threshold, 20% at target, 35% at max . Actual 2024 bonus earned equaled 46.49% of base salary; Ms. Tang’s discretionary portion was 11.1% of base pay . Objective payout for her officer group (GSWC Admin & General Officers, which includes the CFO) was 92.7% of target .
- Eva Tang STIP dollar ranges (objective portion) for 2024:
- Threshold $85,878; Target $183,207; Maximum $274,811
| Metric (GSWC Admin & General Officers) | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout (% of target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS – AWR Consolidated | 80% of budget | 100% | 120% | 102.7% of adj. budget | 22.0% |
| Adjusted EPS – Regulated Utilities | 80% of budget | 100% | 120% | 101.2% of adj. budget | 20.6% |
| Adjusted EPS – ASUS | 80% of budget | 100% | 130% | 105.8% of adj. budget | 10.9% |
| Capital Expenditures – RU | ≥140m | ≥155m | ≥180m | $235.5m (max) | 15.0% |
| Customer Complaints – RWU | ≤0.095% | ≤0.055% | ≤0.025% | 0.032% | 6.5% |
| Supplier Diversity – RU | ≥26.5% | ≥30.5% | ≥34.5% | 33.9% | 6.7% |
| SOX Deficiencies – RU | No MW/SD ≤3 CDs | No MW/SD ≤1 CD | No MW/SD 0 CD | At maximum | 6.0% |
| SOX Deficiencies – ASUS | No MW/SD ≤1 CD | No MW/SD 0 CD | N/A | At target | 5.0% |
| Objective incentive subtotal | 37.5% | 80.0% | 120.0% | Above target | 92.7% |
Notes: “Adjusted EPS” per plan excludes specific items incl. new business development, rabbi trust performance, and unusual/unforeseen regulatory items; overall adjustments reduced objective payouts for A&G and Operations officers vs pre‑adjustment calculations .
Long-Term Incentive (equity): grant mix, metrics, targets, and vesting
- 2024 grant values and counts:
- RSUs: $73,870; 1,014 units; vest 33%/33%/34%
- PSUs (target): $76,291; target 1,014 units (threshold 453; max 1,724); performance period 2024–2026
- 2024 PSU metric weights for CFO: TSR 25%; Aggregate GSWC Operating Expense 60%; ASUS Cumulative Net Earnings 15% .
- PSU payout curves (2024 grant):
- TSR vs water peer set: 1–7 peers outperformed maps to 28.57%–200% of target .
- Aggregate GSWC Operating Expense: ≤$340.1m = 150%; $346.1–$366.1m = 100%; >$378.1m = 0% .
- ASUS Cumulative Net Earnings: ≥$69.2m = 200%; $57.2–$63.2m = 100%; < $51.2m = 0% .
- Vesting terms include 33%/33%/34% time-based tranches for RSUs; PSUs vest ratably subject to performance over the 3‑year period; “Rule of 75” retirement vesting applies (with payout on scheduled dates) .
Performance earned on prior PSU cycle (2022 grant; certified March 2025)
| Metric | Weight | Payout (% of target) |
|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return | 25% | 50.0% |
| Aggregate GSWC Operating Expense Levels | 50% | 50.0% |
| ASUS Cumulative Net Earnings | 25% | 37.5% |
| Total earned (% of target) | 100% | 137.6% |
| Shares earned (units) | — | 934 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned (3/28/2025) | 47,270 (less than 1%) |
| Executive stock ownership guideline | 1.5× salary for SVPs; CFO met guideline in 2024 |
| Anti‑hedging / anti‑pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited absent pre‑approved waiver; no officer/director has pledged since policy adoption |
| RSUs vested (Rule of 75) but not yet paid (12/31/2024) | 1,789 units; $139,041 value at $77.72 |
| Equity incentive plan — unearned PSUs outstanding (12/31/2024) | 3,054 units; $237,357 value at $77.72 |
| Scheduled payouts from prior‑vested RSUs | 262 units within 30 days of 2/6/2026; 342 units within 30 days of 3/12/2026; 353 units within 30 days of 3/12/2027 (plus accrued dividend equivalents) |
| Dividend equivalent rights | Accrue on RSUs/PSUs until paid; paid only to extent underlying award vests/pays |
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements: None; executives are at‑will employees .
- Clawback policy: Effective Oct 2, 2023; 3‑year lookback for accounting restatements (both “Big R” and “Little r”); recovery except where impracticable per NYSE rules .
- Insider trading policy: Blackout from day −14 to two trading days after earnings; 10b5‑1 plans permitted under policy .
- Change-in-control (CIC): Double-trigger cash and equity; RSUs/PSUs vest at target upon qualifying termination within 2 years of CIC; cash severance equals 2.99× (salary + target cash incentive); welfare benefits continue (3 years for CEO/CFO; 2 years other NEOs); 280G cutback; 409A six‑month delay if applicable .
- Estimated CIC benefits (hypothetical termination at 12/31/2024):
- Base Salary Benefit $1,792,505; Bonus Benefit $684,737; Welfare/Fringe $97,589; Auto purchase benefit $2,836; RSU $139,041; PSU $139,594; Total $2,856,302 .
- Non‑CIC termination benefits (12/31/2024 assumptions):
- Termination (other than death/disability/CIC): $285,611 (life insurance premium value + auto purchase + RSU + PSU at target timing) .
- Termination on disability: $285,611 .
- Termination on death: $1,178,635 (includes policy death benefit) .
- Post‑termination restrictive covenants tied to CIC pension/benefit installments: one‑year non‑competition and non‑solicitation compliance required for continued payments .
Pension and Retirement
| Plan | Years of Credited Service | Present Value of Accumulated Benefit ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Pension Plan | 28 | 1,884,424 |
| Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) | 28 | 3,897,243 |
Notes: No non‑qualified deferred compensation plans beyond SERP. Defined benefit eligibility and values follow plan assumptions; SERP benefit formula and timing detailed in proxy .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: No stock options granted in last three years; LTIs delivered via RSUs/PSUs (performance‑based and time‑based); clawback, ownership guidelines, and anti‑hedging/pledging in place .
- Peer benchmarking: Consultant Pearl Meyer; executive TDC calibrated between the 25th–50th percentile vs peer group; peer set comprises regulated water, gas, electric utilities (including CPUC‑regulated water peers) .
- Say‑on‑pay support: 95% approval in 2024; company cites shareholder support for approach; no material changes year‑over‑year to program design .
- Year‑over‑year changes: CFO base salary increased 5.8% in 2024 to $599,500 ; 2024 total compensation reflects lower pension value volatility vs 2023 for CFO (no 2024 pension change reported for CFO) .
Performance & Track Record
- Company performance under CFO tenure includes sustained dividend growth (10‑year dividend CAGR 8.0%), earnings growth (10‑year EPS CAGR 7.3%), and 2024 GAAP diluted EPS of $3.17 .
- 2024 pay-versus-performance: TSR value of $100 initial investment at $98.24; peer group TSR at $101.00; CAP framework provided for CEO/NEOs to assess alignment trends (context for finance leadership) .
- 3Q25 update: EPS up 11.6% YoY; segment EPS growth across water, electric, contracted services; CFO served as signing officer on the 8‑K and investor contact on press release .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Tang’s equity exposure (vested but unpaid RSUs; outstanding PSUs) and compliance with ownership guidelines signal skin-in-the-game; anti‑hedging/pledging and a robust clawback further align incentives with long-term shareholder value .
- Pay-for-performance: STIP and PSU designs tie significant pay to regulated utility operating efficiency (aggregate GSWC operating expense), ASUS earnings, and relative TSR—key levers for utility value creation; 2022 PSU cycle paid at 137.6%, driven by above‑target internal metrics despite TSR factor at 50% .
- Retention and overhang: “Rule of 75” accelerates vesting, but payout timing is staggered (scheduled settlement dates) limiting immediate selling pressure; known future settlement dates (2026–2027) provide visibility into potential insider liquidity windows .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger CIC protection (2.99× cash multiple + equity vesting at target) is standard for small/mid-cap utilities; estimated CFO CIC package ($2.86m) is moderate vs peers and includes 280G cutback .
- Risk controls: No options, no repricing, no single-trigger cash severance or tax gross-ups; strong governance and high say-on-pay support (95%) lower governance risk premia .