Daniel Draper
AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGSAbout Daniel Draper
Daniel Draper (age 45) is Group Chief Underwriting Officer at AXIS, appointed in September 2022 after serving more than two years as Group Head of Underwriting; he previously held leadership roles at AXIS including Group Chief Actuary, Chief Risk Analytics Officer, and Insurance Segment Chief Risk Officer, and earlier managerial positions at the UK Financial Services Authority, XL Capital, and Ernst & Young; he holds a Master’s in Engineering from the University of Bath and is a Fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries . His 2024 annual incentive was driven by company OROACE performance of 18.6% versus a 16.9% target (company payout factor 134%) and 180% for individual non‑financial metrics, yielding 147.8% of target and a $1,077,695 payout . AXIS’ 2022 PSU cycle paid 192.3% based on relative TSR at ~83rd percentile, evidencing strong shareholder returns, and the company cited “record stock price in 2024” when awarding above‑target 2025 LTI; Draper’s 2025 LTI target was set at $900,000 and his 2025 award mix was 60% RSUs / 40% PSUs totaling $1,000,000 (125% of 2024 target) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AXIS | Group Chief Underwriting Officer | Appointed Sep 2022 | Senior underwriting leadership for group |
| AXIS | Group Head of Underwriting; Group Chief Actuary; Chief Risk Analytics Officer; Insurance Segment Chief Risk Officer | 8 years | Actuarial, risk analytics, segment risk leadership |
| VIBE (Lloyd’s Managing Agent) | Group Chief Risk and Actuarial Officer | 2019–2020 | Led risk and actuarial functions |
| Financial Services Authority (UK) | Managerial positions | Not disclosed | Regulatory/oversight experience |
| XL Capital | Managerial positions | Not disclosed | Insurance/actuarial leadership |
| Ernst & Young | Managerial positions | Not disclosed | Professional services experience |
External Roles
No public-company board memberships or external directorships disclosed for Draper in the 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $508,232 | $583,326 |
| Base Salary (GBP, current) | £495,000; converted ≈ $627,710 at 1.2681 USD/GBP | £495,000; converted ≈ $627,710 at 1.2681 USD/GBP |
| Target Bonus (%) | 100% initial; current target 125% of base | 125% of base |
| Pension/Retirement Contributions | $57,118 (total “All Other”) | $65,611 (UK pension $12,681 + cash allowance in lieu of pension $52,930) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan – Structure and Outcomes (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Factor | Component Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company Financial: OROACE | 70% | 16.9% | 18.6% | 134% | $510,410 × 134% = $682,950 |
| Individual Non‑Financial | 30% | N/A | 180% score | 180% | $218,747 × 180% = $394,745 |
| Total | 100% | — | — | 147.8% | $1,077,695 (actual) |
Goal range slopes for OROACE: Threshold 11.9% (50%), Target 16.9% (100%), Maximum 21.9%+ (200%) .
Long‑Term Incentives – Design
| Year | RSU % | PSU % | LTI Target/Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 (award for 2024 performance) | 60% | 40% | $1,000,000 (125% of 2024 LTI target) | Committee raised Draper’s annual LTI target to $900,000 in Jan 2025; mix intended to balance retention and performance alignment |
| 2024 Grants (Jan 30, 2024) | — | — | RSUs: $479,979; PSUs: $351,370 (grant-date fair value) | PSU performance measures: rTSR and Adjusted DBVPS; rTSR valued via Monte Carlo ($71.65 per share) |
PSUs granted 1/30/2024 vest on 3rd anniversary (commencement March 1, 2024) subject to performance; RSUs vest in four equal annual tranches starting first anniversary of March 1, 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 8,706 common shares (<1%) as of March 14, 2025; 78,650,779 shares outstanding; officers/directors as a group: 521,611 (0.7%) |
| Ownership Guidelines | NEOs required to hold 3x base salary; 5‑year compliance window; unvested RSUs settling in shares count; PSUs and cash‑settled RSUs do not count |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors/officers; pledging AXIS securities for loans/obligations also prohibited; insider trading windows and pre‑clearance required |
| Outstanding Unvested Awards (12/31/2024) | See table below |
Outstanding Equity Awards (12/31/2024)
| Grant Date | Instrument | Unvested Units | Market Value at $88.62 | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/26/2021 | RSUs | 1,569 | $139,045 | Footnote (2) RSUs vest in 4 equal annual tranches from Mar 1 of grant year |
| 1/25/2022 | RSUs | 3,120 | $276,494 | RSUs vest in 4 equal annual tranches from Mar 1 of grant year |
| 1/24/2023 | RSUs | 3,096 | $274,368 | RSUs vest in 4 equal annual tranches; first vest Mar 1, 2024 |
| 1/24/2023 | PSUs (target) | 2,751 | $243,794 | 3‑year performance period; vesting commencement Mar 1, 2023 |
| 1/30/2024 | RSUs | 8,013 | $710,112 | RSUs vest in 4 equal annual tranches; first vest Mar 1, 2025 |
| 1/30/2024 | PSUs (target) | 5,342 | $473,408 | 3‑year performance period; vesting commencement Mar 1, 2024 |
| Aggregate Market Value | — | — | $2,117,220 | — |
Note: “Outstanding Equity Awards” table in proxy does not list any stock options for Draper; awards are RSUs and PSUs .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Agreement | Dated Jan 19, 2023; term through Dec 31, 2025; auto‑renews annually unless 6 months’ prior notice by either party |
| Base/Bonus/LTI | Minimum base £375,000; current base £495,000; target bonus now 125% of base (initial 100%); LTI target $900,000 for 2025 ($800,000 in 2024) |
| Non‑Compete / Non‑Solicit | 6‑month non‑compete; 12‑month non‑solicit of employees/customers post‑termination; ongoing confidentiality |
| Termination – Any Reason | Accrued pay, prior‑year unpaid bonus, accrued expenses, unused vacation; release required |
| Termination – For Cause | Immediate without notice for specified misconduct (e.g., fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, criminal conviction, failure to meet regulatory fitness standards), with notice and 30‑day cure |
| Termination – Without Cause | 6 months’ notice; lump sum 0.5× base salary; 0.65× annual bonus at target; continued vesting of outstanding unvested RSUs/PSUs; pro‑rata annual bonus for year of termination |
| Resignation – Good Reason | Same economics as “without cause” if good‑reason conditions and cure periods met |
| Death/Disability | Pro‑rata annual bonus; immediate vesting of outstanding unvested RSUs/PSUs |
| Change in Control (Double‑Trigger) | If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 24 months post‑CIC: 0.5× base salary; 1.65× annual bonus at target; pro‑rata annual bonus; immediate vesting of all outstanding unvested RSUs/PSUs |
Potential Payments Upon Termination or Change in Control (as disclosed)
| Scenario | Base Pay | Separation Bonus | Value of Outstanding Equity (accelerated/continued) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death/Disability | — | $729,158 | $2,117,220 | $2,846,378 |
| Good Reason | $291,663 | $1,203,110 | $2,117,220 | $3,611,993 |
| Without Cause (pre‑CIC) | $291,663 | $1,203,110 | $2,117,220 | $3,611,993 |
| Double‑Trigger Post‑CIC | $291,663 | $1,932,267 | $2,117,220 | $4,341,151 |
Notes: Figures converted to USD at 1.2681 USD/GBP for Draper; benefits/perquisites gross‑up shown applies to certain U.S. NEO scenarios; Draper’s benefits line is “—” in table .
Clawback and Severance Program Context
- AXIS clawback policy (updated Sept 2023) recovers incentive compensation for current/former executive officers within three years preceding a required restatement, consistent with SEC/NYSE rules; applies to LTEP and AIP .
- AXIS adopted an Executive Severance Plan in 2024 to standardize severance protection; current NEOs (including Draper) remain under existing employment agreements unless they elect plan coverage; change‑in‑control benefits are double‑trigger only; no excise tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger vesting .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment is robust: Draper’s annual incentive is 70% tied to company OROACE with explicit goal slope; 2024 delivered above‑target OROACE and a 147.8% payout; PSUs link to rTSR and Adjusted DBVPS, with the 2022 cycle paying 192.3% on TSR performance at ~83rd percentile, reinforcing shareholder‑aligned incentives .
- Retention risk appears contained near‑term: auto‑renewing contract through 2025 with 6‑month notice; severance provides 0.5× base and 0.65× target bonus and continued vesting without cause; double‑trigger CIC includes immediate vesting, which can be materially valuable given $2.1M in unvested equity at YE 2024 .
- Insider selling pressure likely centers on scheduled RSU vesting events (annual tranches starting each March for recent grants) rather than options; company prohibits hedging and pledging, and imposes trading window and pre‑clearance protocols, reducing misalignment/pledge risk .
- Ownership “skin in the game” is modest at 8,706 shares (<1%); however, AXIS mandates 3× salary ownership for NEOs with a five‑year compliance window, and unvested share‑settled RSUs count toward guidelines, supporting longer‑term alignment .
- Governance backdrop supportive: 96% Say‑on‑Pay support in 2024, and explicit “no excise tax gross‑ups” and “no single‑trigger CIC vesting” best‑practice features reduce shareholder‑unfriendly optics .