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Jon Stonehouse

Jon Stonehouse

Chief Executive Officer at BIOCRYST PHARMACEUTICALSBIOCRYST PHARMACEUTICALS
CEO
Executive
Board

About Jon Stonehouse

Jon P. Stonehouse is President and CEO of BioCryst and has also served as Interim CFO since April 2025; he joined as CEO and director in January 2007 and became President in July 2007 . He holds a B.S. in Microbiology from the University of Minnesota and previously held senior roles at Merck KGaA (SVP Corporate Development), Astra Merck/AstraZeneca, and Merck & Co. . Under his tenure, BioCryst’s ORLADEYO net sales grew from $121.9M in 2021 to $434.1M in 2024, while GAAP net loss narrowed to $(88.9)M in 2024; the company’s TSR (indexed to $100 at start) was 217.97 in 2024 (after 401.45 in 2021 and 332.75 in 2022) . On July 25, 2025, he notified the board of his retirement effective December 31, 2025; he will remain on the board, with CCO Charlie Gayer appointed CEO effective January 1, 2026 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Merck KGaASVP, Corporate DevelopmentJul 2002–prior to joining BioCryst in Jan 2007 Led M&A, global licensing/BD, strategy, and alliance management
Astra Merck/AstraZenecaVarious commercial rolesNot disclosed Commercial leadership experience in large pharma
Merck & Co.Sales and sales leadershipNot disclosed Foundation in sales; progressed to leadership

External Roles

OrganizationCapacityYearsNotes
Bellicum Pharmaceuticals (NASDAQ: BLCM)DirectorDec 2014–Feb 2024 Public biopharma board experience
Precision BioSciencesAdvisory Board2008–2018 Private biotech advisory role
GenScriptAdvisory BoardNot disclosed Private bioservices advisory role

Fixed Compensation

Component2022202320242025 (set)
Base salary ($)640,000 665,600 705,536 728,466 (3.25% increase)
AIP target (% of base)Not disclosedNot disclosed85% 85% (unchanged for CEO in 2025)
2024 Summary Compensation (USD)SalaryStock awards (RSUs)Option awardsNon‑equity incentive (AIP)All otherTotal
Jon P. Stonehouse705,536 2,675,919 4,002,134 899,558 34,139 8,317,286
2023665,600 819,825 2,724,624 537,472 30,257 4,777,778
2022640,000 1,355,325 4,482,254 480,000 25,415 6,982,994

Notes:

  • All other compensation in 2024 comprises $17,250 401(k) contribution and $16,889 life insurance premiums .

Performance Compensation

Metric (AIP 2024)Weighting (points at target)Target level disclosed?Committee determinationPoints awardedPayout consequence
ORLADEYO commercialization (reimbursed patients, revenue, lifecycle)35 No (competitive harm) Exceeds67.5 Contributed to 150% of target AIP payout
Complement-mediated diseases (Factor D, other complement)15 No Exceeds17.5
Product portfolio (BCX17725; avoralstat to DME trial)30 No Met30.0
Organization (talent/succession; culture; audits; ops discipline)20 No Exceeds35.0
Total100 150 Pool paid at 150% of target; paid Jan 2025
2024 AIP mechanicsTarget ($)Actual payout ($)FormVesting
CEO (85% of salary)599,706 (from plan-based award table) 899,558 (150% of target) CashPaid January 2025

Equity mix and vesting (2024 grants):

  • Granted at ~65th percentile vs peer data; mix of options and time-based RSUs; both vest 25% annually over 4 years; options 10-year term; exercise price at fair market value on grant date .
  • No performance share units disclosed in 2024 (equity is time-based RSUs and options) .
2024 LTI Grants (12/19/2024)Options (#)RSUs (#)Option exercise priceVestingTerm
Jon P. Stonehouse750,250 362,100 $7.39/sh 25% per year over 4 years (options and RSUs) Options: 10 years

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership5,259,954 shares; 2.5% of class as of April 14, 2025
Includes options exercisable within 60 days4,320,070 shares via options exercisable within 60 days
Shares outstanding basisPercent computed against 209,207,928 shares outstanding (plus holder’s 60‑day acquirable shares)
Unvested equity (select awards as of 12/31/2024)RSUs unvested: 30,750 (2021), 63,750 (2022), 95,625 (2023), 362,100 (2024)
Ownership guidelinesCEO: 3x base salary; directors: 3x annual cash retainer; all covered individuals in compliance as of 12/31/2024
Hedging/pledgingAnti‑hedging policy prohibits hedging transactions by directors/officers ; proxy footnotes do not indicate any pledged shares for Mr. Stonehouse
Overhang/underwater options contextWeighted‑avg exercise price of outstanding options ($7.93) and of exercisable options ($7.96) exceeded stock price $7.04 on 4/14/2025, suggesting many underwater; significant overhang disclosed

Outstanding awards snapshot (recent grants) as of 12/31/2024:

Grant dateAwardExercisableUnexercisableStrikeExpirationUnvested RSUsRSU MV ($)
12/14/2021Options/RSUs430,875 143,625 11.43 12/14/2031 30,750 231,240
12/19/2022Options/RSUs297,500 297,500 10.63 12/19/2032 63,750 479,400
12/14/2023Options/RSUs148,750 446,250 6.43 12/14/2033 95,625 719,100
12/19/2024Options/RSUs750,250 7.39 12/19/2034 362,100 2,722,992

Employment Terms

Scenario (as of 12/31/2024)Base salary ($)Target bonus ($)Health care premiums ($)Equity acceleration or continued vestingTotal ($)
Termination without cause or constructive termination1,411,072 1,199,411 (2x target AIP for CEO) 20,711 2,631,194
Disability1,411,072 1,199,411 20,711 2,631,194
DeathEquity acceleration $583,945 (options after 5 years of service rule) 583,945
Qualified retirement (Retirement Policy)Continued vesting value $1,916,153 (awards granted ≥1 year prior) 1,916,153
Change in control and termination1,411,072 1,199,411 20,711 Equity acceleration $4,736,677 7,367,871

Key contract features and governance safeguards:

  • Double‑trigger equity vesting on change of control under the plan; if awards are not assumed, full vesting occurs; otherwise, vesting requires termination conditions .
  • CEO severance includes 2x target AIP for termination without cause, constructive termination, or disability; best‑net excise tax cutback applies (no gross‑up) .
  • Clawback policy applies to incentive compensation; no option repricing and no tax gross‑ups under the plan .

Succession and dual roles:

  • Stonehouse was appointed Interim CFO effective April 9, 2025 with no change to compensation; a CFO search was underway .
  • He will retire as CEO on December 31, 2025 and remain on the board; CCO Charlie Gayer will become CEO on January 1, 2026 .

Board Governance

  • Role on board: Management director since 2007; not independent; board has an independent Chair (Dr. Nancy Hutson) and 9 of 10 directors were independent in 2024 .
  • Committee memberships: CEO is not listed on Audit, Compensation, or Corporate Governance & Nominating committees; committees are fully independent .
  • Attendance: Each director attended at least 75% of board/committee meetings in 2024; Stonehouse and the Chair attended the 2024 annual meeting .
  • Director compensation: Employees receive no additional director pay (Stonehouse receives none) .
  • Say‑on‑pay: 2024 advisory vote received >95% support; committee maintained approach and linkage to company performance .

Performance Context

YearCAP to CEO ($)TSR (indexed to $100)Peer TSRNet Income (loss) $000sORLADEYO sales $000s
202010,853,629 215.94 110.52 (182,814) 133
202117,053,230 401.45 137.47 (184,062) 121,865
20224,009,070 332.75 153.08 (247,116) 249,689
2023(3,691,891) 173.62 159.01 (226,539) 323,812
202410,979,333 217.97 172.62 (88,881) 434,090

Notes:

  • Compensation Actually Paid (CAP) is per SEC Item 402(v) methodology and fluctuates with equity fair value changes .
  • ORLADEYO ramp and improving net loss underpin above‑target AIP payouts for 2024 .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and leverage: 2024 pay skews to at‑risk elements (AIP and equity); equity awards were set around the 65th percentile of peers and are time‑based (retention) rather than performance‑vesting PSUs (alignment opportunity) .
  • Metrics rigor: The AIP uses multi‑pillar corporate objectives anchored to commercialization (35% points) and pipeline (45% combined) with organizational execution (20%); targets are undisclosed for competitive reasons; 2024 payout at 150% reflects outperformance vs plan .
  • Shareholder protections: Independent comp committee, clawback, no repricing, no gross‑ups, one‑year minimum vesting, double‑trigger CoC vesting .
  • Share usage/overhang: High option overhang and many options underwater at 4/14/2025; board sought an 11M share increase to maintain competitive equity programs through 2026 .

Risk Indicators and Red Flags

  • Underwater options may necessitate larger RSU/option grants for retention but limit near‑term option exercise/selling pressure .
  • Committee disclosed and corrected past RSU miscalculation (reduced subsequent grants), indicating governance responsiveness .
  • No related‑party transactions requiring disclosure since Jan 1, 2024; anti‑hedging policy in place .
  • Say‑on‑pay support >95% in 2024 lowers risk of adverse proxy advisor action near term .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment/retention: CEO’s significant option position (4.32M exercisable within 60 days) and unvested RSUs spread over four‑year schedules align incentives with stock appreciation and retention; underwater option profile reduces immediate selling pressure while RSU vesting creates recurring liquidity windows each anniversary .
  • Pay‑for‑performance: AIP metrics are tied to ORLADEYO revenue/patients and pipeline execution; 150% payout in 2024 mirrors commercial outperformance and pipeline progress, suggesting a positive incentive link heading into the leadership transition .
  • Transition risk: Stonehouse’s interim CFO dual‑hat and announced 12/31/2025 CEO retirement elevate transition/continuity risk; however, an internal successor (Gayer) with direct ORLADEYO execution credentials is appointed, and Stonehouse remains on the board, mitigating disruption .
  • Change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger cash and equity acceleration totals ~$7.37M (as modeled at 12/31/2024), with best‑net excise tax protection; no gross‑up and strong plan safeguards limit shareholder‑unfriendly optics .
  • Governance: Independent Chair, fully independent key committees, director attendance thresholds met, and robust stock ownership guidelines (in compliance) collectively support governance quality as the company targets profitability .