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Leanne D. Cunningham

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at BROWN FORMAN
Executive

About Leanne D. Cunningham

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Brown-Forman (BF-A). Joined Brown-Forman in 1995 and was appointed CFO in July 2021; she announced plans to retire effective May 1, 2026 . Fiscal 2025 saw underlying net sales decline 2% and underlying operating income decline 3%, with Brown-Forman’s 1-year TSR at -26% versus +15% for the S&P 500 Consumer Staples Index and +12% for the S&P 500, highlighting pay-for-performance tension in a challenging year . She has 29.83 years of credited service; pension present value as of April 30, 2025 totals $3.56 million (qualified $1.02M, non-qualified $2.54M) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Brown-FormanExecutive Vice President & CFO2021–2026Led finance organization, investor relations, and capital allocation; guided long-term strategic decisions and talent development
Brown-FormanCorporate Accountant1995 (start)Foundation in accounting; progressed through finance, corporate strategy, and production operations
Brown-FormanSenior VP roles (Shareholder Relations Officer; Commercial Finance; FP&A)Not disclosedBuilt investor and shareholder engagement; strengthened commercial finance and planning capabilities

External Roles

  • None disclosed in company filings or press releases for public-company directorships .

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2025Notes
Salary and Holiday Bonus ($)$729,190 Fixed cash; holiday bonus is tenure-based
Target Short-Term Incentive ($)$650,000 Target opportunity for FY 2025
Actual Short-Term Incentive Paid ($)$205,400 (paid June 15, 2025) Reflects FY 2025 performance and uniform individual payout decision

Performance Compensation

Short-Term Incentive (Company metrics; vest one-year)

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActual FY 2025Resulting Payout Basis
Underlying Net Sales Growth YoY40% (half of 80% company portion)-3% → 0% payout 2% → 100% 7% → 200% -2% Company portion outcome equated to 7% of target overall
Underlying Operating Income Growth YoY40% (half of 80% company portion)-3% → 0% payout 4% → 100% 11% → 200% -3% Company portion outcome equated to 7% of target overall
Individual Performance20%Committee awarded same percentage for all NEOs due to restructuring (“Building Better”) Included in actual payout total ($205,400)

Long-Term Incentives (Equity)

Award TypePerformance MetricsWeightingTarget Grant (FY 2025 cycle)Vesting / MeasurementOutcome / Vesting Dates
PBRSUs (Performance-Based RSUs)3-year cumulative TSR vs S&P 500 Consumer Staples; 3-year adjusted operating income CAGR vs same index 50% TSR / 50% Op Inc$1,233,482 target for FY 2025–2027 Payout 50%–150%; straight-line; TSR and operating income ranks determine multiplier FY 2025 grant vests on or about June 1, 2027
SSARs (Stock-Settled Stock Appreciation Rights)Stock price appreciation above grant price n/a47,799 SSARs granted at $45.07 exercise price Become exercisable May 1, 2027; expire April 30, 2034 No FY 2025 exercises by Cunningham

Recently Completed Cycle Outcomes

AwardPerformance PeriodResultShares / Cash to Cunningham
PBRSUsFY 2023–202550% payout; TSR rank 11th percentile 2,427 Class A shares issued June 2, 2025
Long-Term Cash IncentiveFY 2023–2025137% payout based on relative underlying net sales and operating income $456,758

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (as of 4/30/2025)Class A: 5,712 shares; Class B: 56,693 shares (includes 14 Class B shares in 401(k)) — each less than 1% of class
Unvested PBRSUs (market value)FY 2023 grant: 14,040 shares (~$485,924) expected vest June 1, 2026; FY 2024 grant: 28,533 shares ($994,090) expected vest ~June 1, 2027
SSARs OutstandingExercisable: historic grants (2016–2021) shown; Unexercisable: 16,125 (2022), 22,987 (2023), 47,799 (2024); strike prices $73.61, $69.87, $45.07; expiries 2032–2034
Pledging / HedgingNo pledging disclosed for Cunningham; company prohibits hedging, short sales, and derivatives for insiders
Ownership GuidelinesNo stock ownership guidelines for employees; Committee reviews NEO ownership for grant decisions

Employment Terms

TopicTerms / Status
Employment agreementNone for NEOs (no fixed-term contracts)
Severance planNo formal severance plan; occasional consulting agreements for retirees (e.g., used with other NEOs)
ClawbackSEC Rule 10D-compliant mandatory recoupment; additional 2013 policy extends to 6 years for fraud/misconduct
Change-in-controlAwards continue on same cycle; options/SSARs immediately vest but retain original schedule; “double-trigger” acceleration and payout at target upon qualifying termination within 1 year post-CIC
Termination treatmentPro-rata current-year awards at target upon death/disability/CIC; retirement and involuntary not-for-cause remain outstanding and settle on actual performance; SSAR exercise windows adjusted per event
Deferred compensationExecutive Savings Plan (ESP) balance $487,668; registrant contributed $43,106; FY 2025 earnings $(49,790); one withdrawal in FY 2025
PensionPresent value: Qualified $1,021,246; SERP $2,543,181; credited service 29.83 years
Perquisites401(k) match $18,198; life insurance $2,496; car allowance $14,400; other reimbursements $13,268 (incl. personal security support)

Multi-Year Compensation (Summary)

MetricFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Salary ($)620,842 655,646 729,190
Stock Awards ($)387,315 1,075,043 1,204,949
SSAR Awards ($)333,304 499,967 616,607
Non-Equity Incentive ($)902,001 937,015 662,158
Change in Pension Value and NQDC Earnings ($)450,596 579,124 1,087,460
All Other Compensation ($)38,881 37,906 48,362
Total ($)2,732,939 3,784,701 4,348,726

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix and targets: Brown-Forman targets executive pay at ~50th percentile of a 21-company comparator group; CEO/NEO pay is majority variable/at-risk through PBRSUs and SSARs .
  • Metric changes: FY 2025 short-term plan increased company performance weight to 80% and removed prior D&I metric to focus on underlying net sales and operating income .
  • Equity design: PBRSUs include a 50% payout floor in lieu of time-based RSUs; payouts range 50%–150% on relative TSR and adjusted operating income, discouraging award repricing and emphasizing long-term alignment; company prohibits option/SSAR repricing and backdating .
  • Say-on-pay: 2023 say-on-pay received >99% approval, indicating strong shareholder support for program design .

Vesting Schedules and Potential Selling Pressure

  • PBRSUs: FY 2023 grant vested June 2, 2025; FY 2024 grant expected ~June 1, 2026; FY 2025 grant expected ~June 1, 2027 .
  • SSARs: FY 2024 SSARs become exercisable May 1, 2027 and expire April 30, 2034; no FY 2025 SSAR exercises by Cunningham, reducing near-term selling pressure signals .

Equity Ownership & Pledging Risk

  • Beneficial ownership is de minimis percentage; no pledging disclosed for Cunningham. Company restricts insider hedging, short sales, and derivative transactions, which supports alignment and mitigates risk of adverse trading optics .

Performance & Track Record

  • FY 2025 outcomes: Underlying net sales -2% and underlying operating income -3%; company returned $420M via regular dividends; ROAIC reported at 14.4% .
  • Relative TSR: -26% (1-year), -19% (3-year), -10% (5-year) vs Consumer Staples +15%, +6%, +12% and S&P 500 +12%, +12%, +16%, underscoring a challenging period during CFO tenure .

Compensation Peer Group

  • Comparator group includes global beverages and consumer brands (e.g., Constellation, Diageo, Pernod Ricard, Hershey, Monster, Molson Coors) used to benchmark compensation; targets set at median (50th percentile) .

Governance, Clawbacks, and Trading Policy

  • Independent Compensation Committee and consultant (WTW); robust clawback policies per SEC Rule 10D plus legacy policy; strict insider trading policy banning hedging/derivatives/short sales; no employee stock ownership guidelines, but Committee reviews NEO ownership annually .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Heavy PBRSU/SSAR mix and strict anti-hedging policy align incentives with long-term TSR and adjusted operating income; PBRSU floor (50%) moderates downside but can dilute pure pay-for-performance in weak markets .
  • Retention risk: Announced retirement effective May 1, 2026 introduces succession risk; search underway for successor, suggesting planned transition and limited near-term disruption .
  • Selling pressure: No FY 2025 SSAR exercises and staggered vesting dates imply limited immediate selling pressure; potential activity may increase as FY 2024 PBRSUs vest (~June 2026) and FY 2024 SSARs approach exercisability (May 2027) .
  • Performance sensitivity: Short-term incentives tied to underlying net sales and operating income, with FY 2025 underperformance producing low payouts; long-term cash component for 2023–2025 paid at 137%, indicating better relative multi-year fundamentals vs industry peers despite recent TSR underperformance .