Robin Vince
About Robin Vince
Robin A. Vince (age 53) is President and CEO of The Bank of New York Mellon (BNY) and a management director since 2022; he became CEO in September 2022 after serving as President and CEO‑elect from March 2022 . He holds a B.A. from the University of Nottingham and previously served as Chief Risk Officer at Goldman Sachs and in multiple senior roles across treasury, operations, markets, and EMEA leadership . Under his leadership, BNY reported record 2024 revenue of $18.6B, record net income applicable to common shareholders of $4.3B, and delivered 23% ROTCE (reported) and 23.8% adjusted ROTCE; TSR for the year translated to $178.09 on a $100 base and net income was $4,543MM (pay‑versus‑performance table) . The Board highlights positive operating leverage, fee growth (+6% YoY), NII down 1% but outperforming outlook, expenses down 4% reported and up 1% ex‑notables, and capital returned of $4.4B (102% of earnings) in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| BNY Mellon | Vice Chair; CEO of Global Market Infrastructure (oversaw Clearance & Collateral, Treasury Services, Markets & Execution, Pershing) | 2020–2022 | Oversight of core market infrastructure businesses; groundwork for CEO succession |
| Goldman Sachs | Chief Risk Officer; Treasurer; Head of Operations; Head of Global Money Markets; COO EMEA; CEO Goldman Sachs International Bank | 1994–2020 | Led risk, liquidity, operations, markets, and international banking; partner since 2006; managing director since 2002 |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Hospital for Special Surgery | Board of Trustees | Current | Governance oversight at leading healthcare institution |
| Perelman Performing Arts Center (PAC NYC) | Board | Current | Civic/cultural governance in NYC |
| National Geographic Society | Hubbard Council member | Current | Advisory role at global scientific/cultural organization |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Incentive ($) | Target TDC ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 1,300,000 | 18,700,000 | 20,000,000 | Target incentive increased to position CEO pay nearer peer median; no base salary change |
Performance Compensation
Awarded 2024 Total Direct Compensation (based on 2024 performance; granted Feb 2025)
| Component | Amount ($) | Structure / Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| Cash incentive | 5,610,000 | Paid January 2025 |
| PSUs (grant value) | 16,830,000 | 3‑year performance (2025–2027), earnout 0–150% vs Adjusted ROTCE (70%) and relative TSR (30%); cliff vest at end |
| RSUs (grant value) | 5,610,000 | Vests over 3 years; equal annual tranches |
Scorecard outcomes and guardrails:
- Corporate component earnout: 150% for 2024 (financial metrics 70%, non‑financial 30%) .
- Individual modifier: 100% for Vince; risk assessment: no adjustment .
- Minimum funding threshold: CET1 at least 8.5%; actual CET1 11.2% at 12/31/2024 .
PSU metric framework (2025 grants for 2024 performance)
| Metric | Weighting | Target/Range | Payout Range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average Adjusted ROTCE (2025–2027) | 70% | Bands with increased target; 22–26% yields 100–150%; >26% = 150% | 0–150% for ROTCE component | Cliff vest at end of 3 years |
| Relative TSR vs TSR Peer Group | 30% | 50–75th percentile yields 100–150%; <25th percentile yields 0–<50% | Overall PSU earnout capped at 150% | Cliff vest at end of 3 years |
TSR Peer Group: AMP, BAC, BLK, SCHW, C, BEN, GS, IVZ, JPM, MS, NTRS, RJF, STT, TROW, USB, WFC .
Summary Compensation Table (grant year accounting)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 1,300,000 | 16,275,042 | 5,610,000 | 110,985 | 23,296,027 |
| 2023 | 1,300,000 | 10,025,856 | 5,425,000 | 50,311 | 16,801,167 |
| 2022 | 916,667 | 6,706,317 | 3,557,540 | 22,945 | 11,203,469 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (Feb 19, 2025) | 214,468 shares; right to acquire 92,039 within 60 days |
| Ownership as % of outstanding | Less than 1% (none of named individuals >1%) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO must hold 7x base salary within 5 years and retain 50% of net after‑tax shares until age 60; all NEOs must hold 4x base; all NEOs meet guidelines as of record date |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging | Robust prohibitions for executives and directors; pre‑clearance required |
| 2024 vesting (realized) | 70,857 shares vested; $3,927,422 value realized |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 13,621 (2022), 45,680 (2023), 97,748 (2024) |
| PSUs outstanding (12/31/2024) | 91,542 (2022–2024), 131,715 (2023–2025), 199,597 (2024–2026); market values shown in proxy |
| PSU earnout (2012 grant example) | 2022–2024 PSUs earned at 125% (ROTCE 120% earnout, TSR 138% earnout; average adjusted ROTCE 22.3% vs 20.5% target) |
RSU vesting cadence (for annual awards):
- 2024 grants: 33% vested on Feb 15, 2025; remaining vest 50% on Feb 15, 2026 and 50% on Feb 15, 2027 .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Role start dates | President & CEO‑elect March 2022; President & CEO September 2022 |
| Contract type | No fixed‑term employment agreements; company avoids single‑trigger CIC benefits and excessive perquisites |
| Severance (without cause) | Cash severance $1,300,000; pro‑rated incentive $28,050,000 (actual 2024 cash + deferred); health/welfare $44,824; additional stock vesting value $36,743,845; total $66,138,669 |
| Change‑of‑Control (CIC) | Cash severance $40,000,000; pro‑rated incentive at target $18,700,000; health/welfare $64,648; additional stock vesting $36,743,845; total $95,508,493 (plan indicates no single‑trigger) |
| Death | Additional stock award vesting value $36,743,845 |
| Clawbacks/forfeitures | NYSE‑compliant recovery of erroneously awarded incentive‑based comp; broad conduct‑based clawback and forfeiture; risk‑based forfeiture possible |
| Deferred comp participation (2024) | No entries for Vince in nonqualified deferred compensation table |
| Perquisites | Company aircraft permitted for efficiency/security; Vince reimbursed all personal use in 2024; late 2024 Board required CEO use of company aircraft for all air travel; car/driver available but Vince reimbursed personal driver use |
Board Governance
- Board service: Management director since 2022; not independent; no committee memberships .
- Board independence: 10 of 11 nominees are independent; Chair and CEO roles are separated (independent Chair: Joseph J. Echevarria); if combined in future, a Lead Independent Director will be appointed .
- Board/committee cadence and attendance: Board held 14 meetings in 2024; average director attendance ~95%; all directors attended the 2024 Annual Meeting .
- Anti‑pledging/hedging and strong shareholder rights (majority voting, proxy access, written consent) reinforce governance quality .
Compensation Structure Analysis
| Observation | Detail |
|---|---|
| Pay mix shifts | CEO incentive equity tilt increased: PSUs 60% (from 50%), RSUs 20% (from 25%), cash 20% (from 25%), aligning pay with three‑year performance and stockholder interests |
| Performance linkage | Corporate scorecard (70% financial, 30% non‑financial) capped at 150%; 2024 corporate component paid at 150% with improvements in adjusted operating leverage, EPS, ROTCE, revenue and margin |
| Risk controls | Individual risk assessments; clawback/forfeiture policies; minimum CET1 8.5% threshold (actual 11.2% at YE 2024) |
| Say‑on‑pay | 95% approval at 2024 Annual Meeting (for 2023 pay program) |
| Benchmarking | HRC references TSR peer group and G‑SIB peers; equity earnouts tied to adjusted ROTCE and relative TSR vs defined TSR peer set |
Performance & Track Record
| Metric (2024) | Value | YoY | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted total revenue ($B) | 18.6 | +4.3% | Fee revenue +6%; NII −1% vs outlook outperformance |
| Adjusted noninterest expense ($B) | 12.5 | +1.4% | Reported expenses −4% YoY |
| Adjusted operating leverage | +288 bps | n/a | Far Exceeds rating |
| Adjusted pre‑tax operating margin | 32.6% | +2.2 pp | Exceeds rating |
| Adjusted net income applicable to common ($B) | 4.5 | +13.0% | Far Exceeds rating |
| OEPS ($) | 6.03 | +18.9% | Far Exceeds rating |
| Adjusted ROTCE | 23.8% | +2.0 pp | Exceeds rating |
| Reported record revenue ($B) | 18.6 | n/a | Proxy introduction |
| Reported net income ($B) | 4.3 | n/a | Proxy introduction |
| Capital returned ($B) | 4.4; 102% of earnings | n/a | Buybacks/dividends |
| Pay‑versus‑performance TSR (value of $100) | $178.09; Peer $173.90 | vs 2023 $117.20 | Company‑selected measure includes Adj. ROTCE 23.8% and net income $4,543MM |
Director Compensation (for context; Vince receives none as management director)
- Management directors do not receive Board compensation; Vince received $0 for Board service .
- Independent director retainer/equity structure provided (e.g., 2024 equity $195k; cash $110k base; audit/risk membership adders) .
Related Party Transactions and Conflicts
- No related party transactions requiring approval in 2024; strong policy and thresholds; periodic pre‑approvals and reporting to CGNSR .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited for executives/directors; pre‑clearance required .
- Broad clawbacks; NYSE‑mandated recovery policy for restatements .
- Large CIC package ($95.5M total potential) could be viewed as generous but aligned with no single‑trigger practice; additional vesting components are standard for equity continuity .
- Aircraft usage oversight and security‑driven requirements mitigate reputational/security risks; personal use reimbursed in 2024 .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking, pay inflation risk)
- TSR Peer Group comprises major asset managers and banks (AMP, BAC, BLK, SCHW, C, BEN, GS, IVZ, JPM, MS, NTRS, RJF, STT, TROW, USB, WFC); compensation benchmarking also references G‑SIBs .
- Target percentile for pay vs peers not explicitly disclosed; HRC noted raising CEO target incentive closer to peer median due to performance and G‑SIB complexity .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 95% approval on 2024 say‑on‑pay vote (for 2023 compensation program) .
- Extensive stockholder outreach to holders of >65% of shares; director engagement on governance and compensation .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Deep experience in risk, capital and liquidity, operations, markets, international banking, and financial regulation; knowledge of BNY businesses .
Board Governance (director service details)
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Director since | 2022 |
| Independence | Not independent (management director) |
| Committees | None |
| Board leadership | Independent Chair; separation of roles; mechanism for Lead Director if roles combine |
| Meeting attendance | Board averaged ~95% attendance in 2024; 14 meetings; all directors attended Annual Meeting |
Fixed Compensation (detail table for grant mechanics)
| Grant Type (2024 grant year) | Date | Units | Grant‑date FV ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 2/1/2024 | 195,496 target; 293,244 max | 10,850,028 | Earnout 0–150% based on Adjusted ROTCE and relative TSR |
| RSUs | 2/1/2024 | 97,748 | 5,425,014 | Vests pro‑rata over 3 years |
Investment Implications
- Equity‑heavy incentives with increased PSU weighting (60%) heighten alignment to three‑year adjusted ROTCE and relative TSR; 2024 corporate component at 150% and strong operating leverage signal near‑term confidence but raise expectations for sustaining ROTCE and EPS growth through 2027 PSU window .
- Vesting cadence creates predictable potential selling windows each February; however, stringent ownership/retention requirements (7x salary, 50% net share hold to age 60) and anti‑hedging/pledging policies limit discretionary selling pressure and reduce alignment risk; monitor Form 4s around mid‑February vest dates .
- CIC economics ($95.5M total potential) and accelerated vesting could represent retention strength but investor sensitivity to severance scale remains; the company’s “no single‑trigger” stance mitigates governance concerns .
- Separation of Chair and CEO, high board independence, and robust risk/clawback frameworks reduce dual‑role governance risks; say‑on‑pay support (95%) and TSR outperformance vs peer cohort strengthen sentiment, but continued delivery on adjusted ROTCE and cost discipline will be critical for PSU earnouts and stock performance through 2027 .
Best AI for Equity Research
Performance on expert-authored financial analysis tasks