Amerino Gatti
Baker HughesAbout Amerino Gatti
Amerino Gatti is Executive Vice President, Oilfield Services & Equipment (OFSE) at Baker Hughes, appointed September 3, 2024 with the transition effective by October 1, 2024; he previously served as CEO and Chairman of TEAM, Inc. (2018–2022) and spent 25 years at Schlumberger in senior production-focused roles. He is 54 years old as of February 4, 2025 and holds a mechanical engineering degree from the University of Alberta . Company performance during 2024 featured $28.2B in orders, $27.8B revenue, adjusted EBITDA up 22% with margins at 16.5%, adjusted EPS up 47%, and free cash flow of $2.26B; TSR over 1-, 3-, and 5-year periods was +23%, +84%, and +86%, respectively . Management has highlighted OFSE margin progress to a ~20% target and sees further upside through mature asset solutions with Gatti’s domain expertise cited as a lever for continued improvement .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baker Hughes | EVP, Oilfield Services & Equipment | 2024–present | Brought in to drive profitability, growth, innovation and customer satisfaction in OFSE |
| TEAM, Inc. | CEO and Chairman | 2018–2022 | Led diversified industrial services provider; public-company CEO experience |
| Schlumberger | Various senior roles (e.g., President of Production Group NA; President Well Services; GM Qatar & Yemen) | ~1993–2018 (25 years) | Deep production solutions domain expertise across regions and functions |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Helix Energy Solutions (NYSE: HLX) | Director | 2018–2024 | Public company board service |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus for Amerino Gatti have not been disclosed in the 2025 proxy (he was not a 2024 Named Executive Officer); BKR determines NEO base salaries versus a market reference group and approved selective increases in 2024 for NEOs .
Performance Compensation
Corporate 2024 Short-Term Incentive (STI) structure and outcome
| Metric (70% Financial / 30% Strategic) | Weight | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Max (200%) | Result | Payout multiple | Weighted payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 10% | $26B | $27.5B | $29.5B | $27.8B | 116% | 12% |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($) | 25% | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.7B | $4.6B | 173% | 43% |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%) | 10% | 14.5% | 15.6% | 17.0% | 16.5% | 163% | 16% |
| Free Cash Flow ($) | 25% | $1.75B | $2.05B | $2.5B | $2.26B | 146% | 37% |
| Subtotal (Financial) | 70% | 154% | 108% | ||||
| Strategic Blueprint (safety/compliance; growth & transformation; sustainability & leadership; shareholder returns) | 30% | 107% | 32% | ||||
| Total Corporate Funding | 100% | 140% |
Notes:
- STI metrics and outcomes apply company‑wide and to executive officers; individual payouts vary by role and unit modifiers. The CEO’s payout was 160% of target; other NEOs ranged 130%–150% .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) design (PSUs/RSUs)
- RSUs: typically vest one‑third per year over three years, subject to continued employment .
- PSUs (3‑year performance period; cliff vest at end):
- Core metrics: Relative Free Cash Flow conversion (50% weight) versus the oilfield services peer set; Absolute ROIC (50% weight) versus internal goals .
- TSR modifier: ±50% based on relative TSR vs OSX index peers, TechnipFMC, and S&P 500 Industrials (median) .
- Payout curves: 0%–150% per core metric with straight‑line interpolation between performance points; TSR applies as modifier .
- Track record: 2022 PSU awards paid at 166.82% after applying the TSR modifier to core metric outcomes (Relative FCF, ROIC) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | BKR policy / status |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO: 6x base salary; CFO: 3x; other executive officers: 2x; 5 years to comply; hold 75% of net shares until compliant |
| Hedging / pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers under Insider Trading Policy |
| Clawback | Recovery of incentive compensation adopted Oct 2023; applies to current/former Section 16 officers for restatements; discretionary recoupment for misconduct causing material inaccuracy |
| Option policies | Company does not currently grant stock options; no backdating or repricing |
Note: The proxy’s beneficial ownership table as of March 24, 2025 lists current directors and certain executive officers; Amerino Gatti’s individual share count was not separately disclosed there .
Employment Terms
| Plan / Provision | Key terms | Triggers / treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Executive Severance Plan | Typically 12 months base salary and outplacement for executive officers upon involuntary termination (without cause); CEO has enhanced terms (additional six months base and 1.5x bonus lookback) | |
| Executive Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Plan | Double‑trigger cash severance: CEO 2.5x salary+target bonus; other NEOs 2.0x; prorated target bonus; continued benefits (2.5 yrs CEO; 2.0 yrs others); cutback to avoid 280G excise taxes; no gross‑ups | |
| Equity upon CIC and qualifying termination | RSUs: service restrictions lapse (accelerated); PSUs: service restrictions lapse and performance fixed at target (or greater of target/actual through transaction under certain “covered transaction” scenarios) | |
| Equity upon involuntary termination (non‑CIC) | Pro‑rata vesting for RSUs and options held ≥1 year; PSUs remain eligible pro‑rata subject to performance |
Note: The CIC Plan covers top management including NEOs; individual participation status for Amerino Gatti is not explicitly listed in the proxy—executive award agreements govern .
Performance & Track Record since Appointment
| Date | Announcement / context | Gatti role / quote | Implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 20, 2025 | Multi‑year fully integrated completions contract with Petrobras; introduces SureCONTROL Premium ICV and other completions tech | “Deepwater… require unmatched reliability… continual innovation… developed for Petrobras’ standards” – EVP OFSE | Supports OFSE growth in Brazil deepwater; mix shift towards higher‑tech completions |
| Jun 11, 2025 | Equinor integrated P&A services for Oseberg East; P&A Center of Excellence in Bergen/Stavanger | “Unlock new efficiencies… set new standards for well abandonment” – EVP OFSE | Builds mature assets and well decommissioning franchise; annuity‑like services |
| Sep 29, 2025 | Award to supply up to 50 subsea tree systems in Brazil | “Accelerate growth in Brazil’s offshore energy sector” – EVP OFSE | Large OFSE equipment backlog; scale and localization benefits |
| Oct 24, 2025 | Aramco: expand integrated underbalanced coiled tubing drilling (UBCTD) from 4 to 10 units in Saudi Arabia | “Shape how oil & gas are produced… holistic, integrated approach” – EVP OFSE | Strengthens Middle East OFSE franchise; integrated services margin potential |
| Management commentary | CEO highlighted OFSE reaching ~20% EBITDA target; next leg via self‑help and mature asset solutions with Amerino and team | Emphasizes continuity and further improvement under new OFSE leadership | Margin durability and incremental catch‑up to best‑in‑class peers |
Company 2024 Snapshot (context for incentive alignment)
| Metric | 2024 value |
|---|---|
| Orders | $28.2B |
| Revenue | $27.8B |
| Adjusted EBITDA growth | +22% YoY |
| Adjusted EBITDA margin | 16.5% (+170 bps YoY) |
| Adjusted EPS growth | +47% YoY |
| Free cash flow | $2.26B |
| Say‑on‑Pay approval | 95.2% (2024 vote) |
| TSR (1 / 3 / 5 years) | +23% / +84% / +86% |
Compensation Structure Analysis (signals)
- Pay is predominantly at‑risk: other NEOs averaged ~79% performance‑based; CEO ~90% performance‑based; long‑term incentives dominate pay mix .
- Shift toward PSUs and away from options reduces risk‑taking; PSUs weighted to FCF conversion and ROIC, with a relative TSR modifier to align outcomes with shareholders .
- Double‑trigger CIC, clawback policy, and prohibition on hedging/pledging reduce governance risk; no option repricing or tax gross‑ups .
- 2024 STI design balanced profitability (EBITDA and margin), growth (revenue), and cash (FCF) with a strategic scorecard; corporate funding paid at 140% on above‑target execution .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: Gatti’s compensation will be governed by BKR’s structures that emphasize EBITDA, FCF, ROIC and relative TSR—favorable for margin expansion, cash conversion and peer‑relative returns in OFSE .
- Selling pressure: With PSUs on three‑year cliffs and RSUs vesting over three years, plus 2x‑salary ownership guidelines and anti‑pledging rules, structural near‑term selling pressure appears limited for senior executives; however, Gatti’s individual holdings were not disclosed in the 2025 proxy .
- Retention/CIC economics: Executive severance and double‑trigger CIC terms are competitive (2.0x cash multiple for other NEOs; RSU acceleration; PSUs fixed at target on CIC termination), supporting retention while avoiding single‑trigger windfalls .
- Execution risk and upside: Early tenure coincides with notable OFSE wins (Petrobras completions and subsea, Equinor P&A, Aramco UBCTD expansion) and management intent to push OFSE margins beyond ~20%—a potential catalyst if sustained through cycle .