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Maria Claudia Borras

Chief Growth & Experience Officer and Interim Executive Vice President, Industrial & Energy Technology at Baker HughesBaker Hughes
Executive

About Maria Claudia Borras

Maria Claudia Borras is Chief Growth & Experience Officer (since September 2024) and, effective October 24, 2025, also interim EVP, Industrial & Energy Technology; she previously led Oilfield Services (2017–2022) and Oilfield Services & Equipment (2022–2024). She is 56 years old and has 30+ years of experience with Baker Hughes and the energy technology industry . Company performance context during her NEO tenure: 2024 orders $28.2B, revenue $27.8B, adjusted EPS +47% YoY, adjusted EBITDA +22% YoY, EBITDA margin 16.5%, free cash flow $2.26B; 1/3/5-yr TSR of +23%/+84%/+86% significantly outperformed peers .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Baker HughesEVP, Oilfield Services2017–2022Led OFS through portfolio and operating changes during early phase of transformation .
Baker HughesEVP, Oilfield Services & Equipment2022–2024Centralized operations, margin improvement in Subsea & Surface Pressure Systems; progressed transformation, strong orders .
Baker HughesChief Growth & Experience OfficerSep 2024–presentDrives enterprise growth and customer experience; leads commercial, regional, marketing and transformation agenda .
Baker HughesInterim EVP, Industrial & Energy TechnologyEffective Oct 24, 2025Interim leadership of IET while continuing CGXO responsibilities .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)$935,000 $950,000 $957,692
Stock Awards (Grant-date fair value, $)$6,240,012 $3,236,726 $3,088,599
Non-Equity Incentive Plan (Cash Bonus, $)$617,500 $2,566,623 $1,261,000
All Other Compensation ($)$318,109 $252,000 $426,556
Total Compensation ($)$8,110,621 $7,043,477 $5,728,116

2024 salary rate approved at $970,000; target and actual bonus were $970,000 and $1,261,000 (130% of target) .

Performance Compensation

2024 Short‑Term Incentive (STI) – Design, Targets, and Payout

ComponentWeightThresholdTargetMaximum2024 ResultPayout MultipleWeighted Payout
Revenue ($)10%$26B$27.5B$29.5B$27.8B116%12%
Adjusted EBITDA ($)25%$4.0B$4.3B$4.7B$4.6B173%43%
Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%)10%14.5%15.6%17.0%16.5%163%16%
Free Cash Flow ($)25%$1.75B$2.05B$2.50B$2.26B146%37%
Strategic Blueprint (non‑financial)30%Assessment 107%107%32%
Company‑wide outcome100%Financial 154%108% (financial), 32% (strategic) → 140% overall funding .
Individual payout (Borras)$970,000Actual $1,261,000130%

Notes: Non‑GAAP metrics reconciled in Annex A; no adjustments to as‑reported revenue and FCF .

Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Grants and PSU Design

InstrumentGrant dateTarget unitsGrant-date fair value ($)VestingPerformance metrics
PSUsFeb 1, 202452,392 [target]$1,588,616Cliff vests after 3 years (performance period 2024–2026)50% Relative FCF Conversion vs OSX/TechnipFMC, 50% Absolute ROIC; TSR modifier ±50% vs OSX/TechnipFMC and S&P 500 Industrials median .
RSUsFeb 1, 202452,392$1,499,983Vests 1/3 each year over 3 yearsService-based .

PSU details: Payout curve 0–150% on each core metric; straight‑line interpolation; TSR applies as modifier to core outcome .

PSU Payout History (2012 cycle referenced)

CycleCore measures and resultTSR modifierTotal payout
2022–2024 PSUsWeighted payout 125.05% (FCF conversion 150% weighted 75%; ROIC: absolute change 146.8% weighted 36.7%; cumulative average 53.4% weighted 13.35%)+33.4% (BKR cumulative TSR 85% → 1.334x)166.82% (vested Jan 2025) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 24, 2025)

HolderShares ownedOptions/RSUs exercisable or vesting by May 23, 2025Total beneficial ownership% of shares outstanding
Maria Claudia Borras170,978 159,066 330,044 0.033% (330,044 / 990,349,581)
  • 2024 stock vested: 108,418 shares; 2024 options exercised: 18,000 ($162,360 value) .
  • Insider policy prohibits hedging/derivative transactions and pledging of Company stock by executive officers; no pledging permitted .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: other executive officers report to CEO must hold 2× base salary; 5-year attainment window; all NEOs were in compliance in 2024 .

Outstanding and Unvested Equity (Borras) at 12/31/2024

| Award type | Grant date | Status at 12/31/24 | Units | Key terms | |---|---|---:|---| | Stock options | 7/31/2017 | Exercisable | 50,362 | Strike $36.89; expires 7/31/2027 . | | Stock options | 1/22/2018 | Exercisable | 55,506 | Strike $35.55; expires 1/22/2028 . | | Stock options | 1/23/2019 | Exercisable | 5,585 | Strike $22.98; expires 1/23/2029 . | | RSUs (3‑yr ratable) | 1/25/2022 | Unvested | 17,902 | Vest ratably over 3 years beginning 1st anniversary . | | RSUs (3‑yr cliff) | 1/25/2022 | Unvested | 107,411 | Cliff vest on 3rd anniversary (expected Jan 2025) . | | PSUs (2022 cycle) | 1/25/2022 | Unearned (as of 12/31/24) | 89,588 | Reflected at achieved 166.82%; vested Jan 2025 . | | RSUs (3‑yr ratable) | 1/24/2023 | Unvested | 33,168 | Vest 1/3 annually over 3 years . | | PSUs (2023 cycle) | 1/24/2023 | Target unearned | 49,751 | Scheduled vest Jan 2026, subject to performance . | | RSUs (3‑yr ratable) | 2/1/2024 | Unvested | 52,392 | Vest 1/3 annually (17,464 per year) . | | PSUs (2024 cycle) | 2/1/2024 | Target unearned | 52,392 | Scheduled vest Jan 2027, subject to performance . |

Employment Terms

  • Executive Severance Plan (involuntary termination, no CIC): 12 months base salary, outplacement (up to 12 months), prorated bonus; pro‑rata vesting on certain RSUs/options; PSUs remain eligible subject to performance .
  • Executive Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Severance Plan (double‑trigger, within 24 months of CIC): for NEOs other than CEO, 2.0× base salary and 2.0× target bonus cash severance, prorated bonus, continued benefits for 2 years; RSUs vest; PSUs vest at target (or higher if actual at transaction) .
  • Illustrative CIC termination values at 12/31/2024 (Borras): total $14,337,378, including severance $3,880,000, prorated/target STI $970,000, RSU/PSU acceleration $9,137,328, dividend equivalents $292,750, benefits/interest adjustments .
  • Clawback: Adopted October 2023; mandatory recoupment for accounting restatement; discretionary recoupment for misconduct leading to material inaccuracies in financials or incentive metrics .
  • Deferred compensation (SRP): 2024 Company contribution $174,842; 2024 earnings $35,952; year‑end balance $805,824 .
  • Pension: Supplemental Pension Plan present value $384,687; Company Pension Plan $26,417; plan frozen; installments typically begin after age 60 or post‑separation waiting period .

Related Party, Hedging/Pledging, and Compliance

  • No Item 404(a) related‑party transactions for Borras in 2025 interim appointment disclosure; no family relationships or arrangements in selection .
  • Insider trading policy prohibits hedging/derivatives and pledging by executives and directors .
  • 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: 95.2% “FOR” .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance linkage is robust: STI tied 70% to financial metrics (EBITDA, FCF, revenue, margin) and 30% to strategic objectives; 2024 company funding 140% reflects strong execution; Borras’ 2024 payout was 130% of target, consistent with segment/individual modifiers .
  • Retention vs. selling pressure: Large unvested equity through 2027 (multi‑year RSUs and PSUs) supports retention; expect periodic vest events (e.g., 2025–2027) which can create sell‑to‑cover flows, though pledging/hedging is prohibited—reducing alignment risk .
  • Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership of ~0.033% and compliance with 2× salary ownership guideline indicates meaningful, though not large, direct exposure; dividend equivalents on RSUs further align incentives .
  • Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger structure and ~2× salary/bonus multiple for NEOs, plus equity acceleration at target, imply significant but market‑aligned protection; 12/31/24 pro forma CIC payout estimate of ~$14.3M illustrates exposure under stressed scenarios .
  • Execution track record: Company performance under her leadership roles and CGXO remit shows strong EBITDA growth, margin expansion, FCF, and multi‑year TSR outperformance, aligning PSU metrics (ROIC, FCF) with investor value creation priorities .