Luc Bonnefoy
About Luc Bonnefoy
Luc Bonnefoy is President, Surgical at Bausch + Lomb (BLCO), a role he has held since June 2023 after nearly two decades in senior surgical leadership at the company. He is 58, with a DESS in Microbiology/Genetic Engineering from Institut Pharmaceutique et Industrielle de Lyon (IPIL) . At the company level, BLCO delivered 2024 revenue growth of 16% reported and 17% constant currency, reflecting execution against product launches and commercial priorities under the current incentive framework; 2023 AIP paid at 104% of target, driven by above‑target revenue and strategic priorities and below‑target Adjusted EBITDA performance . Current executive incentives emphasize companywide Adjusted EBITDA and Revenues for annual bonuses and a three‑year PSU program tied to organic revenue growth and relative TSR, aligning leadership to top‑line and shareholder outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bausch + Lomb | President, Surgical | Jun 2023–present | Leads global Surgical segment execution and growth initiatives |
| Bausch + Lomb | SVP, Surgical | Nov 2021–Jun 2023 | Drove global surgical portfolio priorities and commercial execution |
| Bausch + Lomb | VP, Surgical, International | 2013–2021 | Led international expansion and operations across Surgical in ex-U.S. markets |
| Technolas Perfect Vision (B+L company) | VP, EMEA | 2009–2013 | EMEA leadership for refractive technology platform within B+L |
| Bausch + Lomb | EMEA Surgical marketing/sales; Surgical BU France | 2002–2008 | Built regional sales/marketing capabilities and local business unit leadership |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in company proxy filings for Mr. Bonnefoy .
Fixed Compensation
- BLCO discloses detailed compensation for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) only; Mr. Bonnefoy is not a 2024 NEO, so his base salary and target bonus are not separately reported in the proxy .
Performance Compensation
Annual and long-term incentive design applicable to senior executives (companywide).
| Incentive Element | Metric | Weighting | Target/Goals | Actual/Payout (recent) | Vesting/Term |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) | Adjusted EBITDA (non‑GAAP) | 60% of financial component | Company pre‑set annual targets (not disclosed in detail) | 2023 company AIP paid 104% overall (above‑target revenue/strategic, below‑target EBITDA) | Annual cash; performance year basis |
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) | Revenues | 40% of financial component | Company pre‑set annual targets (not disclosed in detail) | Included in 104% overall payout for 2023 | Annual cash |
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) | Strategic Priorities | 20% of total AIP | Company strategic objectives set annually | Included in 104% overall payout for 2023 | Annual cash |
| PSUs (3‑yr) | Organic revenue growth (non‑GAAP) | 50% (2024 PSU); increased to 75% for 2025 grants | 2024 year goal: Threshold 4.5% = 50%, Target 6% = 100%, Stretch 7% = 200% ; 2025 weighting adjusted to 75% org. growth | Payout at end of 3‑yr cycle; performance averaged annually | Cliff at 3 years (performance measured 2024–2026) |
| PSUs (3‑yr) | Relative TSR vs S&P 500 Health Care | 50% (2024 PSU); reduced to 25% for 2025 grants | Threshold 30th pct = 50%, Target 50th = 100%, Stretch 80th+ = 200% ; 2025 weighting reduced to 25% | Payout at end of 3‑yr cycle | Cliff at 3 years |
| RSUs | Time‑based | Typical portion of LTI mix; 25%→30% for non‑CEO NEOs in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 33% per year over 3 years, service‑based |
| Stock Options | Time‑based | Typical portion of LTI mix; 25%→20% for non‑CEO NEOs in 2025 | Exercise price ≥ fair market value on grant date | N/A | Vest ratably over 3 years; 10‑yr term |
Notes:
- 2025 AIP cap increased to 250% of target; 2025 LTI mix modestly shifts more to RSUs for stability amid share price volatility (CEO mix unchanged) .
- Equity grant timing is standardized (post‑earnings) with explicit MNPI safeguards; no option repricing permitted under plan .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership tables list directors and NEOs; Mr. Bonnefoy’s individual share count is not separately disclosed. Aggregate policy note: none of the shares held by listed directors/executive officers in the table are pledged; the company also prohibits pledging and hedging by officers, directors and employees .
- Share ownership guidelines apply to NEOs (CEO: 6x salary; other NEOs: 3x; 5 years to comply, must hold 50% of net vested shares until met). The proxy does not state separate guidelines for non‑NEO executive officers; Mr. Bonnefoy is not a 2024 NEO .
- Robust clawback framework: a Dodd‑Frank financial‑restatement recoupment policy (3‑year lookback) and a separate misconduct/detrimental conduct clawback applicable to equity and incentives; no indemnification for clawback losses .
Employment Terms
- BLCO discloses individual employment agreements/severance terms for NEOs (e.g., CEO multiple of 2x salary+bonus; non‑CEO NEOs generally 1x, or 2x upon CIC). Mr. Bonnefoy’s contract terms, severance multiple, and change‑of‑control treatment are not individually disclosed in the proxy as he is not a named executive officer .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Companywide incentives emphasize top‑line (revenue growth) and relative TSR via PSUs, with cash AIP tied to Adjusted EBITDA and Revenues—supportive of growth/returns alignment for Surgical leadership like Mr. Bonnefoy even when individual details aren’t disclosed .
- Retention/overhang: Standard three‑year PSU/option cycles and RSU tranches create staggered vesting and potential periodic selling windows; anti‑hedge/pledge and clawbacks reduce misalignment/behavioral risk .
- Transparency gap: As a non‑NEO executive, Mr. Bonnefoy’s precise salary, bonus targets, grant values, and ownership are not disclosed—investors should monitor Form 4 insider filings and future proxies for any elevation to NEO status or material equity grants to gauge selling pressure/retention risk. The AIP’s 104% 2023 payout and strong 2024 revenue growth signal incentive realizability tied to execution, but segment‑level (Surgical) KPI disclosure is limited in the proxy .