Steven Raia
TopBuildAbout Steven Raia
Steven P. Raia is a named executive officer of TopBuild (BLD), currently serving as President, TopBuild Special Operations and Executive Adviser (effective January 1, 2024), after leading TruTeam (TopBuild’s installation operations) as President from March 2019 through year-end 2023 . During his tenure in senior operating roles, TopBuild delivered record 2024 sales of $5.3B (+2.6% YoY), nearly $1.1B in adjusted EBITDA, and $706.7M of free cash flow . Pay-for-performance alignment is evident: 2024 annual incentive paid near target (100.4% of target) , while the 2022–2024 performance share cycle paid 200% on EPS but 0% on relative TSR, directly reflecting results vs multi-year goals . Say‑on‑pay support remains strong (97% in 2024; 98% in 2023) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| TopBuild (TruTeam Operations) | President, TruTeam Operations | Mar 2019 – Jan 1, 2024 | Led TruTeam operations (executive operating leadership) |
| TopBuild | President, TopBuild Special Operations and Executive Adviser | Jan 1, 2024 – Present | Executive adviser/special operations role supporting enterprise priorities |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No public company directorships disclosed for Mr. Raia in TopBuild’s proxy statements . |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (%) | LTI Target ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 515,000 | 70% | 675,000 |
| 2024 | 550,000 | 75% | 750,000 |
| Year | Actual Annual Incentive Paid ($) |
|---|---|
| 2023 | 613,300 |
| 2024 | 414,150 |
Notes:
- TopBuild targets total pay near market median; no individual employment agreements; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Perquisites are limited (401(k) match and executive physical are the main items in “All Other Compensation”) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Company Metrics and Results
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual/Result | Payout vs Target | Weighted Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income as % of Sales | 30% | 14.5% | 17.0% | 18.7% | 17.3% | 117.0% | 35.1% |
| Operating Income, as Adjusted ($mm) | 30% | 788.9 | 928.1 | 1,020.9 | 908.0 | 89.2% | 26.8% |
| Net Sales ($mm) | 20% | 4,914.2 | 5,460.2 | 6,006.2 | 5,251.8 | 71.4% | 14.3% |
| Working Capital as % of Sales | 10% | 14.3% | 13.0% | 11.7% | 14.0% | 42.3% | 4.2% |
| Safety Incident Rate | 10% | 2.68 | 2.23 | 1.97 | 1.95 | 200.0% | 20.0% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | — | 100.4% |
Notes:
- 2023 AIP paid 168.1% of target (strong AOI and margin outperformance), highlighting variability tied to performance .
- AIP metrics and weightings: AOI margin (30%), AOI dollars (30%), Net Sales (20%), Working Capital % (10%), Safety incident rate (10%) -.
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Design and Outcomes
- Design: 60% PRSUs (3-year performance, split 50% adjusted EPS and 50% relative TSR), 40% time-based RSUs (3-year ratable vesting) .
- 2022–2024 PRSU outcomes (paid in Feb 2025): EPS paid at 200% of target; relative TSR paid at 0% (bottom quartile vs peer group) .
| 2022–2024 PRSU Cycle (Grants in 2022) | Target Shares (EPS) | EPS Payout (%) | EPS Shares Earned | Target Shares (TSR) | TSR Payout (%) | TSR Shares Earned | Total Value on 2/21/2025 ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steven P. Raia | 674 | 200% | 1,348 | 674 | 0% | — | 409,495 |
2024 Grants (Award Date 2/20/2024):
- PRSUs: Target 1,174; threshold 294 (25%); max 2,348 (200%) . Vest on ~3rd anniversary, subject to EPS and relative TSR over 2024–2026 .
- RSUs: 782; vest in three equal annual installments beginning first anniversary (2025–2027), subject to continued service .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Trend
| As-of Date | Shares Beneficially Owned (#) | Shares Outstanding (#) | Ownership (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 29, 2024 | 2,737 | 31,814,888 | ~0.009% (calc. from ) |
| Feb 27, 2025 | 4,646 | 29,245,308 | ~0.016% (calc. from ) |
- Company notes each named individual holds “less than 1%” of outstanding shares .
- Stock ownership guidelines: for executives reporting to the CEO at VP+ or leading a segment, 1x base salary in stock; five-year compliance window; all NEOs have satisfied or are on track .
- Hedging and pledging are prohibited (no variable forwards, swaps, collars, exchange funds, pledging, margin accounts, short selling, or standing/limit orders) .
- Clawback: NYSE Rule 10D-1 compliant, mandatory recovery of excess incentive comp upon restatements/corrections (no-fault) .
Vested/Exercised and Unvested Holdings (as of 12/31/2024 and during 2024)
- 2024 vestings/exercises: 2,762 shares vested ($1,118,555 value); 707 options exercised ($128,900 value realized) .
- Outstanding unvested awards at 12/31/2024:
| Award Type | Grant Date | Unvested Units (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 2/15/2022 | 300 | 93,402 |
| RSU | 4/1/2022 | 2,867 | 892,612 |
| RSU | 2/21/2023 | 941 | 292,971 |
| RSU | 2/20/2024 | 782 | 243,468 |
| PRSU (target) | 2022 grant (EPS/TSR) | 1,348 | 419,686 |
| PRSU (target) | 2023 grant (EPS/TSR) | 2,116 | 658,795 |
| PRSU (target) | 2024 grant (EPS/TSR) | 1,174 | 365,513 |
- Options: At 12/31/2023, 707 options at $214.58 expiring 2/16/2031 were outstanding; these were exercised in 2024 .
Employment Terms
- Severance Plan (amended Oct 28, 2024): Non-compete and non-solicit covenants required; severance eligibility upon qualifying termination (without cause/for good reason) .
- Standard (non‑CIC) severance (as if terminated 12/31/2024): 1x salary continuation ($550,000), 1x target bonus continuation ($412,500), pro‑rata bonus ($412,500), and medical benefits ($9,272); total $1,384,272 .
- CIC double‑trigger (two months prior to or within 24 months after a CIC): 2x salary ($1,100,000), 2x target bonus ($825,000), pro‑rata bonus ($412,500), medical ($18,543), and full vesting of unvested equity valued at $2,969,570; total $5,325,613 .
- Change‑in‑control accelerations: unvested options and RSUs vest 100%; unvested PRSUs vest at target .
- Award/Severance covenants: executive award agreements include a non‑competition covenant during employment and for one year thereafter .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and design: Large share of pay is at-risk and equity-based; LTI is 60% PRSU (EPS and relative TSR) and 40% RSU; options were phased out in 2022 to better align with business dynamics and market practice .
- AIP momentum: 2023 payout was high (168.1%) on strong AOI and margin; 2024 normalized to ~100% with a 200% payout on safety offset by below-target AOI dollars and net sales .
- Multi-year performance signal: EPS objective delivered maximum (200%) for 2022–2024 PRSUs, but relative TSR paid 0% (bottom quartile), balancing earnings growth with market-relative return discipline .
- Governance and guardrails: Strong clawback; hedging/pledging bans; no repricing of underwater options without shareholder approval; independent consultant (Willis Towers Watson) and defined peer groups guide benchmarking .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Policies
- Ownership guidelines: 1x base salary for executives reporting to CEO at VP+ or segment leaders; five years to comply; all NEOs are compliant or on track .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited, reducing misalignment and collateral risk .
- Related-party transactions: None in 2024 under policy review .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say‑on‑pay approval: 97% (2024 annual meeting) and 98% (2023 annual meeting), indicating strong investor support for program design .
- 2025 shareholders approved the Amended and Restated 2015 LTIP (25.97M for / 0.55M against) .
Investment Implications
- Incentive alignment: High variable pay with explicit EPS and relative TSR gates should continue aligning realized pay with durable earnings growth and market-relative performance; the zero TSR payout for 2022–2024 underscores downside guardrails .
- Near-term supply/vesting: Scheduled RSU vesting through 2027 and the 2024–2026 PRSU cycle could create periodic selling pressure to cover taxes, evidenced by 2024 vestings ($1.12M realized) and option exercise activity .
- Retention/change‑in‑control: Standard 1x severance multiple and 2x CIC multiple (with full acceleration) offer retention with balanced shareholder protections (double‑trigger, no gross‑ups, non‑compete) .
- Company performance backdrop: Record 2024 sales, strong FCF, and disciplined capital returns (>$966M buybacks in 2024) provide a constructive backdrop for incentive attainment; however, relative TSR underperformance in the last cycle indicates market-sensitive execution risk despite robust EPS delivery .
Sources: TopBuild DEF 14A (Mar 14, 2025) **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:1]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:7]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:10]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:12]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:31]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:34]**-**[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:36]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:38]**-**[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:42]** **[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:44]**-**[1633931_0001558370-25-002964_bld-20250428xdef14a.htm:46]**; TopBuild DEF 14A (Mar 15, 2024) **[1633931_0001558370-24-003403_bld-20240429xdef14a.htm:21]**-**[1633931_0001558370-24-003403_bld-20240429xdef14a.htm:23]** **[1633931_0001558370-24-003403_bld-20240429xdef14a.htm:27]**-**[1633931_0001558370-24-003403_bld-20240429xdef14a.htm:35]**; TopBuild 8‑K (Apr 29, 2025) **[1633931_0001558370-25-005826_bld-20250428x8k.htm:2]**.