Amir Cohen
About Amir Cohen
Amir M. Cohen, 48, has served as Blade Air Mobility’s Chief Accounting Officer since May 2021; he is a CPA with an M.B.A. from NYU and a B.A. in Economics and Accounting from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem . During his tenure, Blade achieved its first positive Adjusted EBITDA in 2024 ($1.205 million), a >$17 million improvement vs. 2023, and paid out 108% of target under the company’s 2024 STIP, signaling improving operating discipline . The company’s Pay vs. Performance disclosure shows a $100 investment rising to $118.72 in 2024 while reporting a 2024 net loss of $27.3 million, framing both stock and financial outcomes during the most recent year of his service .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| WPP (multinational communications holding company) | Various roles, most recently SVP Finance | 2008–2021 | Not disclosed in proxy |
| PwC LLP (New York) | Manager | 2006–2008 | Not disclosed in proxy |
External Roles
- No external board or public company directorships are disclosed for Mr. Cohen in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
- The proxy identifies named executive officers (NEOs) as the CEO, President/GC, and CFO, and provides detailed compensation only for these NEOs; CAO-specific base salary, target bonus, and payouts are not disclosed .
- Company-wide governance elements relevant to executives include stock ownership guidelines (other executive officers: 1x base salary), with the company stating no executives were out of compliance as of December 31, 2024 .
Performance Compensation
Note: Blade discloses detailed plan design and outcomes for NEOs; CAO-specific awards/metrics are not separately disclosed. The following tables summarize the disclosed company framework and NEO outcomes to assess alignment context.
- 2024 Short-Term Incentive Plan (Company-wide design for NEOs)
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual 2024 | Payout vs. Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($) | 100,000 | 500,000 | 5,000,000 | 1,205,000 | 108% |
| Notes | 50% payout at threshold; straight-line to max above target | Achieved first positive Adjusted EBITDA | CEO/President/GC/CFO paid in early 2025 per 108% factor | ||
| Sources | |||||
- 2024 Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – long-term design for NEOs
| PSU Metric | Weighting | Performance period | Vesting mechanics | 2024 outcome snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (five hurdles) | 70% | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2027 | Measured quarterly on trailing four quarters; vest upon Comp Committee certification with continued service | First EBITDA hurdle certified Mar 6, 2025 → 20% vested for NEO grants |
| Free Cash Flow (defined measure) | 15% | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2027 | Same quarterly TTM framework | Not specifically disclosed as achieved in 2024 |
| EVA commercial milestone | 15% | Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2027 | If not achievable for exogenous reasons, reallocated proportionally to remaining unachieved measures as of end 2026 | Not disclosed as achieved |
| Sources |
- 2023 STIP Partial Equity Settlement: For NEOs, 20% of the 2023 cash bonus target was delivered as RSUs in March 2024 (vested ~3 weeks later) to conserve cash and align incentives; this illustrates compensation governance but is not disclosed for the CAO .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (individual) | Not disclosed for Mr. Cohen; the security ownership table lists directors and NEOs individually, plus “all directors and executive officers as a group,” but does not break out the CAO . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | CEO: 5x base salary; Other executive officers: 1x base salary; Directors: 5x maximum potential annual cash retainer . |
| Compliance status | As of Dec 31, 2024, none of the executive officers or non-employee directors were out of compliance with the guidelines . |
| Hedging/pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging; also prohibits margin purchases and borrowing against accounts holding Company stock . |
| Clawback | Board approved a clawback policy requiring recovery of certain incentive compensation from current or former executive officers upon a qualifying restatement, in line with SEC/Nasdaq rules . |
Insider transactions and vesting schedules specific to Mr. Cohen (Form 4 history, RSUs/options by grant, in-the-money values, pledged shares) were not disclosed in the proxy, and no individual Section 16 filings for Mr. Cohen surfaced in our document search; therefore, we cannot assess near-term insider selling pressure or specific vesting overhang for the CAO from these materials .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment terms | The proxy describes at-will employment and restrictive covenant agreements (confidentiality, 12-month non-compete and non-solicit) for named executive officers (NEOs). The CAO’s individual employment agreement terms are not described . |
| Severance/change-in-control (CIC) | Blade’s Change in Control Severance Plan applies to NEOs with specified multiples (CEO: 1.5x salary outside CIC/2x in CIC; other NEOs: 1x; plus health benefits, pro-rata target bonus in CIC, and acceleration of time-based equity). CAO participation is not disclosed . |
| PSU treatment on termination/CIC | For the 2024 PSU grants (NEOs): vesting upon certified achievement if termination occurs post-achievement pre-certification; 100% vesting if unassumed in a CIC while employed at closing; 100% vesting if assumed and then involuntary termination without Cause or for Good Reason. CAO-specific equity terms are not disclosed . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and governance: While CAO-specific compensation levels and grants are not disclosed, governance guardrails (clawback, strict anti-hedging/anti-pledging, stock ownership guidelines with full compliance) mitigate misalignment risk and reduce pledging/hedging concerns that can pressure stock or compromise alignment .
- Pay-for-performance architecture (as disclosed for NEOs): Heavy emphasis on profitability (Adjusted EBITDA) and cash generation (Free Cash Flow), plus an EVA milestone, aligns incentives with value creation and capital discipline; 2024 positive Adjusted EBITDA and STIP payout evidence that targets were set and measured rigorously .
- Data gaps: Absence of CAO-specific disclosures (base salary, target bonus, equity grants, vesting) limits precision on retention risk and insider selling pressure; additional Section 16 data (Form 4s) would be required to assess near-term selling overhang or accelerated vesting dynamics. Our search did not surface individual CAO Form 4s in these materials .
- Execution trajectory: The turn to positive Adjusted EBITDA in 2024 alongside the company’s pay design suggests strengthening operating discipline, but continued net losses and the reliance on multi-year PSU goals imply ongoing execution risk and the necessity of sustained performance to translate into durable shareholder returns .
Sources: Blade Air Mobility, Inc. 2025 DEF 14A (filed March 24, 2025), including Executive Officers, Executive Compensation, Pay vs. Performance, Stock Ownership, Insider Trading Policy, Stock Ownership Guidelines, Severance Plan and PSU terms .
Appendix: Key Company Performance References
- Adjusted EBITDA 2024: $1.205 million; improvement >$17 million vs. 2023; STIP payout 108% of target .
- Pay vs. Performance (2024): $100 investment → $118.72; Net loss: $(27.3) million .