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Sean Werner

Chief Technology Officer at BIOLIFE SOLUTIONSBIOLIFE SOLUTIONS
Executive

About Sean Werner

Sean Werner, age 51, is Chief Technology Officer at BioLife Solutions (BLFS) since November 2024, after serving as Senior Technology Officer, Life Sciences from September 2021 to November 2024 . He previously was President of Sexton Biotechnologies until its acquisition by BioLife, and held regulatory leadership roles at Cook Regentec and Cook Medical; he holds a BS in Biology (Indiana University), a PhD in Biology (Purdue University), and completed post-doctoral work at Indiana University School of Medicine and Eli Lilly . Company performance during his tenure transition includes 2024 revenue of $82.3 million (+8% year-over-year from $75.9 million) and adjusted EBITDA of $15.6 million (19% margin), with TSR for 2024 at 160.44 versus peer group TSR of 109.19 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
BioLife SolutionsSenior Technology Officer, Life SciencesSep 2021–Nov 2024Led technology initiatives supporting cell processing tools for CGT workflows
Sexton Biotechnologies (acquired by BioLife)PresidentOct 2019–Sep 2021Guided product development and commercialization of bioprocessing tools; company acquired by BLFS
Cook Regentec LLC (Cook Medical subsidiary)Director of Regulatory AffairsJan 2015–Sep 2021Directed pre-clinical/clinical testing and submission strategies leading to global commercialization of medical devices
Cook MedicalDirector of Regulatory Science, Cell TherapiesOct 2013–Oct 2019Supported autologous cell therapy and single-use disposables development programs

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Indiana University School of MedicinePost-doctoral researcherNot disclosedAdvanced biological research underpinning later device and bioprocessing commercialization
Eli Lilly and CompanyPost-doctoral researcherNot disclosedContributed to scientific programs relevant to regulatory and product development expertise

Fixed Compensation

  • Not disclosed: Werner is not among BioLife’s 2024 named executive officers, and his base salary, target bonus, and actual bonus are not reported in the proxy .
  • Company philosophy emphasizes competitiveness, pay-for-performance, and equity alignment; benchmarking targets around the 50th percentile of an industry peer group are used for NEOs .

Performance Compensation

Note: Werner’s specific participation and payouts are not disclosed. The company’s 2024 executive short-term incentive plan (applied to NEOs) was entirely tied to Company Objectives.

MetricWeighting (%)TargetActualPayout Determination
Revenue30$76 million $82 million Met maximum threshold ($81m+) → 39% of Target Award for this metric
Adjusted EBITDA Margin (excl. exec bonus)3013% of revenue 21% of revenue Met maximum threshold (16%+) → 39% of Target Award for this metric
Remediation of material weaknesses20Remediate all prior MW; no new MW Remediated prior MW; incurred one new MW 10% payout (partial)
NetSuite MRP module (Media line)20Implement on Media Not fully implemented 0% payout
  • Aggregate NEO payout was 88% of target for 2024 Company Objectives .
  • Long-term incentives for NEOs: 50% service-vesting RSUs and 50% market-based RSUs (TSR vs 20-company peer group), with typical vesting 25% at year 1 and remaining quarterly over three years; TSR awards earn 0–200% based on percentile (30th→80th) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: Werner is not enumerated in the June 23, 2025 beneficial ownership table; individual share count for him is not disclosed .
  • Hedging/pledging: Company policy prohibits executive hedging or pledging of BioLife securities (alignment positive; pledging red flag mitigated) .
  • Clawback: Incentive compensation (including awards linked to stock price and TSR) is subject to Dodd-Frank compliant clawback in the event of a financial restatement within the prior three fiscal years .
  • Equity program design: Emphasizes RSUs with service-based and market-based (TSR) conditions to align pay with long-term performance; TSR measured vs a defined peer set .

Employment Terms

  • Werner’s specific employment agreement is not disclosed; NEO agreements provide a framework indicating company practice:
    • Severance (without cause or for good reason): 12 months’ base salary, 12 months of COBRA premiums plus tax gross-up, and full vesting of all unvested equity awards .
    • Change-in-control protection (double-trigger for NEOs; CEO differs): 12 months’ salary (24 months for CEO), 100% of annual incentive opportunity for the year of change, 12 months of COBRA (24 months for CEO) plus tax gross-up, and full vesting of unvested equity awards upon termination within 12 months of a change in control .
    • Equity plan acceleration: 2023 Plan is double-trigger; 2013 Plan is single-trigger on change in control .
  • No excise tax gross-ups generally provided under Sections 280G/4999 and adherence to 409A requirements (shareholder-friendly) .
  • Insider trading policy: Formal policy governing transactions by directors, officers, employees, and consultants .
  • Pension and deferred comp: Company reports no defined benefit plans or nonqualified deferred compensation programs for NEOs; not indicated for Werner .

Investment Implications

  • Compensation-performance alignment: Executive incentives prioritize Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA margin, and TSR vs peers; equity is largely RSU-based with market conditions, supporting long-term value creation and alignment with shareholders .
  • Retention risk: While Werner’s individual contract terms and ownership are undisclosed, the company’s NEO severance/change-in-control framework (full equity vesting upon qualifying termination) may reduce turnover risk but could accelerate selling supply if awards vest under change-in-control scenarios .
  • Insider selling pressure: No Form 4 activity or beneficial ownership details are disclosed for Werner; absence of pledging combined with policy prohibitions reduces alignment concerns from hedging/pledging, but limited visibility constrains “skin-in-the-game” assessment .
  • Execution risk: 2024 showed strong operational improvement (revenue growth and 21% adjusted EBITDA margin excluding executive bonus), but IT implementation shortfall (NetSuite MRP) and a newly incurred material weakness temper the near-term control and systems quality assessment .
  • Governance signals: Say-on-pay support (82.4% for FY2023) and a clawback policy suggest constructive compensation governance; TSR outperformance vs peers in 2024 further supports performance-based orientation .